Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

The ongoing African Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI, is a promising solution to Africa's problems of conflict and unrest. The ACRI offers a way by which the U.S. and other countries can assist African nations in developing their capabilities to perform peacekeeping, crisis-response and humanitarian-relief missions.

The role of U.S. special-operations forces in the ACRI is critical. While SOF are not the only U.S. forces to contribute to the ACRI, they are the centerpiece around which the other forces operate. SOF soldiers teach all of the critical components of ACRI training — from individual skills to squad, platoon and company-level tasks; civil-military operations; and psychological operations.

If the ACRI offers promise as a way of dealing with unrest in Africa and other parts of the world, it also foreshadows a greater use of SOF in the U.S. policy of engagement. Dealing with a variety of conflicts may require that we examine closely the nature of those conflicts. In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Colonel Glenn Harned examines the relationship of insurgents to the populace, reasoning, "Nonstate conflict will remain the primary focus of our nation's special-operations forces for the foreseeable future, and it is time that we begin to explore their nature more systematically."

Hand-in-hand with a better understanding of what we do is an understanding of who we are. Colonel Mark Boyatt's article examines the concept of core ideology, specifically, the core ideology of Special Forces. SF core ideology is an important concept, and it will be a major topic of discussion at the 1999 SF conference.

In addition to defining who we are, we must also determine who will fill our ranks in the future. Faced with a demanding operations tempo and a downsizing Army, we are undertaking initiatives to improve Special Forces recruiting. This year, we have modified some of the prerequisites for enlisted soldiers to apply to Special Forces.

While our ultimate standards remain unaltered, the modified prerequisites will give more soldiers a chance to be assessed for SF. To inform soldiers about the challenges and rewards of serving in SF, we have produced an SF recruiting videotape.

In a recent letter to the commander of the Army Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General William Tangney, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer called the recruiting video "a motivating and stimulating tape that I know will inspire many young soldiers to want to wear the green beret." He added, " You and your organization are truly at the tip of the spear, and I applaud all you do for our great Nation and our great Army."

Our increased recruiting efforts are necessary because of today's smaller Army, and because of the increased demand that future operations will place upon the skills of SOF soldiers. If operations such as the ACRI are indicative of the future, SOF will remain, in General Reimer's words, "at the tip of the spear."

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Features

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The African Crisis Response Initiative: America's Engagement for Peace in Africa

by Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie

Photo by Bob McNeely

President and Mrs. Clinton, accompanied by Ghanaian President Jerry John Rawlings, examine Peace Corps exhibits in Accra, Ghana, during their 1998 visit.

President Bill Clinton's recent visit to Africa has generated a significant amount of public interest in the African Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI. As part of America's partnership with Africa, the ACRI deserves full description. At the same time, it is important that we see the ACRI in the broad view of multinational peacekeeping training that extends far beyond the capabilities of any one nation or group of nations.

The goal of the ACRI is to work in partnership with African countries to enhance their capacity to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner. The objective of the ACRI is to assist stable democratic countries in developing rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions and companies from forces who can work together to maintain peace on a continent that has too often been torn apart by civil strife. The ACRI's intent is neither to create a standing army in Africa nor to withdraw from Africa. As President Clinton has demonstrated, the United States intends to remain engaged on the African continent, working with its African partners to promote economic growth, democracy and stability.

The ACRI's effort is in keeping with the goal enunciated in the peacekeeping report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in November 1995. In that report, the secretary-general called for the international community to place more empha-

This article is adapted from Ambassador McCallie's speech to the Emerald Express Symposium, hosted by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton, Calif., April 8, 1998. — Editor

sis on helping African countries develop the capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to emergency situations on their continent. His request has since been repeated by numerous African leaders.

Many African countries have been conducting peacekeeping operations for years, not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world, under U.N. sponsorship. There have also been productive partnerships in peacekeeping training between African states and non-African states for a number of years. France has worked with its West African partners extensively. In March, France, along with its partners Senegal (the host nation), Mali and Mauritania, completed a successful peacekeeping exercise in West Africa. That exercise, called "Guidimakha," also involved smaller contingents from several other West African nations, as well as contingents from both the United Kingdom and the U.S. France has also agreed to assist Côte d'Ivoire in establishing a peacekeeping-training center.

The U.K., in partnership with Zimbabwe and Ghana, is supporting the development of centers of excellence, to include peacekeeping training. Denmark, in cooperation with the government of Zimbabwe, has placed a peacekeeping officer at the Zimbabwean staff college.

Africans themselves are addressing head-on the issue of peacekeeping and peacekeeping training. In April 1997, the government of Zimbabwe, assisted by the U.K., hosted a peacekeeping exercise involving troops from 10 southern African states. The Zimbabwean-led "Blue Hungwe" exercise provided a model for future peacekeeping exercises. Undoubtedly, South Africa will build upon Blue Hungwe's success while simultaneously working with other partners in the South African Development Community, or SADC, to develop "Blue Crane," a peacekeeping exercise scheduled for November 1998.

Peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West African States have been successful in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and peacekeeping units from West and central Africa have deployed to the Central African Republic during this past year. In east Africa, forces from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania conducted a successful peacekeeping exercise in June, with the support of the U.S. Central Command.

It is in this broader context of multinational peacekeeping training that we

Photo by Lemuel Casillas

A U.S. Air Force security policeman and two soldiers from Botswana provide airfield security in Mogadishu, Somalia, during Operation Restore Hope. Many African countries have been taking part in peacekeeping operations for years.

Photo by Paul R. Caron

Soldiers from the Economic Community of West African States prepare to deploy to Liberia in support of a peacekeeping mission.

should view the ACRI. The ACRI was first proposed in September 1996 in response to the fear that we might see an eruption of ethnic violence in the African great-lakes region comparable to the tragedy that occurred in Rwanda in 1994. Together with its partners in Africa and Europe, the U.S. government explored the idea of creating an African Crisis Response Force that could intervene to save lives in drastic humanitarian crises.

U.S. diplomatic teams visited numerous African and European capitals and consulted extensively with officials from both the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity, or OAU. "Don't create a force," the teams were told. "Create an interoperable capacity." The clear thinking behind this advice was that such a capacity could be deployed by the U.N., the OAU, or African subregional organizations. Units could also be deployed as part of a multinational-force arrangement. Such operations should in any case be conducted with the approval and the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council.

Quite appropriately, our African and non-African partners also advised that in any international training initiative, we should establish strong links with the OAU and the U.N. Interestingly, our European and African partners suggested that we narrow the gaps between the initiatives of France, the U.K. and the U.S., so that there would be no perception of competition in the peacekeeping arena. As a result of that advice and a good deal of diplomatic work, France, the U.K. and the U.S. arrived at an agreement in May 1997 to support a coordinated peacekeeping-training effort in Africa based upon long-term capacity enhancement, legitimacy, openness and transparency.

Some partners of the ACRI suggested that the ACRI consider whether to train and equip for peacekeeping operations or for the more challenging operations of peace-enforcement. Many conflicts in Africa require robust intervention forces, but U.N. military experts advised the ACRI to concentrate initially on peacekeeping and to emphasize training, not equipment. In developing a training curriculum that would be useful to African units for service in every part of the world (an important consideration), we drew heavily upon the peacekeeping doctrine and procedures of the U.N., the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-

ization, the U.S., the U.K., France and the Nordic countries. The resulting international peacekeeping doctrine is flexible and can incorporate useful additions. For instance, African countries with considerable peacekeeping experience will undoubtedly contribute to the developing curriculum: In Senegal, Special Forces trainers listened and learned from their Senegalese counterparts. That is as it should be — training is a two-way street.

In addition to common training being important, standard communications equipment is also important. With the advice and counsel of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the ACRI developed a communications package, including off-the-shelf radios with a frequency-adjustment capacity. This technology allows peacekeeping forces from different countries to communicate with one another, with their respective headquarters, and with the U.N. or other convening authority.

In approaching the task of developing an interoperable peacekeeping capacity, the ACRI must follow two tracks: training and consultation. In the area of training, the ACRI is working with several African partners to enhance the capacity of their military forces to perform peacekeeping operations and to respond to humanitarian crises.

Specifically, U.S. Special Forces are training with battalions from several African nations. Initial training, which includes 70 trainers for approximately 70 days, emphasizes basic soldier skills, working with refugees, operating with humanitarian organizations and observing human rights. The training places a strong emphasis on peacekeeping-specific skills and the protection of refugees. Several humanitarian organizations have participated in the training exercises.

Following the initial training, smaller teams of 20-30 trainers will return to the host nation every six months. They will participate in command-post exercises and conduct sustainment training that emphasizes logistics, battalion and brigade leadership, train-the-trainer skills, and the development of civil-military operations in humanitarian emergencies.

The ACRI has completed initial training in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali and Ghana. Later this year, the ACRI is scheduled to begin training with Benin and Côte d'Ivoire. Training for two battalions and a brigade headquarters in Ethiopia, originally scheduled for August, has been temporarily delayed. The ACRI looks forward to extending its cooperative relationship to many other African countries, but in the interest of maintaining the sovereignty of nations, the training relationship should be voluntary.

We are sometimes asked why the ACRI has begun bilateral training before the OAU or the international community has settled on a unified approach. The answer is twofold: First, crises continue to occur, and the ACRI and its training partners have deemed it wise to start preparing for such crises now. Second, none of the ACRI training precludes a broader African approach, whether at regional or subregional levels. It is prudent to begin strengthening African peacekeeping capacity and to allow cooperation and coordination to grow organically among nations.

African countries with considerable peacekeeping experience will undoubtedly contribute to the developing curriculum: In Senegal, Special Forces trainers listened and learned from their Senegalese counterparts. That is as it should be — training is a two-way street.

The ACRI has been actively exploring with other countries the means of generating greater confidence and cooperation in peacekeeping-training efforts. We recognize that the U.K., France and the U.S. together do not have sufficient resources to meet the needs of all our African partners. Therefore, it is important that a broad range of African and non-African states become involved in the multinational peacekeeping-enhancement process. U.N.

Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Bernard Miyet invited all interested member states to meet informally in New York Dec. 5, 1997, to discuss how best to coordinate mutual efforts. Sixty nations attended, and representatives of almost 30 delivered remarks. The meeting made significant progress, laying the foundation for broad international cooperation and for a successful follow-up meeting in May 1998.

Perhaps the question most often posed regarding the ACRI is, "Where is the command-and-control structure?" The ACRI is a training initiative. It is not an attempt to impose a command structure upon our African partners. While we are able to provide bilateral training — including command-and-staff training — and while we can work with our African partners to support regional and subregional training exercises, we recognize that Africans themselves must determine what the appropriate command-and-control structures will be. They will decide when and how to deploy their peacekeeping troops. And they will decide whether to work through continental or subregional organizations to establish standby command structures.

Recent comments by African leaders indicate that African nations, in cooperation with subregional organizations, the OAU and the U.N., will soon begin developing some form of standby or reserve command structures that will enable them to field the requisite units rapidly and effectively. Likewise, the international community will continue to be called upon to provide appropriate logistics and financial support for operations approved by the U.N. Security Council. The development of an increased peacekeeping capacity on the African continent will not absolve the international community of its responsibilities, but it will empower Africans to play a stronger role in responding to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges that threaten the peace and the welfare of their continent.

As we proceed with the ACRI training program, we shall continue to work with humanitarian organizations. In fact, we would like to institutionalize our links to these organizations, not only to draw upon their vast experience in humanitarian emergencies, but also to lay the groundwork for future cooperation between these organizations and ACRI-trained units.

Even as the ACRI seeks to increase its contact with humanitarian organizations,

U.S. Special Forces have already trained with ACRI battalions from several African nations. Initial training, which includes 70 trainers for approximately 70 days, emphasizes basic soldier skills.

Photo by Tom McCollum

it is working to broaden its contact with elected representatives in Congress and their professional staffs. We cannot overstate the importance of that relationship. It is critical for our funding, but it is also an important part of the workings of a representative democracy. We want Congress to understand our program and to know our African partners. An intelligent and cooperative policy toward security in Africa can be sustained only through an enhanced dialogue with Congress.

We do not expect that the ACRI or any combination of international training initiatives will address the complete range of Africa's problems in managing conflicts. That heavy burden falls more appropriately to the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. We do believe, however, that preparing for peacekeeping is an important step both in the creation of stability and in the promotion of an environment of safety and security. We also believe that the problem calls specifically for African leadership. With strong African leadership and willing and supportive external partners, the ACRI can make a significant difference on the African continent.

Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie is special coordinator for the U.S. African Crisis Response Initiative. Prior to his current assignment, he was diplomat-in-residence at the Ralph J. Bunce International Affairs Center at Howard University in Washington, D.C., where he did research on the development of civil society and conflict-resolution mechanisms in Africa. During his 23-year career with the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador McCallie has served as the U.S. Ambassador to Namibia (1993-96), deputy chief of mission at American embassies in Zambia (1988-90) and in South Africa (1990-93), political officer in Zaire, economic officer in the United Arab Emirates, political counselor in Liberia, and country-desk officer for Nigeria in the State Department. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Vanderbilt University and a master's degree in development studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

ACRI: Establishing a New African Paradigm

by Colonel David E. McCracken

In the late summer and fall of 1996, instability threatened the great-lakes region of east Africa. Fearing a repeat of the genocide that spread throughout Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton administration sought to find a way of averting crises instead of responding to them — an initiative that would let Africans keep the peace in Africa.

Through an interagency process, the U.S. developed the African Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI. The ACRI has established a new paradigm for Africa: multiechelon training activities — from individual skills through staff-level decision-making — are giving African nations the tools to meet the challenges of peacekeeping, or PK, and humanitarian-relief and to maintain respect for human rights and civil authority.

Each ACRI training event is a comprehensive activity that integrates military units; local civilians; and international and local organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental). The ACRI gives African nations a better capability of resolving a crisis scenario — whether it involves a natural disaster, an international peacekeeping operation or a humanitarian-assistance mission.

Assessment

As the lead agency for the ACRI, the Department of State, or DoS, set the priorities for the assessment and training schedules. DoS also evaluated countries on other critical criteria: respect for civilian authority; respect for human rights; and prior success in either a peacekeeping operation or a humanitarian-relief operation, or HUMRO — preferably within the African continent. After Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia and Uganda indicated an interest in receiving ACRI training, the ACRI sent out pilot teams to determine whether those countries' military forces were capable of participation. All seven countries were deemed capable.

The pilot teams also briefed each host nation and each U.S. country team on a proposed organization for each country's participating unit. The organization would normally consist of a battalion with a headquarters, three line companies and a combat-support company. Such an organization would permit the unit to sustain itself when deployed — self-sustainment was an issue with several of the nations that had prior African peacekeeping experience.

The pilot teams made no attempt to direct the task-organization of the nation's participation; in fact, each participating country has had its own variation. However, each country has concurred that an ACRI battalion needs its own civil-military staff function and an organic combat-support unit for self-sustainment.

Because the principal function of the ACRI is to conduct military training using

Photo by Brian Thomas

ACRI training prepares host-nation soldiers in 11 tasks, including marksmanship, that are considered critical for peacekeeping and humanitarian-assistance operations.

security-assistance funding from DoS appropriations, the Department of Defense, or DoD, tasked U.S. European Command, or EUCOM, to be the supported CINC for all military training.

Nations participating in the ACRI lay within the areas of responsibility, or AOR, of EUCOM, and the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, but because the preponderance of African countries are in the EUCOM AOR, DoD tasked the U.S. Special Operations Command to provide mobile training teams of Army Special Forces as the base force. The 3rd SF Group (the SF unit within EUCOM whose area of responsibility is Africa) was chosen to provide the pilot teams. When a pilot team assessed a CENTCOM country, however, the assessors included soldiers from the 5th SF Group, because the 5th Group would conduct the training. Pilot teams conducted their missions between December 1996 and April 1997.

While the pilot teams were conducting their assessments, a small team of officers, warrant officers and NCOs began developing a comprehensive program of instruction, or POI. Taking a collective approach to U.N., Nordic, British, French and U.S. peacekeeping doctrine, the POI team derived 11 critical tasks for the ACRI battalion. Included were U.N.-approved peacekeeping tasks and force-protection tasks that were essential in meeting the concerns voiced by African leaders who had prior PK and HUMRO experience. During pilot-team visits, these leaders had shown concern that, in HUMRO in particular, security conditions might break down.

After the POI received tentative approval from the commander of the 3rd SF Group, three members of the team — Major William T. Hager, Chief Warrant Officer James W. McLean (both from the 3rd SF Group) and Master Sergeant Richard D. Stephenson (from the 5th SF Group) visited the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit to solicit its concurrence on the POI. The

ACRI Notional Host-Nation Battalion



chief of the U.N. unit, Colonel Peter Leentjes of the Netherlands Army, endorsed the draft POI.

Organization

Each ACRI mobile training team, or MTT, consists of approximately 60 personnel, commanded by a U.S. Army Special Forces major. The MTT consists of a B-detachment (approximately 10 personnel); three A-detachments (normally nine or 10 of the authorized 12 men, commanded by a captain or a chief warrant officer); and one composite combat-support detachment (approximately 10 personnel, commanded by a logistics captain, who provide critical military skills, such as water purification, maintenance, supply, preventive medicine, transportation, military police, food service, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations). The combat-support detachment is normally composed of U.S. Army Forces Command personnel who are stationed throughout CONUS. The commander of the combat-support detachment serves as the ACRI battalion logistics officer's principal trainer and adviser. The entire detachment performs an invaluable task by improving the ACRI battalion's capacity to effect unit sustainment. The four training detachments are augmented by a combat-service-support detachment that has the mission of establishing the "bare base" training site. Up to now, these soldiers have been assigned to U.S. Army-Europe.

Equipment

The ACRI increases participants' existing capacity to conduct PK and HUMRO. One means to that objective is to establish command and control through common, effective communications. The U.N. communications section recommended small, lightweight, nonsecure, hand-held radios as the base communications item. Each participating country also receives high-

frequency radios to use in communicating with the next higher command. At least one satellite-communications radio is also provided as a means for making "fail safe" emergency calls. These three systems are interoperable among all ACRI participants, and the frequencies of the hand-held radios can be changed (using a laptop computer, which is also provided) to meet the demands of any operational mission.

Additional equipment items that are issued as part of the ACRI are portable water-purification systems and state-of-the-art, lightweight mine detectors for additional force protection. The ACRI also issues one uniform per soldier, complete with headgear, blouse and trousers, underwear, socks, boots. A standard-issue "kit," which includes suspenders, canteens, first-aid pouch and rucksack, is also issued to each soldier to ensure uniformity and to provide for fair wear and tear during training.

Training

ACRI training uses a multiechelon technique: Various activities, such as training in infantry functions and combat-service functions, are conducted concurrently throughout the 60-day initial-training program. These activities merge at the end of training, during the field-training exercise, or FTX.

The training begins with the inprocessing of each soldier and the issuing of all nonlethal equipment. During the inprocessing, each host-country soldier receives an eye exam, which is conducted by various U.S. military units, on a rotating basis, as tasked by either EUCOM or CENTCOM. Host-nation soldiers receive necessary corrective lenses either on the spot or within a few days. Having completed its work, the optometry team returns to duty in Europe or CONUS. For approximately 15 percent of the host-nation soldiers, eyeglasses enable them to see the world clearly for the first time. The exam and the eyeglasses serve a dual purpose: They provide "increased capacity," starting with the individual, to improve the ACRI battalion's professionalism, and they show the individual soldier that the ACRI places great value on his or her participation.

Training proceeds from individual skills, such as rifle marksmanship and land navigation, to squad, platoon and company-level tasks. Staff training uses the deliberate decision-making process, an effective technique for conducting mission analysis. Training employs the train-the-trainer concept, focusing on the officers and NCOs, who then lead their subordinates in practical exercises of the learned tasks.

Most of the participating units have not had extensive training in civil-military operations. During CMO training, U.S. officers and NCOs from the 4th Psychological Operations Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion work with their host-nation counterparts to develop a public-information campaign and to con-

Eye examinations are included in the initial processing for ACRI training. Eyeglasses provide 'increased capacity' to individual soldiers.

Photo by Brian Thomas

ACRI Training Concept



PURPOSE: Conduct a 60-day program of instruction on peacekeeping operations (ability to expand to 70 days for austere locations).

METHOD: Incorporate multiechelon training, culminating in a realistic battalion peacekeeping field-training exercise.

ENDSTATE: Produce a battalion capable of deploying to conduct peacekeeping operations and/or humanitarian-relief operations within the continent of Africa.

tact international and local-government organizations and agencies to ask if they will participate in the ACRI training. Usually, between five and 25 of these agencies participate in the FTX, the International Committee of the Red Cross being among the most active. That organization frequently provides additional training in international human rights and law of warfare besides what is included in the POI.

The comprehensive, realistic FTX is the hallmark of ACRI training. During initial training, the battalion from each participating country plans its own comprehensive FTX. By the time the FTX has been completed, each unit will have been evaluated on the 11 critical battalion collective tasks recognized in U.N. peacekeeping doctrine and identified in the POI.

Between 2,000 and 4,000 local civilians — from village elders to newborns — volunteer to serve as "displaced civilians" needed for realism in the FTX. Approximately $100,000 worth of medical supplies are provided to the host-nation medical platoon for its interaction with the displaced civilians. A U.S. military medical team — consisting of a medical doctor, a dentist, a veterinarian and three assistants — provides oversight of this training aspect.

The ACRI is an inclusive concept: The host nation contributes a unit of at least 600 soldiers to participate in the training; the U.S. provides trainers; the combined training assistance team, which includes U.S. and host-nation evaluators, observes and evaluates the FTX and provides a report to the participating nation. There may be other observers and participants from any nation that donates resources to the training event — Belgium, for example, had 15 personnel integrated into the training team in Ghana. Regional observers are individuals invited by the host nation to observe the training in order to ensure that the ACRI is understood within their respective region. Each ACRI initial-train-

ing event has had observers from five to 15 countries. More and more interest is also being shown by NGOs, IGOs and PVOs as they become aware of the ACRI training program.

Future

What is the future of the ACRI? How do we sustain this momentum? Congressional staff members have visited ACRI training events, and even the skeptics have recognized the value of the initiative and the keen interest shown among African nations. The ACRI has proposed four bilateral events for each participating country over the next three years, as well as two multilateral sustainment events designed to develop the capacities of staff planners at the combined-task-force and multinational-force levels. Funding of $15 million for fiscal year 1997 and $20 million for fiscal year 1998 are strong indicators of congressional support, but each year presents a new funding-approval challenge.

The ACRI is working. During the first series of sustainment exercises, conducted in Senegal, Malawi and Uganda six months after their initial training, each of those nations' soldiers demonstrated proficiency in critical company-level tasks. Moreover, all equipment was accounted for, and goals for the retention of trained personnel were met.

A limited investment in communications and force-protection equipment, coupled with the American style of training management, is paying huge dividends. Africans are being empowered with the tools to solve their own challenges in peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief operations. Soldiers from Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, working with the combat-support forces needed for infrastructure development, are forging a new African paradigm that is exciting in its potential.

Colonel David E. McCracken is chief of the Special Operations Division, J-33 Operations Directorate, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his previous assignment, he was commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group. Since graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course in April 1977, Colonel McCracken has served in numerous Special Forces assignments, including two assignments in Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group; two assignments in the Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group; and two assignments in the National Capitol Region. He is co-author of a Harvard University national-security-policy analysis paper, Roads to New Strength: Preparing Leaders for Military Operations Other Than War.

Civil Affairs in Support of the African Crisis Response Initiative

by Major Bill Butcher

In July 1997, a tactical support team from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed from Fort Bragg, N.C., to Senegal as part of the African Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI.

ACRI training is designed in accordance with United Nations standards. Military units from participating countries throughout Africa undergo ACRI training to enhance their capability to conduct peacekeeping operations, or PKO, and humanitarian-relief operations, or HUMRO. When called upon, ACRI-trained soldiers will conduct operations under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council in coordination with the Organization of African Unity, or OAU, and other appropriate subregional international governmental organizations, or IGOs.

Senegal and Uganda were the first two countries to receive training as part of the ACRI. During the training in Senegal, approximately 60 U.S. Army soldiers, including one Special Forces B-detachment headquarters, three Special Forces A-detachments, support soldiers from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Support Command, and the team from the 96th CA Battalion — CA Tactical Support Team 43 — trained nearly 800 Senegalese soldiers in all facets of peacekeeping.

CATST 43's 60-day mission was to train members of a newly established Senegalese CA team to conduct civil-military operations, or CMO, in order to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of a prospective host-nation populace. The CA soldiers conducted a three-phase training program. The first phase taught the Senegalese soldiers the basics of CMO; the second phase acquainted the Senegalese soldiers with various relief agencies; and the third phase tested them with practical and field-training exercises in which the Senegalese demonstrated the application of various CMO concepts.

First phase

The first phase of CMO training lasted 15 days. During this phase, the U.S. instructors introduced the five activities of CMO: populace and resources control, or PRC; foreign-nation support, or FNS; military civic action, or MCA; humanitarian assistance, or HA; and civil defense, or CD. Because the African nations participating in the ACRI training lacked the resources for conducting FNS, HA and CD, those activities were introduced but not exercised.

The PRC training sessions focused on operations involving dislocated civilians, or DCs. Particular emphasis was placed on protecting civilians in a post-conflict environment. According to the U.N. charter, a Chapter Six peacekeeping operation requires that all parties in a conflict agree to military intervention by a neutral party. In this type of permissive environment, CA teams would be tasked to consolidate masses of DCs, provide relief for human

Photo by Brian Thomas

A U.S. soldier from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion trains members of the Senegalese CA team in conducting civil-military operations.

suffering, prevent the outbreak of disease, and protect persons from harm.

The MCA training sessions demonstrated how a military contingent with limited resources can provide assistance to a host nation. When properly planned and well-executed, MCA projects can help win the local population's support for government and military objectives. During peacekeeping operations, health-care and public-works projects are the ones considered to be most helpful to the indigenous populace.

The Senegalese ACRI battalion included a medical platoon — consisting of 25 medics, a surgeon, a general practitioner, a pharmacist and a dentist — and an engineer platoon — consisting of a light-construction squad and two combat-engineer squads. With the help of local NGOs and IGOs, the Senegalese battalion achieved a good relationship with the local populace, particularly during the field-training exercise, or FTX, conducted during the third phase of the ACRI training mission.

The first phase ended with a 72-hour exercise in operational-area assessment. Exercise scenarios simulated the movement of DCs; the establishment of civilian collection points; and the location, construction and operation of DC camps. The Senegalese CA team quickly grasped the concepts that were presented and effectively solved the hypothetical situations.

Second phase

During the second phase, the U.S. CA team introduced their Senegalese counterparts to nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and international relief agencies that could assist the Senegalese in their peacekeeping/humanitarian-relief operations. With the assistance of the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, and her NGO/IGO coordinator, the U.S. CA team was able to establish relationships with various umbrella organizations and with organizations such as the U.N. High Commission on Refugees, the Christian Children's Fund, the International Red Cross, and AFRICARE. CATST 43 also formed a relationship with the local Peace Corps, TOSTAN (an organization focused primarily on the literacy of women), World Vision and local Senegalese private voluntary organizations, or PVOs.

To enhance the relationship between the Senegalese and the NGO/IGOs in-country, the U.S. CA team invited representatives from numerous American and Senegalese agencies to visit the ACRI training site. This meeting gave the U.S. soldiers an

opportunity to inform the agencies of the purpose of ACRI and to invite them to participate in the training of the Senegalese CA team. Representatives from the participating agencies dined in the field mess hall and received an introduction to the civil-military operations center, or CMOC. The representatives, in turn, briefed the soldiers on their own agency's mission and capabilities, and they discussed the operation of dislocated civilian camps. At the end of the visit, all the organizations were invited back to participate in the third-phase FTX by conducting operations within the CMOC.

Third phase

The ACRI training mission's third phase was an FTX during which the Senegalese battalion was tasked to conduct a peacekeeping operation in the notional country of Camcit (Central African Mythical Country in Turmoil). The task force-sized exercise was similar to exercises conducted in the U.S. at the Joint Readiness Training Center and at the National Training Center. The exercise was conducted in a cluster of villages near Thies, and village residents participated as role players. The main village of the community, Fandene, served as the temporary location for the battalion command post and for the CMOC.

Upon notification, the Senegalese civil-military operations officer deployed his CA team to the village of Fandene and set up a CMOC. From that location, the Senegalese CA team coordinated and organized a medical- and dental-assistance exercise that subsequently provided treatment to more than 1,000 villagers. The Senegalese CA team also repaired a six-kilometer section of road and constructed an African kitchen and a covered marketplace. The Senegalese CA team also cared for dislocated civilians and coordinated convoy security for numerous humanitarian-aid convoys.

Lessons learned

Every mission has lessons learned that can be applied in the future. If given the opportunity to conduct the mission in Senegal again, the members of CATST 43 would better prepare the Senegalese S5 during the mission-planning concept; they would create language-specific scenarios; and they would coordinate efforts to gain the cooperation of an entire village to serve as dislocated civilians.

Had the staff-planning and the resourcing phases of the training been conducted earlier in the rotation, they would have

As part of its CMO training, the Senegalese CA team constructed a covered marketplace.

Photo by Bill Butcher

been more effective. The staff training was conducted one week prior to the FTX. Unfortunately, this did not allow sufficient time for the staff to perform any practical exercises prior to the FTX. The support aspects of the FTX should have integrated the Senegalese S1, S3 and S4 in the training and resource meetings, beginning with the first phase. Instead, the U.S. soldiers conducted the planning, resourcing and preparation for all phases of the training and allowed the Senegalese battalion to execute those operations only during the FTX.

Although many of the Senegalese officers and NCOs had a good understanding of English, their official language is French. Unfortunately, our short-notice deployment to Senegal precluded our translating the slides or practical exercises into French. The Senegalese might have had a better understanding of CMO if the information had been presented in French or Wolof. Soldiers who deploy into non-English speaking countries in the future should ensure that all necessary information has been translated prior to their deployment.

Conducting dislocated-civilian activity during the FTX was absolutely essential. If called upon by the U.N. to perform a peacekeeping mission, Senegalese soldiers will undoubtedly be required to control and protect dislocated civilians. They must also be prepared to conduct basic humanitarian-relief operations, in concert with other agencies. The DC scenarios in the FTX did not properly replicate the minimum number of expected DCs. Future training missions of this type should test the ACRI battalions by involving entire villages for day-long DC training exercises. In exchange, ACRI battalions could compensate the villages by performing small MCA projects. Moreover, such missions would allow the Senegalese to experience some of the overwhelming anxiety that they will encounter in a real situation.

The most valuable lesson we learned in Senegal is that Senegalese soldiers, if given the proper resources, are capable of serving as effective and professional peacekeepers not only on the African continent, but throughout the world. The ACRI in Senegal proved to be an effective means of training. Senegalese peacekeepers learned how to respond to a crisis situation or a natural disaster, and they learned how to protect the lives of civilians while simultaneously rebuilding a shattered society.

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Getting the Word Out: The Role of PSYOP in the ACRI

by Captain Mark T. Alexander

In October 1996, in the hope of developing an African force capable of responding to crisis situations in time to prevent tragedies, the United States initiated the African Crisis Response Initiative, or ACRI. The ACRI's mission is to "enhance existing capabilities of selected African militaries to enable their greater, and more effective, participation in either limited humanitarian relief or peacekeeping operations."[1]

Recent deployments of U.S. peacekeeping forces to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia have emphasized the need for psychological operations, or PSYOP, to play an integral role in peacekeeping operations, or PKO, and humanitarian-relief operations, or HUMRO. PSYOP can induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Success in a PKO depends on convincing all sides to agree with, and to implement, the terms of the peace plan. Success in a HUMRO depends on informing the populace of when and where to seek aid and in convincing the populace to use designated safe routes and sites in obtaining that aid. It is these types of missions that the ACRI was designed to perform, and PSYOP can be critical to the ACRI's success. Recognizing that fact, the U.S. European Command, or USEUCOM, included PSYOP as part of the ACRI training package.

ACRI is a five-year program, with $15 million allocated for the first year, and $20 million per year for the second and third years. USEUCOM is the executive agent for the development of the military aspects. The U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and the U.S. Transportation Command serve as supporting CINCs.

U.S. Forces conducting ACRI training work under the operational control of the Special Operations Command-Europe, or SOCEUR. Soldiers from the 3rd and 5th Special Forces groups conduct the training, supported by personnel from various units and services, including the 4th PSYOP Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. ACRI training is coordinated with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or UNDPKO. UNDPKO, however, is neither manned nor financed to conduct ACRI and does not control international bilateral training initiatives such as ACRI.[2]

The goal of ACRI is to provide limited equipment and unit-level training to 10-12 infantry battalions and 4-6 specialized companies. Participation is intended for "countries with professional military units which meet the following standards: acceptance of democratic civilian authority; respect for human rights; participation in prior peacekeeping operations or a demonstrated interest in engaging in peacekeeping activities; and a relatively high level of basic military proficiency."[3]

As part of the ACRI training package,

Photo by Dave Bartram

ACRI training is designed to teach not only small-unit tactics and marksmanship, but also convoy and checkpoint operations, civil-military operations, and PSYOP.

host-nation soldiers receive training in basic rifle marksmanship; land navigation; first aid; small-unit tactics; convoy operations; checkpoint operations; coordinating with nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and private volunteer organizations, or PVOs; handling VIPs and the media; conducting civil-military operations, or CMO; and conducting PSYOP. The eight-week training culminates in an externally evaluated, field training exercise, or FTX. Small teams of trainers return to the country approximately every six months to conduct sustainment training and command-post exercises, or CPXs.

The PSYOP portion of ACRI training typically consists of nine classes:

- Employing a PSYOP team.
- Conducting staff coordination.
- Preparing a PSYOP annex.
- Preparing tactical PSYOP products.
- Disseminating PSYOP products (print, audio, audio-visual).
- Conducting face-to-face PSYOP.
- Deploying to the area of operations.
- Conducting tactical PSYOP assessment operations.
- Operating in a combat environment.

By May 1998, initial training had been completed in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi and Mali. To date, more than 2,000 African troops have been trained. Colonel Meissa Tamba, the information director of Senegal's Defense Ministry, said, "It's increasingly clear that peacekeeping in Africa is becoming the responsibility of Africans. This kind of training will make us better prepared to carry it out."[4]

Senegal

Senegal was the first nation to receive training under the ACRI. That training mission, conducted from July 12 to Sept. 27, 1997, was led by Company A, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and involved 60 U.S. trainers, an 800-man Senegalese infantry battalion, military observers from nine other African and European nations, NGOs and PVOs, and approximately 10,000 Senegalese civilians. PSYOP training was conducted by Sergeant First Class Dave Bartram of the 6th PSYOP Battalion. Bartram emphasized the need to publicize to the local populace the purpose of ACRI training. During the FTX portion of training, the U.S. PSYOP team, the host nation's Ministry of Information and the PSYOP trainees conducted a combined information campaign using two U.S. portable loudspeaker systems. The two systems were the minimum necessary for the training. In an actual PKO or HUMRO, the Senegalese would have needed vehicle-mounted systems.

Uganda

Simultaneous to the ACRI training in Senegal, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, was conducting training with a 750-man battalion in Uganda. Staff Sergeant David Born from Company A, 9th PSYOP Battalion, trained 25 NCOs from the Ugan-

dan battalion's political and intelligence sections. While the LSS-40 portable loudspeaker system that Born brought with him assisted immensely in the training and in the FTX, the ACRI did not provide the Ugandans with a system of their own. (Uganda does, however, have a military print facility in Kampala that could be used to produce PSYOP print products).

Malawi

Malawi, which already had PKO experience in Mozambique and Rwanda, received ACRI training from September to November 1997. PSYOP soldiers from Company C, 9th PSYOP Battalion, trained soldiers from the Malawian battalion's S5 section. Lumping PSYOP and Civil Affairs (S5) together can result in conflicts between Civil Affairs and PSYOP missions. Using the lessons learned from Senegal and Uganda, the PSYOP team prepared a briefing for the battalion staff on the purposes, effects, capabilities and employment of tactical PSYOP. The Malawian staff was then able to more effectively employ PSYOP in the FTX. Using bullhorns and Company C's LSS-40B, the Malawian PSYOP team informed local villagers and encouraged them not to interfere with the training exercise.

Mali

The most recent iteration of ACRI training took place in Mali from January through April of 1998. Accompanying soldiers from Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, PSYOP trainers from Company A, 9th PSYOP Battalion, trained 18 officers from a Malian battalion. The Malian officers later developed a program to convey the purpose of the FTX to the local populace. They also developed and implemented a PSYOP campaign that contributed to the visibility and the success of a medical refugee-assistance scenario, or MEDRATES. The medical program immunized approximately 12,000 Malians against meningitis, provided medical and dental care to some 2,000 Malians, and provided veterinary care to more than 1,500 animals.

Response to the ACRI missions has been extremely positive. While the ACRI may not be the only answer to Africa's problems, it is an important step in creating a solution.

The current ACRI proposal calls for four events per participating country over a three-year period, and two additional sustainment events that will prepare staff planners for involvement in combined task forces and multinational task forces.

Lessons learned

Although PSYOP has played an effective role in the ACRI, it has too often been a last-minute inclusion. Including PSYOP members in the initial site surveys would allow them to identify the PSYOP trainees early on and to prepare an appropriate training plan. In addition, including PSYOP-specific equipment as part of the nonlethal equipment donation to the host

Photo by Dave Bartram

Members of the Senegalese PSYOP team conducted a combined information campaign with the U.S. PSYOP team and the Senegalese Ministry of Information.

nation would enhance not only that nation's training, but also its ability to accomplish the ACRI mission. The importance of PSYOP to the success of peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief operations cannot be overemphasized. From convincing opposing sides that accepting the peace plan is in the interest of all, to publicizing the appearance and dangers of mines, to informing people where they can receive the necessities of life, PSYOP is an essential component of any such operation. As the ACRI moves into its subsequent phases, including PSYOP as a full-fledged member of the mission will help ensure ACRI's continued success.

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Notes:

[1] ACRI concept briefing by the U.S. European Command, November 1997.

[2] ACRI concept briefing given by U.S. European Command J5, Lieutenant Colonel Nunn, 16 April 1998.

[3] Nunn briefing.

[4] Judith Matloff, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Aug 1997.

Africa: New Realities and U.S. Policy

by Ambassador David Passage

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the death of the Soviet Bear, and the effective termination of the long, cold standoff between nuclear-tipped superpowers have brought the United States to the point where perhaps we can now see Africa through eyes unobstructed by the complications of global geostrategic conflict, unencumbered by weepy sentimentality, and undeterred and undaunted by the multitude of obvious problems of that stumbling continent.

Many contemporary analysts and observers begin their comments about Africa with remarks such as, "Now that the Cold War is over, Africa can assume its rightful place in America's constellation of priorities" — the clear presumption being that Africa belongs at the bottom of such a rank-ordering of America's foreign interests.

The classic American predisposition to "rank" its interests, and therefore its priorities, may, in fact, tell us more about ourselves than it tells us about Africa or what our national interests there really are.

Any reasonable prioritizing of U.S. interests in Europe (that is, among the members of the NATO alliance — the most important security commitment that the U.S. has) would logically place the smaller countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Nordic countries, Iceland, and maybe Portugal) toward the lower end of the scale. But the U.S. has, in fact, significant interests in all of them — national-security interests; political, economic, financial and commercial interests; as well as historical, cultural and "people" interests.

The importance of Britain, France or Germany — or Russia, China or Japan — will drive decisions made by policy-makers in Washington. But the strength of American feelings about the less tangible aspects of our relationships with foreign countries and their peoples has the capacity to elevate those relationships to a level approaching the level of our relationships with our largest and most important "global" partners.

An apt illustration is the U.S. relationship with the Baltic countries — Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. American sympathy led to our maintaining full diplomatic relations (and corresponding physical diplomatic establishments) in the U.S. for more than 50 years of their enslavement to Nazi Germany and then Soviet Russia. Another illustration is the U.S. relationship with Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The strength of these relationships is

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Photo by Tom McCollum

The U.S. has real interests in Africa, not the least of which is a "people" interest: a large percentage of Americans trace their ancestry to African countries.

more closely related to the sizes of ethnic communities in Minnesota than to the dollars-and-cents value of U.S. trade with those countries.

U.S. relations with Africa

All of this by way of introducing U.S. relations with Africa. Just as Luxembourgers would be offended if told they were near the bottom of a rank-ordered list of European countries' importance to the U.S., so, too, would — and should — Africans be offended if told that their countries and their continent ranked at the bottom of a list of U.S. priorities.

The simple fact is that the U.S. has real interests in most countries of the world, and although some of these countries may command greater or lesser interest than others, they need to be dealt with on their own merits and in their own context, not on the basis of our national propensity to rank things. This is particularly true of our relations with Africa.

Fundamental to the nature of relationships between countries is the strength of their historical and cultural ties; the importance of their economic and commercial relationships; and the similarity of their political and policy interests.

It is unthinkable that the U.S. would turn its back either on Latin America, given the large and growing Hispanic minority in the U.S., or on Asia, when somewhere between 10 and 12 percent of our population traces its origins to China, Japan, Korea or, increasingly, to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and elsewhere in the Far East. Likewise, the U.S. is not about to turn its back on Africa, a continent from which a hefty percentage of our own citizens trace their ancestry. If I, descended from French Huguenots, can be proud of my European forebears, why cannot my fellow Americans be equally proud of a heritage that springs from Senegal, the Gambia, Ghana or Nigeria?

If that seems overly sentimentalist, perhaps we should take a more purely economic or commercial approach: How many Americans could identify the principal foreign suppliers of petroleum to the U.S.? A handful might correctly guess Mexico, but would they realize that immediately following Mexico and Venezuela are at least five African countries: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo and Cameroon? Our sur-

prise at learning that the U.S. obtains a significant amount of oil from Africa tells us more about our own ignorance than we may wish to know.

We need not, and probably could not, list the full range of metals, minerals, other natural resources — or the full range of U.S. exports (vehicles, machinery, aircraft, foodstuffs, consumer products) that we sell in Africa. Professional economists and Africanists have amply described these elsewhere, and they are not the point of this paper — policy is. The bottom line with respect to U.S. economic and commercial interests in Africa is that there is a substantial market for U.S. goods and services there, but it is one for which we will have to compete with Europeans, Asians and, increasingly, Latin Americans. The U.S. has an interest in building and strengthening our economic and commercial ties to Africa, for many others are waiting to take advantage wherever we fail to compete.

Africa/U.S. political relationship

Finally, the nature of the political relationship. For the better part of the 35-plus years of its post-colonial experience, Africa was the victim of (and victimized itself by) the East-West conflict — the clash of carnivorous ideologies.

The U.S. sought to enlist as many African countries as it could in its global confrontation with Soviet communism. The USSR and the Peoples Republic of China went head-to-head against the West in the competition for African political support and commercial markets. Africans, repeatedly offended by overbearing and sometimes even oafish European business and occasionally government pooh-bahs who painstakingly and frequently painfully reminded Africans of their continuing dependence on the former metropolitan powers, opted in the main for "nonalignment." With a handful of exceptions like Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and some co-opted leaders of key former French colonies, all the main spokesmen for African aspirations were socialists like Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea's Sekou Toure, Zambia's Kenneth David Kaunda, and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere. France's efforts to build a Francophone community (largely by unembarrassedly retaining a tight grip on its former West African colonies' finances) yielded fruit with such African statesmen as Senegal's Leopold Senghor (and, latterly, Abdou Diouf), Ivory Coast's/Côte d'Ivoire's Felix Houphouet-Boigny, and Congo's Denis Sassou-Nguesso (since oust-

MSG Thomas Nelson of the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, checks troops from Ghana at an airport outside Monrovia, Liberia, during Operation Assured Lift.

Photo by Paul R. Caron

ed as a result of a democratic election he himself called).

But by and large, Africa and Africans slid slowly down a socialist slope into a morass of hopelessly inefficient, irretrievably uneconomic, and unredeemably corrupt state-run enterprise that squandered decades of production and hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of resources. These resources are lost forever. Their loss has impoverished African countries in a way that will take decades to repair, and it has alienated (and, in many cases, driven out of Africa altogether) an entire generation of educated technocrats who could have built the promise of Africa and translated its potential into hope for its people.

There is not much merit in discussing the whys and the wherefores of this dreary 35-year history other than to note that there is ample blame to go around. Recriminations are easy to hurl, but are generally profitless. Our interest lies with the future, not the past.

Dictators, murderers, thugs

One further bit of unhappy exhumation is probably necessary to focus the debate over how the outside world (and, specifically, the U.S.) should best work with Africa to build a new future, and that is to review one of the more troubling aspects of the history of U.S. policy toward that continent — our choice of African "partners" during the Cold War.

Senator Jesse Helms has said on frequent occasions that he considers U.S. foreign aid to be "money poured down a rathole." Let us look at this in the African context. From the close of the colonial epoch (in the early 1960s) to the end of communist competition with the West on that continent (in the late 1980s), nearly 85 percent of all U.S. economic and security assistance in Africa went to just seven countries: Liberia, Chad, Sudan (before Bashir overthrew al-Mahdi in 1989), Ethiopia (before Mengistu overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974), Somalia (after Siad Barre flip-flopped to the West in 1977 when the USSR switched its support to Mengistu's Ethiopia), Kenya, and Zaire. Except for Kenya (with whose government we are barely on speaking terms because of human-rights abuses), this dreary lineup includes a fair number of countries that would qualify, by any reasonable standard, for Senator Helms' description!

Although the U.S. achieved some transitory advantage in terms of its Cold War standoff with the USSR (and I share with others some responsibility for the policy decisions that led to such U.S. involvement with this dismal assortment of dictators, thugs and murderers), it is hard to see that Africa or Africans gained much by the association (although their rulers certainly did). In Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Zaire, the U.S. has absolutely nothing to show for the several billions of dollars it provided in economic aid and military assistance over a nearly three-decade period (although Ethiopia, without Mengistu, is now staging something of a comeback).

Liberia and Somalia do not even exist as 'countries' any more — countries defined as territories governed by an acknowledged sovereign authority. Their military forces, once disciplined institutions trained and largely equipped by the U.S., have disintegrated.

Liberia and Somalia do not even exist as "countries" any more — countries defined as territories governed by an acknowledged sovereign authority. Their military forces, once disciplined institutions trained and largely equipped by the U.S., have disintegrated. Virtually nothing that America helped build in Sudan, and little that it provided to pre-Mengistu Ethiopia, still exists. Zaire is an archetype (on a continent with a surfeit of such archetypes) of a "failed" state, and the U.S. finally had to administer the coup de grace to Zaire's leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, who it literally wined and dined and otherwise supported for so many years, and whose military the U.S. helped school and arm. Chad was of interest to the U.S. because of its northern neighbor, Libya. Today, Washington is a

severe and outspoken critic of the Kenyan government's repressive human-rights practices.

To be sure, the U.S. was afforded access to Liberia's international airport for many years until the frequency and the certainty of highway roadblocks and robberies by Liberia's armed forces, which we had largely trained and armed, finally led even the U.S. Air Force to retreat to Dakar and Abidjan. No one recalls the last time the U.S. Navy actually wanted to use voluntarily the port of Buchanan; and no U.S. ambassador who was allegedly dependent on the U.S. telecommunications relay station outside Monrovia noticed any diminution in his or her message traffic when Liberian armed forces occupied and trashed the station's grounds and equipment. Did we lie to ourselves about the oft-reasserted importance of our facilities transcending the brutality and corruption of the "sergeant to major general with nary a skid mark" Sammy Doe? It is difficult not to answer "yes."

Far more foreign exchange flows out of Africa each year into European, Asian and American banks than is given to Africa by all foreign-assistance programs from all foreign sources combined! Africa is being robbed blind by its leaders, even as they noisily demand more foreign aid as a moral obligation from the First World.

Chad allowed the U.S. to kick sand into Colonel Gaddafi's eyes; from a Zairian airfield, the U.S. supported a faction in Angola's civil war; and Kenya was willing to allow the U.S. to use two of its major international airfields and the port of Mombasa to stage a variety of military, humanitarian and international peace operations in East Africa and in the Horn. This has dampened any U.S. willingness to be more sharply critical of Kenya's authoritarian domestic policies.

Yet other than these questionable 'gains' for U.S. strategic interests, the U.S. has little to show for the substantial resources it invested in Africa during the 35-plus years since the major colonial powers took their leave.

African 'Marshall Plan'?

It is frequently asserted by African leaders and Africa's friends in the outside world that there is a need for a "Marshall Plan for Africa" — a substantial transfer of financial resources, accompanied by technical assistance, to that continent to assist it in arresting a several-decades-long slump in economic growth.

Yet, Africa is one of the richest continents on this planet. Its main problem is that its investment in its own economic development is almost trivial in comparison to (or as a percentage of) its hard currency earnings. What Africa needs is not more foreign aid (which generally means more crippling foreign debt). The answer lies in its leadership's (both official and private-sector) ceasing to steal so much of it. Far more foreign exchange flows out of Africa each year into European, Asian and American banks than is given to Africa by all foreign-assistance programs from all foreign sources combined! Africa is being robbed blind by its leaders, even as they noisily demand more foreign aid as a moral obligation from the First World.

Corruption has flourished to such a degree in one of the continent's potentially richest countries — Nigeria — that it literally threatens to throttle the military regime that rules that pitiable country. A simple examination of Nigeria's development over the past 25 years will establish beyond doubt that most of Nigeria's oil revenues either have vanished into foreign bank accounts or have been spent on projects now in advanced stages of physical disintegration. Through malfeasance and neglect, whole highway projects, state universities, industrial and manufacturing facilities, government buildings, schools, infrastructure and other construction are crumbling into the sand and mud in which they began.

The oil that funded this spending is now gone. Nigerians will never again see their

A Somali clan representative hands out work passes to clan members who have been granted permission to work on Sword Base in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Photo by G.D. Robinson

oil or the revenues it produced. These cannot be recovered. Nigeria now has that much less oil and little to show for it other than growing squalor and disintegrating infrastructure that was poorly built and not-at-all maintained.

Nigeria is not a unique example, although it is a highly visible one. Country after country in Africa has ended up — three decades after independence — demonstrably poorer than it was when colonial powers packed their bags and retreated to Europe. Theft and corruption have taken the greatest toll; running neck and neck with them are ill-conceived and misbegotten economic and social policies. We can never calculate, nor easily repair, the damage done by a generation of lunatic socialist philosophies and other nostrums perpetrated by high-minded and sanctimonious European and American social and economic planners.

And finally, explosive population growth, abetted by African politicians who argued that the West's interest in curbing Africa's birthrate was economic "racism," will now guarantee that widespread poverty will remain the rule rather than the exception for at least the next several generations. Africans, like everyone else, can have as many children as they wish. And like everyone else, all they have to do is feed them, clothe them, house them, educate them, care for them, and provide jobs for them.

Africa does not need a Marshall Plan to infuse additional capital. It needs to begin using its own ample earnings for its own economic development, and its own common sense for the development of its societies.

Arbitrary borders

Africa suffers from almost too many crippling problems for us to comprehensively enumerate them here. But in addition to being victimized by a third of a century's worth of superpower rivalry and its own overweening corruption, Africa has further crippled itself by its fealty to the sanctity of its colonial-era borders. Largely on the grounds that "national boundaries" were a Pandora's box not to be tampered with, African governments have sought (and have fought) to keep opposing tribes together within national borders that can only be described as whimsical, arbitrary and capricious.

It is hard to imagine peace returning to Sudan so long as Khartoum is determined to keep together a country — itself the creation of late 19th-century London's fertile imagination — consisting of [white] Muslim Arabs and [black] Christian/animist Africans. Arguably, Sudan is less a country than simply a race war. Is it worth continuing the calamitous killing of innocent civilians (both Ovimbundu and Kimbundu) in Angola just to try to hold together another whimsical, arbitrary and capricious late

19th-century European geographic confection? It may, in the end, not be altogether fair to blame the strife between the MPLA and UNITA on Jonas Savimbi's bloody-mindedness — or that in KwaZulu on Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's seeming megalomania — but just how far would national disintegration go in Africa if the lid were removed from this Pandoran tinderbox? Would it matter if there were some rather extensive redrawing of boundaries within and among existing states? The economic and political viability of African states is something for Africans, not outsiders, to determine. But if the alternative is continued bloodletting occasioned by trying to persuade obviously (and sometimes viciously) nonconsenting adults to commit an unnatural act (i.e., to live peacefully together like good Christians), the fragmentation of existing national structures may be preferable, and certainly more humane.

Photo by Jeffrey B. Allen

Refugees gather around a well in Bidoa, Somalia, to get water for washing and drinking. The well was drilled by the Indian Army.

'Viability' of states

Far too much importance has been attached to the concept of the "viability" of states, or, more precisely, the nonviability of mini-states. Luxembourg is not a viable state. Neither is Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands or Belgium. All of these countries are viable only insofar as their arrangements with their neighbors allow them to be. Doubtless, the individual clan districts of Somalia (much like the national tribal homelands of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are economically (and possibly politically as well) nonviable. However, that is a conclusion for the clans to reach themselves, much as it was for the leaders of the Tswana, Sotho and Swazi peoples, and then to make necessary accommodations with appropriate neighbors to ensure national survival and well-being.

If Africa fragments into dozens of additional ethnically based mini-states, and if Africans subsequently conclude that their national units are not viable, let Africans put together new national agglomerations on the basis of their own perceptions of tribal interest, ethnic interest and national self-interest. Too many Africans have died because African leaders (and their mutual self-esteem society, the Organization for African Unity) have been unwilling to open the Pandora's box of sacred, inherited colonial borders.

Policy prescriptions

An article this short cannot comprehensively catalog all the things that need to be accomplished to help Africa "get well," but it might suggest some steps the U.S. could take toward a policy for Africa in the post-Cold War world.

Humanitarian assistance

First, let's throw out the conventional wisdom that, in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. can afford to turn its back on Africa and on Africa's problems — either because of the irrelevance of those problems to our global strategic interests or because of the demonstrated difficulty (Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, etc.) in helping them. But it is a mistake for outsiders to become bogged down in all the "basket cases," just because they may be emotionally touching. Some problems simply are not are amenable to resolution by, with, or at the insistence of, outsiders. Ensuing demonstrations of impotence weaken the will of outsiders, and the will of international organizations, to tackle them. In addition, demonstrations of impotence undermine the willingness of publics in the donor countries

to expend (or risk) the resources — fiscal or human — to deal with problems in parts of the world where problems are seen as endemic and as too great to be dealt with successfully by outsiders.

In a world of unconstrained resources, one would have little objection to shoveling money and humanitarian assistance at countries bent on self-destruction (I fully realize that people do not choose national self-destruction — it is their leaders [and sometimes only some of them] who do so — but the fact remains that the outside world cannot do much to prevent the auto-destruction of a state like Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Sudan.) The U.S. and other democratic countries may need to ask themselves if the peoples of those countries should not be encouraged to take responsibility for disciplining or removing — by whatever means — the leaders intent on destroying their countries. The position of Nigeria under its late dictator, General Sani Abacha, has already been sketched. If outsiders' resources are constrained (and are, or soon will be, diminishing further), perhaps they should try to use those remaining resources where they can do the most good, and build on existing strengths.

There are numerous places in Africa where an expenditure of resources — either humanitarian relief or economic-development assistance — can be used productively to help Africans. The refugee camps of Somalia, Liberia, southern Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and other such war-torn places may be truly heart-rending, but the ones in Mozambique, Angola and Senegal can probably put outside assistance to better use and more rapidly recover from the traumas that created them.

Diplomatic representation

Fiscal reality requires reviewing the principle that the U.S. needs to maintain a resident diplomatic presence everywhere in Africa. During the Cold War, when the U.S. was eyeball-to-eyeball with both the USSR and the People's Republic of China, one could reasonably make a persuasive case for universal representation. That is no longer required by the global strategic situation, and it is no longer necessary for reasons of national prestige. Is it necessary or financially justifiable for the U.S. to maintain an official presence in countries where it has few or no real political, economic or commercial interests? In some countries, for example, the French will see to it that the U.S. is not allowed to develop a presence that might threaten French interests; and in other countries, our political interests are limited to (or at least largely focused on) trying to round up votes on issues of interest to the U.S. in the U.N. and other international fora.

Every other major country accredits envoys to multiple capitals, operating out of consolidated missions when there is no good reason to have resident offices in each capital. No other country in the world has universal representation. There is no reason why the U.S. should be different (unless, of course, we have truly deluded ourselves with our litany about being the sole surviving superpower). There is no reason to have a resident U.S. diplomatic mission in a country like Rwanda or Burundi other than for the anachronistic concept of "universality." Why not cover such countries from Nairobi or from Dar es Salaam (much as we cover the Comoros, the Maldives and Equatorial Guinea from somewhere else)? Why have resident U.S. missions in virtually every West African country when we have only minimal interests in (and influence with) most of them? Why not concentrate our declining representational resources in a handful of capitals — say Dakar, Accra, Lagos, Abidjan and maybe one or two more — to provide coverage for all the others?

Development assistance

The official U.S. development-assistance effort, both economic and security, has run out of steam and credibility, and is now hard aground on the sands of its own questionable effectiveness (not to mention its lack of resources). Over the years, our economic-assistance programs have progres-

sively become more and more ossified. These inflexible programs are driven institutionally by the Agency for International Development, or AID, and individually by AID mission directors who are determined to protect or even expand their programs (and turf). AID itself was frequently the victim of conflicting pressures in the domestic U.S. political arena — the 'birdie' in an appallingly distempered game between Congress and the Executive Branch, with assorted domestic private voluntary organizations cheering and jeering from the sidelines. Aid was mandated by Congress to develop and administer programs dear to the hearts of individual Congressmen, staffers or constituencies — and prohibited from other programs by domestic taboos of one sort or another. The Executive Branch, on the other hand, also regularly used economic and security assistance (particularly the economic-support-fund program) to buck up, bolster, reinforce and otherwise reward the above-discussed thugs and murderers we befriended for strategic East-West or Cold War purposes.

A truly democratic government has no business undertaking schemes that arouse genuine hostility among a significant percentage of its citizens. … Democratic governments should confine their activities to those that enjoy a broad base of popular support.

U.S. development assistance

Until we develop a new national consensus on what sort of economic aid we are prepared to offer and support, U.S. official aid programs will continue to be only marginally effective and hotly contentious (in the U.S. domestic political arena).

(a) AID's use of consultants to draw up advisory plans has been excessive; disproportionate resources have been spent flying battalions of American development experts to Africa to advise recipient countries on how to draw up and manage programs such as secondary education, village health, small enterprise, rural development, etc., which recipient countries were expected to fund or find other donors for. Not infrequently, the American consultants were former U.S. government employees who, by virtue of their previous positions, could write project proposals in just the right way to secure the consultancy contracts. Recipient governments realized this, but in many cases did not believe that they could politically afford to alienate the U.S. by turning down American aid.

(b) The U.S. should not try to do everything everywhere. To be fair, in recent years Washington has pruned back sharply on the number of programs it runs and on the number of countries to which these programs were once offered. But both lists need further paring. There are lots of donors out there; there is no reason for the U.S. to be in competition with them. Given that population-control (or family planning or whatever named) programs are highly contentious in the U.S. domestic political arena, why should AID seek to take this on at all? Let some European country that knows what it is doing (and does not get itself wrapped around the axle of its conflicting domestic partisans) take this on. This is not to disparage or deprecate the importance of population control or of helping Africans deal with it; it is simply a statement that if population control or any other type program arouses that much controversy and discontent in the U.S., AID should not even try to figure out a way to offer it. Furthermore, efforts by pressure groups in Congress or elsewhere to persuade or compel AID to offer it should be resisted. A truly democratic government has no business undertaking schemes that arouse genuine hostility among a significant percentage of its citizens; such schemes should be left for private institutions or for others. Democratic governments should confine their activities to those that enjoy a broad base of popular support.

(c) Over the years, the economic-assistance dialogue has swung between those who favor basic human needs, those who

Photo by Jeffrey B. Allen

U.S. soldiers conduct marksmanship training with African soldiers. Should our only assistance to African nations be military assistance and surplus military equipment?

support concentration on rural agricultural development, those who seek "job creation" in urban areas, those (mostly status-driven African leaders) who push grandiose "white elephant" industrialization and import-substitution schemes, and those who advocate capital development and/or infrastructure projects.

I personally come down firmly on the side of infrastructure. I have seen that when countries focus their efforts (and their foreign friends focus theirs) on a handful of requirements like acquiring clean, safe, pure drinking water; providing adequate roads and transport; getting electricity and communications out to towns and villages; and building schools and rural medical facilities, the people of a country benefit enormously and increase their personal participation in economic development. If a farmer can grow a crop and get it to market at a fair price, he is more likely to stick with farming than to move to a shantytown on the outskirts of the capital. But there is no incentive for him to stay in the village if there is no school for his children, no medical facilities for his family, no safe drinking water, no electricity or communications, and no way of getting his crops to market.

(d) The U.S. has also slipped into an imbalance between economic assistance and security assistance. Historically, liberal congressmen and senators ran the foreign-relations committees and the foreign-affairs committees during the 40 or so years that the democrats held power in the U.S. Congress, and they shaped U.S. assistance programs accordingly. Conservative congressmen and senators peopled the defense committees and strongly supported security-assistance programs (MAP, FMS, IMET, etc.). The result, over the years, was diminishing economic assistance resources relative to security assistance. In some African countries, military and/or security assistance and training programs are virtually the only remaining U.S. assistance. Do we really believe that our only help to African countries should be military assistance and surplus military equipment?

Congress answers to constituencies, but the Executive Branch is responsible for balancing America's national interests and needs. Maybe the administration should offer no assistance to a country where we cannot offer a reasonable balance between economic and military/security assistance. I was once asked by a senior official in Washington not to recommend disestablishing the CIA station in a country where I was serving, on the incredible grounds that with diminishing economic assistance and other programs, CIA representation was one of the few tangible manifestations of American interest remaining in that country. If that is the level of intel-

lectual rationalization we engage in, maybe it is time to declare moral and intellectual bankruptcy!

Regime recognition

Finally, the U.S. should come to grips with its unwillingness to be brutal with brutal regimes. We have repeatedly compromised our principles when they stood in the way of expediency (e.g., Sammy Doe, Muhammed Siad Barre, Mobutu and others). Absent a strategic reason (e.g., the East-West confrontation) to humor the thugs, should not the U.S. be willing to take a more forthright and principled stand against brutality and bestiality? It is probably a mistake to believe that Washington alone (or even in concert with other nations who believe as we do) had the means to bring down Nigeria's General Abacha, but an unknowing observer could be forgiven for believing that it was only Randall Robinson and TransAfrica who cared enough about that country (and what they believed the U.S. should stand for) to talk about upping the ante until Abacha was removed. To be honest, we were not talking about behavior modification; we were talking about Nigeria's need to oust Abacha from office, by whatever degree of force was required to accomplish the purpose.

I realize that Nigeria is the third largest foreign source of U.S. petroleum, and that is important to us. I realize that there were about 10,000 American citizens living and working in the country, potential hostages to Abacha and his thugs. I further believe that only Nigerians can or should change the situation inside Nigeria. However, for a country like the U.S., which feels as strongly as it does about the wrongs of apartheid, to have held its fire in the face of Nigeria's trials and tribulations was reprehensible. The U.S. has a new opportunity with General Abacha's successors to make sure every effort is made to get Nigeria back on the path to better, more honest, and more representative democracy.

Conclusion

The U.S. should fall back, regroup and rethink its African policy.

Photo by R.A. Ward

To help Africa, the U.S. may need to concentrate on programs that provide Africa's people with the tools to help themselves.

(1) Africa is important, but not for the meaningless reasons we have cited in the past. Its people are part of our people, and some of our people care very much for it. It has resources we would like to have access to, and it is an enormous potential market for our products. If we really believe in democracy, human rights, and economic development according to the preferences of the the consumer rather than the bureaucrat, then the U.S. ought to be in the forefront in trying to help Africa. Not for charitable reasons, but for pure national-interest reasons.

(2) To help Africa, we probably need a new philosophy of development; we certainly need a new method of offering development assistance, since the old one is so badly discredited. First, we should concentrate our resources on programs where we can help, rather than on programs that bog us down in domestic political controversy;

provide Africa's people with tools so that they can help themselves (i.e., basics such as clean water, roads and transport and communications, electricity, education and medical care).

(3) We should not feel that we have to be everywhere. We must focus on the handful of countries where we can have a truly significant impact, and let the "ink spot" theory of economic development work: If the outside world (the donor countries) can actually help South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal get their economics going with development programs, this will significantly enhance the ability of these countries to help their neighbors. There is no need to spread our limited and declining foreign-aid resources so thin that they become, in effect, tokenism.

(4) It is time to start pulling the rug out from under the thugs. There is no reason why a country like the U.S., born in revolution to end a tyranny and dedicated to the ideals we say we are devoted to, should hesitate to call on others to overthrow — by violence, if necessary — their own abusive governments. Nigerians will have to bring about change in Nigeria — foreigners cannot do it (or at least they should not do it) for them. Ditto Kenya. Ditto Zimbabwe and Zambia. Ditto every other African country where a "Big Man" has overstayed his leave.

It is time for America to come out from the shadows of its past policies toward Africa. It is time for the patronizing of the past to cease. It is time to hold Africans accountable for their own actions. And it is time to become more realistic about what we can and cannot hope to accomplish there in the interests of both Africa and America.

Ambassador David Passage is a career member of the U.S. Foreign Service. He has served overseas tours in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa, and he has held numerous positions with the State Department in Washington, D.C. These positions include deputy director for southern African affairs, director of regional African affairs, and Director for Africa on the National Security Council staff at the White House (1988-89). Passage participated in negotiations that led to the withdrawal of Cuban and South African military forces from Angola, and in independence for Namibia. He helped initiate negotiations to end Mozambique's civil war; and he contributed to the policy of "constructive engagement" aimed at ending apartheid in South Africa. At the conclusion of his service on the NSC staff, Passage was appointed by President Bush to the position of U.S. Ambassador to Botswana. He served in this position from 1990 to 1993. Following that, Passage served as political adviser to the commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (1993-96). Currently, he is director of Andean affairs at the State Department in Washington D.C. Passage holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Denver and a master's degree from Georgetown University. He is also a graduate of the National War College. Passage is a frequent guest speaker and guest lecturer at U.S. military schools, including command and staff colleges and senior service war colleges.

The Nature of Insurgency: Melting the Iceberg

by Colonel Glenn M. Harned

Mao told us that insurgents are like fish swimming in the ocean. A better analogy is to liken an insurgency to an iceberg floating in the ocean.

The visible tip of the "iceberg" is composed of the armed guerrillas and the action cells of the urban underground. The largest (and most dangerous) mass of the iceberg, invisible beneath the surface of the water, is made up of the underground support cells and the active auxiliary of the insurgent organization. The sympathetic masses are represented by the cold water surrounding the iceberg. Just as the cooling influence of the iceberg decreases as the water flows away from it, sympathy for the insurgency wanes among the masses as their distance from the insurgency increases. To complete the analogy: If the iceberg cools the "ocean," the insurgents win, but if the "heat" from the government and its supporters melts the iceberg, the government wins.

Attacking the visible tip of the iceberg with a hammer and chisel (that is, military-oriented counterguerrilla operations) is a tiring and ineffective way of ridding yourself of an iceberg or of an insurgency. The lazy but patient man's solution is to raise the water temperature (through an integrated, interagency counterinsurgency effort aimed at dissociating the populace from the insurgency). The center of gravity of an insurgent iceberg is the insulating sympathetic masses who keep the iceberg cold and who transfer its chill to the neutral, cool masses beyond the iceberg's immediate influence. The insurgents' goal is to dissipate the government heat (its perceived legitimacy and credible capacity to coerce, in the words of Larry Cable[1]) that threatens the iceberg's survival and ultimate victory.

To "refrigerate" the masses, the insurgents must consume energy. If the insurgency is to survive and prosper, it must replace that energy from an external sponsor or from within the threatened society itself. But to raise the societal "water temperature" sufficiently to melt the iceberg, the government must consume even more energy. Consider how much easier it is to cool a drink in a glass filled with ice cubes than it is to raise the temperature of the room enough to melt the ice cubes. If the government does not apply sufficient heat to its populace (by establishing legitimacy and by demonstrating its credible capacity to protect and coerce the masses, the chilling effect of the iceberg will continue to reduce the core temperature of the society until the country dies of hypothermia. This kind of societal freezing occurred in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.

Why is the iceberg insurgency model relevant? It illustrates the importance of the populace as the center of gravity and demonstrates the long-term nature of

successful counterinsurgency. Lessons in counterinsurgency continue to be important, because, like viruses, insurgencies evolve and adapt to their environments. Although the Cold War era of Maoist rural-based insurgencies and wars of national liberation may have passed, the world is experiencing an explosion of ethnic and tribal political violence. This kind of violence is broadly labeled as nonstate conflict, but in reality, it displays many of the characteristics of insurgency. In fact, "insurgency" can be used as a shorthand term for many of today's messy, nonlinear, nonstate phenomena.

Our concept of insurgency has been too narrowly defined by our Cold War experience and by our unfamiliarity with insurgency's historical roots. Nonstate conflicts will remain the primary focus of our nation's special-operations forces for the foreseeable future. It is time that we begin to explore the nature of nonstate conflicts more systematically — if we are to deal with these phenomena successfully, we must first understand them. Perhaps special operators need to know more about the laws of thermodynamics as they apply to icebergs.

Colonel Glenn M. Harned is assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Commissioned in 1972 after graduating from the University of Pennsylvania, Harned has served in various Infantry and Special Forces command and staff assignments. While assigned to the Special Warfare Center and School as Chief of Doctrine Development, he authored the 1990 edition of FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. *He subsequently commanded the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group; served as SOF branch chief in the J-3 Special Operations Division of the Joint Staff; commanded the Special Operations Command-Korea; and served as director of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Colonel Harned is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the Marine Corps War College.*

Notes:

[1] Larry Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations," *Special Warfare*, Spring 1998, 33.

Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?

by Colonel Mark D. Boyatt

If we in Special Forces are to have a firm grasp of who we are as an entity, we must clearly understand and succinctly articulate our core ideology. Yet at this time, we cannot do so with any consensus.

In February 1997, General Peter Schoomaker, then-commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, challenged USASOC officers to read a professional-development book entitled *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies*, by James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras.[1] After having read the book, we formed a series of working groups that eventually codified the USASOC vision, goals and objectives.

The thoughts and the ideas in *Built to Last* may also guide us in determining our core ideology. What follows is in large part paraphrased from the book.

Core ideology

An organization's core ideology is its enduring character — its stake fixed in the ground that says this is who we are; this is what we stand for; and this is what we are all about. Core ideology has two distinct subcomponents: core values and core purpose (and unless these are passionately held on a gut level, they are not core). Identifying the core values and the core purpose is not an exercise in wordsmithing. It is a process to define who we are.

We do not *create* a core ideology. A core ideology is derived not by looking outside the organization, but rather by looking inside. We do not ask, "What core values *should* we hold?" We ask, "What core values *do* we hold?"

Core ideology must be pervasive; it must transcend any leader. Core ideology is for the people inside the organization, and it need only be meaningful and inspirational to them. Core ideology plays an essential role in determining who is inside the organization and who is outside it. A clear and well-articulated ideology will attract people whose values are compatible with the values of those who are inside the organization and will repel those whose values are contradictory.

Core ideology is not to be confused with core competence. Core competence is a strategic concept that captures an organization's capabilities. Core ideology captures what one stands for and why one exists. One can, and perhaps should, change anything that is not a core ideology.

The act of stating a core ideology influences behavior toward consistency with that ideology. The difference between success and failure of an organization can often be traced to how well that organization establishes a common purpose and shared values to bring out the energies and the talents of its people.

What is Special Forces' core ideology?

Special Forces' core ideology is planned as a major topic of discussion during the Special Forces Branch Conference, to be held at Fort Bragg in April 1999. — Editor

This is not a frivolous question: It should provoke serious thought. What would be lost if Special Forces ceased to exist? Why is it important for Special Forces to exist now and in the future? If you were offered accelerated promotion in another branch, would you accept? Why not? What deeper sense of motivation keeps you in Special Forces? When you ask yourself why Special Forces is important, question each answer by asking "Why?" five times. What is the result?

Core values are essential and enduring tenets. If circumstances around us changed and we were penalized for holding a core value, would we still keep it? If our answer is no, then we did not have a core value. You do not change core values; you change strategies.

A core value is simple, clear, straightforward and powerful. It provides substantial guidance with piercing simplicity. People can *discover* their core values, but new core values cannot be instilled. Core values are not something we buy into. We must have a predisposition to hold them. Core values need no justification, nor do they come into or out of fashion.

What are the core values of Special Forces? Can we envision these core values as being equally valid 100 years from now?

Core purpose is the second component of core ideology. Core purpose is the organization's fundamental reason for being, and it is the more important of the two components. It must capture the soul of Special Forces. Do not confuse the core purpose with goals or strategies, which change over time.

You cannot fulfill a purpose. A purpose is like a guiding star on the horizon: forever pursued but never reached. A core purpose does not change; it inspires change. An organization can and usually does evolve into new areas, but it remains guided by its core purpose.

What is the core purpose of Special Forces? What purpose defines who we are today and who we will be 100 years from now? What is our reason for being?

SF core ideology

The following is a proposed core ideology for Special Forces:

The *core purpose* of Special Forces is to accomplish Special Forces missions *through, with or by* indigenous populations. This is our enduring purpose — our guiding light on the horizon. The *core purpose* of Special Forces is never-changing, regardless of changing strategies or the problems that our belief in it may bring in the future. No other organization has a core ideology of working *through, with or by* indigenous populations.

The *core values* of Special Forces are *unconventionalism, strength of character, doing what is right, and making a difference.* Our core values define who we are and who we will be 100 years from now, regardless of a changing world or the penalties we will encounter for holding these values.

Now we need debate. Our core ideology molds (or should mold) everything we do — from recruiting Special Forces candidates to conducting operations. How do we clarify, articulate and codify our ideology? Only a clear understanding of our core ideology will allow us to correctly focus our resources, our energies, and the talents of our people.

Colonel Mark D. Boyatt is the assistant commandant of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Commissioned in Infantry, he has served as an Infantry platoon leader, company executive officer and company commander. His Special Forces assignments include detachment commander and group operations and training officer in the 5th SF Group; action officer in the Army Special Operations Agency; commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group; chief of staff for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; commander of the 3rd SF Group; and deputy chief of staff for operations for the Army Special Operations Command. A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College, he holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School encourages debate, comments and ideas regarding Special Forces' core ideology. Submit correspondence to Special Warfare *or to the Office of the Assistant Commandant, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307. — Editor*

Notes:

[1] James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997).

Letters

Awards honor SF service during war in El Salvador

As the founder and director of Veterans of Special Operations - El Salvador, I was glad to hear of the recent awards and decorations ceremony honoring those Special Forces soldiers who served with distinction during the war in El Salvador.

A coordinated political campaign to see proper recognition extended to those who participated in this conflict began in l989. Now the veterans who saw a democratic government installed in El Salvador via the free election process have been both vindicated and honored by the government and military who sent them in harm's way.

For the sake of remaining historically accurate, I would like to thank the following individuals. Although many people became involved over the last nine years, these are the few who made the difference on behalf of their brothers in arms. Colonel John McMullen (Special Forces); Major Andy Messing (retired Special Forces); Congressmen Robert K. Dornan and Dan Burton; George Crile and Ed Bradley (CBS' "60 Minutes"); Lieutenant Colonel Nancy Henderson (Medical Corps); Major Generals Kenneth Bowra, J.T. Scott (retired Special Forces) and Sidney Shachnow (retired Special Forces); Steve Fronius; Lieutenant Colonel Gus Taylor (retired Special Forces); and Gilberto Osorio (PRTC-FMLN).

As Brigadier General William G. Boykin said on June 13th, "This will not be the last of the El Salvador awards." Officers and senior NCOs who served during the conflict should take advantage of this opportunity to submit recommendations for those who deserve awards. Most often, these require only a narrative that can be processed through USASOC DCSPER. It is worth noting that CIB/CMB recommendations for the war in El Salvador are required to meet the highest standards set since the early Vietnam era. A careful review of available personnel rosters compiled by Colonel John McMullen and five other senior officers with El Salvador combat experience show that 291 CIBs/CMBs were earned. To date, recommendations have been submitted for just half of those.

Gregory A. Walker
Astoria, Ore.

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *or who would like to discuss topics that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF warrants should prepare for FY 99 promotion board

Even though the FY 98 CW3, CW4 and CW5 promotion board has only recently convened, it is not too early to start preparing for next year's board. SF warrant officers should ensure that their Officer Record Brief, photo and microfiche are up-to-date. This year's board is considering 46 warrant officers for promotion to the grade of CW3; it will consider 68 in FY 99, and 62 in FY 00. Over the next three years, MOS 180A should fill its CW3 authorizations with WOs of that rank. Eighteen soldiers are being considered for promotion to CW4 in FY 98; the board will consider 12 in FY 99, and nine in FY 00. FY 98 is the first year in which 180As are being considered for promotion to CW5. Five warrant officers are being considered for CW5 "below the zone"; seven will be considered below the zone in FYs 99 and 00. All of this means that 180A will finally be able to begin filling its warrant-officer senior positions. Company A, 3rd Battalion, 1st SWTG, will conduct two iterations of the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course in FY 99 and three in FY 00 to handle the large numbers of warrants that will be promoted to CW3. Prior to attendance in the SFWOAC, a warrant officer must have completed Phase I of the WOAC, be selected for promotion to CW3, and have a top-secret security clearance, in accordance with DA Reg. 611-112. Students who arrive for the advanced course without a top-secret clearance will not be allowed to enroll. The Warrant Officer Voluntary Indefinite Selection Board has been suspended in accordance with DA Message 170738Z Apr 98.

LTC command selection board selects 15 SF officers

The FY 99 lieutenant-colonel command selection board considered 112 SF officers for command positions and selected 15. The selectees include three DASR officers selected to command non-SMU units. Board statistics were as follows:

	Elig.	Sel.	Sel. rate (%)
SF	112	15	13.4
DA	2802	405	14.5
Other combat arms	1565	195	12.5

The board selected 11 officers for SF battalion command and four officers for garrison command. In all cases but one, the selectees had served in two or more major's branch-qualifying positions. The profile of the selected officers' key duty assignments was as follows: SF company commander – 10; battalion S3 – 6; battalion XO – 4; joint – 8; group S3 – 4; group XO – 1. When garrison and USAREC commands were factored in, the SF selection rate was on par with the other combat arms. When garrison and USAREC commands were not factored in, the SF selection rate was 9.6 percent, vs. 11.4 percent for the other combat arms. These percentages are consistent with the branch's historically low ratio of available commands to eligible officers. As the personnel proponent for the SF Branch, SWCS is developing a proposal that the Army allocate to the branch additional command opportunities that would be suited to an SF officer's branch skills.

FA 39 officers demonstrate increased qualifications

The FY 99 command-selection rates for FA 39 colonels and lieutenant-colonels demonstrate an increase in officer qualification. The selected officers are predominantly fully trained (Psychological Operations Course or Civil Affairs Course, Regional Studies Course and language training). The lieutenant-colonel command selectees averaged 49 months of FA 39 utilization and the colonel command selectee had 81 months. The lieutenant-colonel command selectees' assignments included detachment/company commander, battalion S3, battalion XO, group XO, group DCO, and joint FA 39 positions. The colonel command selectee is a former battalion commander and group DCO, and has served in a joint FA 39 assignment.

Officers may apply for competitive graduate programs

Each academic year, the SF Branch selects high-potential officers to attend three highly competitive graduate programs (two Army, one SOF-specific):

• *Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict program*. SO/LIC is an 18-month, USSOCOM-sponsored program taught at the Naval Postgraduate School. The mission of SO/LIC is to develop a cadre of highly educated joint special-operations officers. Students are required to complete a thesis that supports the SOF community's research requirements. Graduates are utilized at one of the unified commands or on the Army, joint, or USASOC staff. Utilization begins upon graduation or upon completion of branch-qualification as a major. Each year, the SF Branch selects up to six captains, and FA 39 selects two. For academic year 1999, the program will target year groups 1991 and 1990.

• *Harvard fellowship*. The Harvard fellowship is an Army DCSOPS-sponsored program of study at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. The one-year program trains officers to serve as strategists in ODCSOPS. Upon graduation, officers serve a two- to three-year utilization within ODCSOPS. Graduates can expect to complete a second utilization either as a senior major or as a lieutenant colonel. The Army selects three officers a year for this program.

• *Olmstead Scholarship program*. The three-year Olmstead Scholarship program provides select junior officers the opportunity to become immersed in a foreign culture in order to become familiar with the designated host nation's institutions, characteristics, customs and people. Scholars are expected to travel extensively in their host country in order to capitalize on their experience. Selectees will attend DLI, if necessary, prior to enrolling in their host nation's university. The Olmstead Foundation selects only three of the Army's top seven captains nominated each year.

Branch is soliciting applications for academic year 1999. Target year groups are 1990 and 1991, but the programs are available to all interested officers. Contact CPT Mark Schwartz for eligibility criteria.

Army making transition to OPMS XXI

The Army is making the transition to OPMS XXI by reviewing and recoding all officer positions. There will be no impact upon officers until full implementation of OPMS XXI, which will vary by individual officer year group.

Officers will continue to request and receive a functional area during their fifth year of service. Officers in year group 1993 will be the first to select from the new list of OPMS XXI functional areas when they submit their FA preferences this fall. For information on all of the new FAs, officers can access PERSCOM Online (www-perscom.army.mil/opmd/faaac.htm). Officers already assigned an FA are required to keep it for two years before submitting a request for redesignation. Officers can no longer request FA 54 (Operations Plans and Training) or FA 41 (Personnel); these will not exist under OPMS

XXI. Beginning in FY 99, all officers in YGs 80-91 who hold FA 41 or FA 54 should prepare a memorandum or DA Form 4187 requesting a change of FA, and submit it through their assignment officers. Officers should list more than one new FA and state briefly why they believe they are qualified to change. Officers have until Sept. 30, 1999, to submit their request. After that date, officers will be redesignated by PERSCOM according to the needs of the Army.

Officers already selected for promotion to major will appear before a separate career-field-designation board. Board dates for all year groups can be found on PERSCOM Online. YG 89 is the first year group to receive its career-field designation in concert with its majors board. YGs 80 and 86 will receive PERSCOM preference statements, which must be completed prior to the career-field-designation board in FY 99. Included in the packets will be detailed instructions and information on current and new functional areas. Officers in these year groups should begin receiving their packets in June 1998. Preference statements are due back to PERSCOM not later than January 1999. Members of the career-field-designation board will consider officer preference, input from raters and senior raters, officer performance, undergraduate degree, officers' previously designated functional area, training or prior utilization, and the needs of the Army. After receiving a career field, officers will still maintain a functional area. The revised DA PAM 600-3, scheduled for publication in the fall of 1998, will address the implementation of OPMS XXI and the new OPMS XXI functional areas.

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Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Enlisted proponent takes SF sustainment initiatives

Special Forces manpower requirements and a market analysis of the available recruiting base have prompted the SF proponent to take several initiatives aimed at filling and sustaining CMF 18 through FY 99 and beyond:

- Special Duty Assignment Pay has been instituted.
- The Selective Re-enlistment Bonus has been instituted for FY 98.
- The 110 GT score requirement has been modified to 100 for FY 98.
- The SFAS swim-test requirement has been waived (soldiers must still pass the swim test prior to attending SFQC).
- A cap has been implemented to limit 18D accessions into the physicians-assistant program. Accessions are limited to 15 per year.
- A Zone-B BEAR bonus has been instituted for FY 98.

Over the past three years, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has increased the target for active-component enlisted recruiting — 750 in FY 95; 1,250 in FY 96; and 1,500 in FYs 97 and 98. These increases have been necessary in order to produce the requisite number of SFQC graduates each year as CMF 18 moves toward achieving its program guidance: 101 percent of its authorizations.

To expand the recruiting market, the proponent has modified the 110 GT score prerequisite to 100. In terms of quality, this position is quantifiably supported by Army Research Institute studies, which indicate the GT score for an individual may vary daily by as many as eight points. An individual who scores 110 could have, depending on several factors, achieved a score as low as 102 or as high as 118. The primary concern is that the SGT and SSG recruiting market has already been saturated in a downsizing Army. The opportunity to volunteer, be selected, and qualify for Special Forces has now been opened to a new segment of quality soldiers. The ultimate SF qualification standards have not changed.

The pre-SFAS swim-test requirement has been waived as a prerequisite. Soldiers who do not pass the swim test during SFAS, but who are selected after meeting all other prerequisites, will be scheduled for SFQC. The intent is to allow these soldiers additional time to learn to swim prior to attending SFQC. Soldiers who do not achieve the swim-test standard during SFAS will PCS to Fort Bragg three weeks prior to SFQC to attend formal swim training. If, during this time, a soldier cannot demonstrate swim proficiency to the current standard, he will be ineligible to attend SFQC. This policy changes only the administration and the time line of the Special Forces swim test, not the standard. It also demonstrates a serious commitment to expanding the recruiting market.

Because of a decline in the 18D operating inventory, an increasing OPTEMPO, and the combined effect of those two factors on operational readiness, the proponent has requested a cap of 15 18D PA accessions for FYs 98 and 99. This cap will be evaluated each year as part of the effort to manage and preserve the 18D operating inventory until the Special Operations Medical Training Center can train enough 18Ds to offset the cur-

rent shortage. The proponent supports the participation of 18Ds in the Army PA program, but at this time, the community cannot afford 18D participation at a higher rate.

The Zone-B Bear bonus has been instituted for the remainder of FY 98. This bonus opportunity became effective April 25, 1997, per MILPER message No. 97-084. The Zone-B BEAR (6-10 years) will directly target and attract the Army E5/E6 population toward SF recruitment and accession and will provide recruiters with a significant means of accomplishing the AC enlisted recruiting mission.

Although the GT-score requirement and the swim-test time line have been modified, SFQC standards remain the same. Soldiers must still demonstrate the mental and physical acumen necessary to accomplish course standards; they must still complete the 50-meter swim test in BDUs and boots. In a significantly downsizing Army, Special Forces recruitment and accession policy changes are inevitable in order to sustain and maintain the force. However, the SF proponent remains seriously committed to maintaining the quality and the integrity of CMF 18.

MSG selection board selects 4 CMF 37 NCOs

The 1998 CMF 37 master-sergeant selection board chose four NCOs for promotion. This produced a selection rate of 18.2 percent, compared to the Army average of 15.7 percent. Of those selected for promotion, three were in the primary zone and one was in the secondary zone. Primary- and secondary-zone soldiers appeared to have either all tactical or all regional experience. Jobs outside the PSYOP Group were viewed as positive by board members so long as the NCOs returned to the group as soon as their normally scheduled tours ended.

The selectees' average years of time-in-service, time-in-grade, educational background, and age, vs. the Army averages, were as follows:

	TIS	TIG	Education	Age
PZ (37)	15	4.8	13.7	33.3
PZ (Army)	16.8	4.9	Not indicated	37.1
SZ (37)	10.3	3.3	15	33
SZ (Army)	15.3	3.1	13.8	35.1

CMF 37 soldiers selected for promotion were better educated and younger than the Army average. The overall quality of the selected soldiers was defined by the board as exceptional. Generally, soldiers who were selected had a good mix of successful assignments in the field and had sought leadership positions. For more information call MSG Julius Storch, CMF Manager, at DSN 239-6406/9002 or commercial (910) 432-6406/9002.

Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Reports discuss Korea's 707th Special Mission Unit

The history, roles, and activities of Korea's 707th Special Mission Unit have been discussed in recent reporting. The unit, which is part of the Korean army's Special Warfare Command, was created in 1981. The 707th provided security for VIPs and for key facilities during the 1983 Asian Games and during the 1986 Olympics. At both events, terrorist attacks were considered to be a real danger. The 707th's soldiers — distinguished by their black berets — are assigned urban counterterrorist missions. They also constitute a quick-reaction unit for other kinds of emergencies and special-warfare requirements in wartime. In addition to working with special Korean counterterrorist police units, the 707th also trains with special units from Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Australia.

Indian navy introduces special-operations craft

Reports from late June 1998 indicate that the Indian navy has introduced a "superspeed" coastal patrol boat that is intended to play important roles in low-intensity-conflict environments. Designated the Fast Attack Craft T-80 — and built in cooperation with Israeli partners — the T-80 has a crew of ten, displaces about 69 tons, and has a speed of 45 knots. According to the reports, the T-80 is the "smallest and fastest combatant in the navy." It is armed with two 20 mm cannons (with laser range-finding and laser target-designation), and its forward cannon is said to be capable of remote- controlled firing. The T-80 is ideally suited for, and will be used in, the interdiction of arms and explosives trafficking, particularly along the Gujarat and Maharashtra coastlines. The reports anticipate that the T-80 will be used in joint surveillance, reconnaissance, and interdiction operations with the Indian police and Coast Guard forces. The T-80 can also be used to insert and extract special-operations forces. So far, the Indian navy has only one T-80. A second boat is being built, and the navy is hopeful that more will be constructed. While Indian public statements assert that U.S. economic sanctions — imposed in the wake of Indian nuclear tests last spring — are unlikely to affect on-going defense-production programs like the Fast Attack Craft T-80, they do acknowledge that international military education and training, or IMET, will be curtailed. The curtailing of IMET will halt a number of budding programs, evidently including joint Indo-U.S. naval maneuvers and the special forces training that has been conducted with U.S. SOF on several occasions during the 1990s.

Executive Outcomes confronts cattle rustlers

As part of an expansion of services into rural areas, Executive Outcomes, or EO, a controversial South African private security organization, has undertaken efforts to curtail cattle rustling along the South African-Lesotho border. Staffed heavily by former South African Defense Force personnel, EO was hired by local South African farmers to combat the serious problem of cross-border livestock theft. According to a company spokesman, "EO's service to the farmers includes advice, security awareness and the 'protection of livestock and client assets.' " Already, rustling

in the border area where EO is operating has dropped precipitously. Local stock raisers had tried various approaches in the past — to include hiring Bushmen to protect herds — but none of their efforts were successful. Often characterized as a "mercenary firm," EO is best known for its military/paramilitary actions abroad, particularly in Angola, Sierra Leone, and also in Asia and Latin America. In addition to running its other activities, the company believes that it has a promising future market in providing tailored kinds of security support within South Africa itself.

Russians profile current naval spetsnaz

Russian naval special-designation forces, or spetsnaz, have been less visible in the wake of the USSR's dissolution. Recently, however, the Russian navy's commander in chief, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, reaffirmed that naval special-operations units — which have a long, active history in the Soviet armed forces — remain assigned to the Russian Baltic, northern, Pacific, and Black Sea fleets. Although the admiral provided few specifics on the size and capabilities of the units, he did indicate that they were elite, that they were equipped with special weapons (including small submarines), and that they were comparable to U.S. Navy SEALS or the Israeli Navy's 13th Flotilla. Stating that these units have no special name beyond their "combat swimmer" or "naval spetsnaz" designations, the admiral indicated that most of the units are directly subordinate to their respective fleet commander. Of particular note, Kuroyedov said that he retains naval spetsnaz subunits under his direct control as well, "for resolving fleet tasks and rendering assistance."

Enduring Colombian security problems worry neighbors

According to widespread reporting, states bordering Colombia are becoming increasingly worried by the success of Colombian guerrillas and by the uncontrolled drug trafficking that provides the insurgents' financial support. Concerns are being voiced in both official and unofficial venues. Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, for example, has charged that Colombian guerrillas are supporting logistics centers used by Sendero Luminoso insurgents. Ecuadorian President Fabian Alarcon has pointed to the frequent use of his country's territory by Colombian insurgents and armed groups. Venezuela's President Rafael Caldera has pointed to the need to deploy several thousand additional troops to deal with Colombian guerrilla raids and the rising levels of cross-border crime. Panama similarly has reported that Colombian paramilitaries and guerrillas are crossing into Panama; as a result, Panama has stepped up its border security-force presence. Finally, Brazil has complained about the environmental damage to the Amazon, caused generally by trafficker-supported coca growers and drug laboratories. Collectively, the conflict in Colombia and its spillover of crime and violence are being increasingly felt by the other states throughout the region.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

USASOC honors veterans of El Salvador combat

In a U.S. Army Special Forces Command ceremony June 12, more than 50 Special Forces soldiers and veterans received awards for combat service in El Salvador.

Sergeant First Class Gregory Fronius received the Silver Star posthumously. Fronius was killed March 31, 1987, while defending his battalion from an early-morning assault by communist guerrillas. His actions helped save his battalion.

Other awards included Bronze Star Medals for valor, Army Commendation Medals for valor, Combat Infantryman Badges and Combat Medical Badges. Brigadier General William G. Boykin, commander of the Army SF Command; retired Major General Sidney Shachnow; and retired Brigadier General Joseph Stringham presented the awards.

Special Forces served in El Salvador from 1981 to 1992 in response to a threat from left-wing communist guerrillas who were attempting to overthrow the right-wing government. The Americans trained their Salvadoran counterparts in light-infantry tactics, weapons skills, logistics, reconnaissance, and basic staff planning.

"It was the perfect mission for the Special Forces soldier," said Brigadier General James W. Parker, commanding general, Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command. "It was what we'd been training to do throughout our careers."

Because of political considerations, El Salvador was never designated a war zone. Even though Americans were fighting and dying there, they were ineligible for combat awards.

Photo by Nelson Mumma Jr.

Retired MG Sidney Shachnow (right) presents the Bronze Star Medal with "V" device to LTC Craig Leeker.

Pressure from Army officers, from various congressmen and from a broadcast on television's "60 Minutes" eventually brought approval for the awards.

To be eligible for the CIB, an SF or infantry soldier must have actively participated in ground combat. The CMB recognizes medical personnel, including SF medical sergeants, who have accompanied SF or infantry soldiers into battle. SF, infantry and medical personnel who served in combat in El Salvador between Jan. 1, 1981, and Feb. 1, 1992, are eligible for the CIB and CMB. — *MAJ Tom McCollum, USASOC PAO*

Flynn assumes command of 112th Signal Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Flynn assumed command of the 112th Signal Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Howard I. Cohen in a ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., June 26.

Flynn's previous assignment was in the communications directorate of the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. He has also served as a company commander and platoon leader in the 35th Signal Brigade; a plans officer in the XVIII Airborne Corps; a battalion signal officer in the 75th Ranger Regiment; an operations and plans officer in the Joint Special Operations Command; chief of signal operations, V Corps; and executive officer, 32nd Signal Battalion, 22nd Signal Brigade.

Cohen's next assignment has not been announced.

Special Forces recruiting Armywide

Army Special Forces is recruiting enlisted volunteers from installations Armywide.

SF is accepting applications from specialists and corporals through junior sergeants first class. Specialists and corporals wishing to apply for SF training need not be promotable or have completed the Primary Leadership Development Course. Privates first class may apply for SF training, but they must be E4s before attending SF Assessment and Selection. Soldiers must have a GT score of 100 or higher to apply for SF.

Members of SF A-detachments deploy to locations around the world to work with foreign militaries on real-world missions and training exercises. These missions can affect national-level policies, and SF personnel are often the only official U.S. representatives, besides U.S. Embassy personnel, in a country. Because of the importance of their missions, SF detachments receive a

high level of training.

Opportunities for promotion in SF are high. Each SF battalion has (excluding support MOSs): one CSM; four SGMs; one 1SG; 22 MSGs; 97 SFCs; and 88 SSGs. SF NCOs may also apply to become SF warrant officers, of which there are 22 in each battalion. SF NCOs and warrant officers receive between $260 and $535 each month in additional-skill pay.

For more information, telephone the Fort Bragg SF Recruiting Team at DSN 239-1818. Soldiers can also obtain information on the Special Operations Recruiting Detachment website (http://asociweb/swcs/dotd/products.htm) or(www.goarmy.com/sord/sord.htm).

Preparation will prevent delays in training

To prevent delays for personnel entering advanced special-operations training courses, the Special Warfare Center and School's 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, offers the following advice to unit commanders and prospective students:

Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification Course. One of the primary reasons students are relieved from AIQC is that they have difficulty maintaining the academic workload. Students should have excellent briefing, instructor, and analytical skills; be able to grasp concepts quickly; and be able to work in a fast-paced academic environment.

Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course. To prepare prospective students for ASOT's challenges, battalion ASOT managers should brief them on the scope and the concept of the course.

Individual Terrorism Awareness Course. INTAC is designed for DoD personnel who are deploying to areas where there is a moderate-to-high terrorist threat. INTAC continues to receive students who are deploying to areas where there is no terrorist threat. Commanders should ensure that only appropriate personnel are selected for training.

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape. Unit commanders should ensure that prospective students meet all course prerequisites, particularly the SERE physical, security clearance, swim-test verification, and proper TA-50 according to the SERE packing list.

Military Free-Fall Jumpmaster Course. Personnel should report for training with their official military free-fall jump record, static-line jumpmaster certificate/orders, and Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course certificate/orders. They should also bring their medical records and the original copy of their current HALO physical. For more information, prospective students should contact their S3 or telephone CW2 James K. Owens, company safety officer, at DSN 899-3637.

Special Forces Underwater Operations Course. SFUWO has recently experienced an increase in the number of students who fail the fitness prerequisites. The latest version of AR 611-75 states that all prospective students who report for SFUWO must be able to complete a 50-meter underwater swim and seven pull-ups (palms away). For more information, telephone SFC Nathan A. Evans, operations NCO, at DSN 483-4347.

Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, and Exploitation Techniques Course and *Special Operations Training Course*. SFARTAETC and SOTC average 25-30 percent attrition. One of the primary reasons students are relieved from these two courses is that they fail the midcourse shooting evaluation. Soldiers should receive marksmanship train-up prior to the courses.

PSYOP Division supports Prairie Warrior exercise

During May 1998, the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School supported Prairie Warrior, the capstone exercise of the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Prairie Warrior 98 featured the first student-led joint PSYOP task force, or JPOTF. During the exercise, PSYOP actions occurred continuously at the JPOTF, corps, and division levels. Numerous events called for robust PSYOP action — "steel-on-target" did not dominate the scenario to the detriment of all other elements of combat power.

Although PSYOP was successfully integrated into the exercise, participants noted areas for improvement:

- Earlier input into the CJTF and corps operations-order process.
- Early integration of a more robust IO effort as part of the "Blue Side" of the CJTF.
- Activation of a CJPOTF, with allied-officer participation.
- Use of a PSYOP product-development center, either from the reserves or from 37F AIT, that would electronically transmit products and conduct PSYOP planning.
- Allocation of a PSYOP tactical NCO from the PSYOP reserves to each corps and division 39B student.

Jones new commander of 3rd SF Group

Colonel Gary M. Jones replaced Colonel David E. McCracken as commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group July 17.

Jones' other SF assignments include detachment commander, company commander and plans officer, 5th SF Group; executive officer, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; company commander and group operations officer, 7th SF Group; and deputy commanding officer, Army Special Forces Command.

McCracken is now assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Silent Warriors of World War II: The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines. *By Lance Q. Zedric. Ventura, Calif.: Pathfinder Publishing, 1995. ISBN: 0-934793-56-5. 287 pages. $22.95.*

In *Silent Warriors of World War II*, Lance Zedric provides an overview of the development and employment of the Alamo Scouts, a special-operations unit generally credited as being a predecessor of today's Special Forces. The Scouts were a specially selected group of soldiers whose mission was to provide General Walter Krueger and his Sixth U.S. Army with timely and accurate intelligence concerning the deployment of Japanese military forces along the American invasion route to the Philippines.

The genesis of the Alamo Scouts can be attributed to the intelligence problems that General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific command was experiencing. Part of the problem was of MacArthur's own doing. He had refused to allow the Office of Strategic Services to operate in his theater. Electing to rely on other agencies, subordinate commanders such as Krueger often found themselves short of valid and reliable information. Krueger attempted to develop a joint solution to the problem with the Navy, but this failed to materialize, so Krueger struck out on his own with MacArthur's approval.

Krueger handed the job of developing a unit dedicated to special reconnaissance to Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Bradshaw. The general made his expectations clear. He wanted six- or seven-man teams who



could infiltrate enemy-held islands, gather intelligence, and then get out undetected.

Bradshaw enjoyed a considerable reputation inside of the Sixth Army. He had served as the assistant G2 and was aware of the intelligence problems plaguing operations. With a handful of officers and NCOs assisting him, Bradshaw established the Alamo Scouts Training Center on Fergusson Island, near the northeast tip of New Guinea. While the facilities were being constructed, Bradshaw and his assistants recruited men to undergo preliminary training prior to their serving in the Scouts.

The selection process for the Scouts occurred at two levels. First, company commanders and platoon leaders evaluated prospective candidates at the unit level before sending them forward. At the Alamo Scouts Training Center, Bradshaw and his subordinates performed the second assessment to determine a soldier's mental, psychological, and physical propensity for special operations. The training that followed was demanding in the extreme. Soldiers trained in various aspects of waterborne infiltration. Bradshaw placed heavy emphasis on swimming, land navigation, survival skills, and the nuances of intelligence-gathering.

By February 1944, Bradshaw's first contingent of Scouts was ready for deployment in support of Sixth Army operations in the Admiralty Islands. The first mission was an outstanding success. The Scouts would repeat this performance in many of the 105 additional missions they executed before being disbanded in September 1945. Most of the missions focused on intelligence-gathering, although some of the latter missions, particularly those in the Philippines, were in the nature of liaison work with Philippine guerrillas. Perhaps most well-known among the Scouts' successes was their participation, along with 6th Ranger battalion, in the raid on the Japanese prisoner-of-war camp at Cabanatuan on Luzon.

Zedric has performed a considerable service in providing this account of the Alamo Scouts. Unfortunately, his book contains some shortcomings that detract from its contribution to one's understanding the Pacific War. The most noteworthy example is the book's excessive dependence on secondary sources. In fairness, Zedric does make considerable use

of oral histories, some of them taken at Alamo Scout reunions, but as Shakespeare's Henry V noted, "Old men forget." The diary accounts he incorporates are good, but the author uncritically accepts their accuracy. In his bibliographic essay, Zedric gives a passing nod to the document collections of the National Archives, but his footnotes indicate little to suggest that these were extensively used. Also notable by its absence is any mention of how the Japanese saw the Alamo Scouts. It is easy for veterans to succumb to self-adulation, but scholars must pass judgment based on the evidence. The Japanese may have had an entirely different opinion on the effectiveness of the Scouts.

Silent Warriors, despite its shortcomings, does provide the best account thus far of an exceptional group of men who paved the way for the modern special-operations community. It should not, however, be seen as the final word on the topic.

Dr. Joseph R. Fischer
USASOC Historian's Office
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War. *By Ed Evanhoe. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. ISBN: 1-55750-246-3. 216 pages. $25.95.*

Where was Special Forces first in combat? Where did it suffer its first casualties? If having to answer quickly, some would guess Vietnam. Those with a greater historical knowledge or a longer memory might answer Laos.

Both answers would be wrong. It is rarely noted and not widely known, but the first combat for Special Forces personnel occurred during the Korean War. In 1953, approximately 100 Special Forces soldiers were sent to Korea to serve as members of the 8240th Army



Unit with the United Nations Partisan Infantry Forces. The names of many in this group would reappear during the development of Special Forces, particularly in Southeast Asia. Included were Charlie Norton, Reub Mooradian, Murl Tullis, Mauri Price, Sam Amato, Bob Bodroghy, Jim Collopy, Zolly Kollat and Joe Seyer. Two Special Forces lieutenants, Joe Castro and Doug Payne, were killed in action leading partisan forces.

The Korean War is often forgotten, and its special operations are little known and seldom recounted. *Dark Moon is* one of a very small number of accounts on this subject. In conformance with the author's stated intent, *Dark Moon* is not a formal history. What Evanhoe has written is a highly readable description of a series of operations. Those operations were conducted by a colorful group: veterans with previous histories in the World War II OSS; Philippine guerrillas; the airborne; and the Korean War Ranger companies. Their operations had none of the supporting structure now considered normal. They lacked trained personnel, support organizations, dedicated transport, logistics and even doctrine. Despite these limitations and the greater limitations imposed by the changing military and political conditions in Korea, for more than three years the men of the 8240th AU made themselves a pain to the North Korean and Chinese forces, imposing casualties and, more importantly, forcing extensive diversion of combat forces to rear-area security roles. Evanhoe, who had had his own experience as a member of the 8240th AU, tells the story sparsely but interestingly. He has skimmed the cream from the operational history, providing only the salient aspects. The serious special operator would wish for more information on a host of subjects, including weaponry, air support, the navy and indigenous ships, intelligence and communications.

Unless the reader is conversant with the Far East Command and the Eighth Army organizations of the period, he may have difficulty understanding the command structure, although the author describes it and its numerous changes in some detail. A few organization charts would be most helpful. Not all of the place names mentioned in the text appear on the small maps — a frustration to the reader who is trying to follow the action closely. An unsupported McCarthy-like slur on the loyalty of Department of State personnel is both inappropriate and grating. These faults notwithstanding, *Dark Moon* is a good, if limited, account of special operations conducted by brave men under difficult conditions. It deserves a place on the special operator's bookshelf.

COL Scot Crerar
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Special Warfare

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