


# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

In contemporary military activities, one of the primary considerations for commanders and their soldiers is the importance of the civilian population to the success of their operations.

This is true whether we are trying to mobilize local public support for operations in low-intensity conflict or minimizing civilian interference in conventional operations.

The awareness of the role of the civilian populace has brought increased emphasis and much-deserved recognition to the military forces organized and trained to work in civil-military matters — Civil Affairs.

CA is invaluable at all levels of conflict, whether assisting special-operations or conventional forces. CA civic-assessment teams can assist operations planning by providing a picture of the cultural environment in a particular area and identifying sources of host-nation logistics and services. Through CA activities of humanitarian and civic assistance and population and resource control in LIC, we can often remove the causes of unrest and deny mobility and supplies to insurgents, thereby defeating upheaval by more peaceful means and at a much lower cost. In conventional operations, CA objectives are to bring a normal life back to the inhabitants of a country — by providing shelter to dislocated civilians and rebuilding or restarting civilian government and services.

Although history provides many examples of the need to care for and deal with civilians in war zones, it was not until World War II that the U.S. began using forces designed for that purpose. In that war and in Vietnam, Civil Affairs operations proved the value of protecting and winning the support of the civilian populace.

In recent operations in Grenada and Panama, CA units demonstrated their ability to care for civilians in the combat area and to restore civil government and services as quickly as possible so that government could resume its responsibilities. CA personnel are currently active in Kuwait, assisting to rebuild the government in the wake of Iraqi occupation.

As the role of Civil Affairs has become more prominent and the need for CA forces greater, our doctrine, training and force structure have changed to keep pace. Recent realignment of the Army Special Operations Command has placed all Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces, active

and reserve, under the Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command.

In 1992, new tables of organization and equipment for Civil Affairs foreign-internal-defense and unconventional-warfare battalions will provide detachments more precisely tailored for the various CA missions in LIC. These FID/UW battalions will be reserve component; the one active battalion will remain a general-support battalion, and we will need to harmonize AC and RC capabilities into our doctrine as well as our organizational and operational concepts.

In addition to its reserve Civil Affairs Branch, the Army two years ago added Functional Area 39 to give active-duty CA and PSYOP officers specific training, career management and repetitive assignments. Now the Army has approved a separate enlisted career management field for reserve-component Civil Affairs specialists. MOS 38A will offer soldiers opportunities for training and career progression within their MOS while allowing the Army to identify their skills for repetitive assignments. We are already at work to develop resident and non-resident instruction, training literature, basic and advanced NCO courses and skill-qualification tests for this new MOS.

We have also developed a new doctrinal manual on Civil Affairs, FM 41-10, which is now being put into final-draft form. A second CA manual in progress, FM 41-11, Civil Affairs Functions, will provide how-to instruction in the 20 mission areas of Civil Affairs.

As we move toward a future dominated by low-intensity conflict, and as reduced military budgets dictate waging war by integrated military and diplomatic activities, Civil Affairs, along with other SOF, will play an increasingly important role in keeping the peace, projecting U.S. influence and protecting our national-security interests.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. J. Baratto".

**Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto**

**Commander & Commandant**


Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto

**Editor**

Jerry D. Steelman

**Graphic Art Director**

Bruce S. Barfield



Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: AUTOVON 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special operations units. Individuals desiring a private subscription should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

**Carl E. Vuono***General, United States Army**Chief of Staff*

Official:

**Patricia P. Hickerson***Colonel, United States Army**The Adjutant General*

Headquarters, Department of the Army

**Features**

- 4 Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors in Contemporary Conflict**  
by Col. Rudolph Barnes Jr.
- 12 The Civil Affairs FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for SOF in LIC Operations**  
by Maj. Robert G. Brady
- 18 Civil Affairs in Support of the Unified Combatant Command: A Proposal for USCENTCOM**  
by Col. Ronald M. Smith
- 28 Civil Affairs in Operation Just Cause**
- 38 Seal the Victory: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs**  
by Stanley Sandler
- 42 Converting from H- to L-Series TOE: An Impossible Task for Civil Affairs?**  
by Lt. Col. Larry Wayne
- 44 The Truth About Promotion to Major: A No-nonsense Guide for Officers Facing the Major's Promotion Board**  
by Lt. Col. (P) Thomas Davis III
- 47 Military Qualification Standards System: Army Framework for Leader Development**
- 48 SOLLNIS: New Data Base Preserves SOF Lessons-Learned**

**Departments**

- 2 Letters**
- 50 Opinion**
- 52 Enlisted Career Notes**
- 54 Officer Career Notes**
- 56 Update**
- 62 Book Reviews**

# Letters

## Special Warfare

### **'The Jesuits' re-viewed**

I took exception to the review of the book, *The Jesuits: The Society of Jesus and the Betrayal of the Roman Catholic Church*. The review by Lt. Col. David Decker in the Winter 1990 issue not only indicated an inadequate knowledge of the Jesuits, but also a superficial view of revolutionary warfare.

In the latest issue of the Jesuit periodical, *America* (29 September 90), the Superior General of the Jesuit order, Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, discussed the Martin book:

I think he (Martin) has a novelist's fertile imagination and that his book is first and foremost a novel from which the obligatory disclaimer has been omitted: 'Any resemblance to actual people or events is purely accidental.'

"Martin represents me, for example, as talking to people whom I have never met in my life."

The Jesuits, celebrating their 450th year of existence, do indeed infuriate and antagonize people like me with a rather conservative viewpoint, as do the Maryknoll Fathers. I stopped my subscription to the Maryknoll periodical some years ago because of their slavish adulation of Fidel Castro. Nevertheless, the Jesuits and the Maryknoll Fathers often represent the only defender of the poor, the oppressed, the landless; they represent the "Church of the Poor." To whom else can the peasant turn? In my opinion, had the entire Church bureaucracy followed the lead of the relatively few Jesuits and represented the people instead of the state, the likes of Ortega and Castro would have not come to power in the first place, and the death and destruc-

tion in El Salvador might have been averted.

Decker seems to have adopted the view that "liberation theology" is an intrinsic evil. Nowhere in the Scriptures does Christ enjoin His disciples to go forth and defend the nobility, the landowners and military cliques. If the Marxists have manipulated liberation theology, it is only because we have, as Colonel Decker's review so well illustrates, allowed them full rein as we set ourselves against their agendas. Once again we seem to be aligning ourselves with the privileged against the disenfranchised. Moral issues aside, it is a sure recipe for another counterrevolutionary failure. Instead of looking for Marxist priests, we should be learning from the Jesuits and liberation theology.

Finally, rather than be worried about Soviet penetration of the Society of Jesus, I am concerned that so little has been learned from the annals of revolutionary war by those charged with teaching it at the Command and General Staff College.

Norvell B. De Atkine  
Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Fayetteville, N.C.

### **UN duty has advantages**

Special Forces officers are always looking to go to strange places, meet interesting people and ply their linguistic skills. This is particularly true if they hold a functional area of either Foreign Area Officer or Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs. There may be no better opportunity to do this than a year's tour of duty with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East.

The organization was established

in 1948 as a small group of military observers assigned to assist Count Folke Bernadotte in his attempt to arrange a cease fire between fledgling Israel and five Arab countries intent on "driving the Jews into the sea." There have been many wars, truces, cease fires and only one peace accord. Through it all, UN military observers from many nations have tried to assist in the effort to bring genuine peace to a troubled region. Some of them have died in the performance of their duties.

Environmentally, the Middle East is not what you might think; extremes from blistering desert to snow-capped mountains can be found. Some areas like those along the Nile and Jordan Rivers are lush with vegetation. Egypt's Sinai Peninsula contains some of the most forbidding and beautifully rugged terrain anywhere on the globe and has a history that spans millenniums. The entire area provides opportunities for the study of survival techniques in wide varieties of terrain and climatic conditions.

If one is interested in military history, it is in abundance there and has been written on in great detail, particularly the subject of the various Arab-Israeli wars. The opportunity to examine, at first hand, the battlefields near the Giddi and Mitla passes in the Sinai Desert is a once-in-a-lifetime chance.

By mission, Special Forces officers must possess the ability to work closely with soldiers of other nations. No assignment provides more challenges in this regard than the UN. Cross-cultural communication is an everyday affair. Officers from 15 other countries serve as

UN observers (many don't use English as their first language). Additionally, observers deal daily with the native populations in whatever region they are assigned.

There is a plethora of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity throughout the region. Although Arabic is spoken most commonly, it is spoken in different dialects from Morocco to Iraq.

This is a joint tour of one year's duration, although some officers are permitted to extend. With the exception of the Chief of the U.S. Military Observer Group in Jerusalem, all billets are designated for either captains or majors. Those who serve here normally receive the Joint Services Commendation and United Nations Peace Keeping Medals. The environment is one which is not only joint but combined and foreign as well. This adds to the complexity of the assignment and also makes it one of the most fascinating tours available to officers of any branch or service.

Since observation duties are not time-intensive, a tour with the UN is a perfect time to complete CGSC by correspondence or pursue other educational opportunities. The UN also provides 18 days of leave which can be used for regional travel.

For the most part American officers who serve there are volunteers. They come from many branches and all services. Although the U.S. does not pay to bring families to the region, many officers do pay out-of-pocket to have their families with them during the tour. UN per diem is generous and helps to cushion the impact of expenses incurred with a family move. Potentially an officer can be assigned in Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and other countries where peacekeeping is required. Currently Americans are not permitted to serve in Lebanon.

The challenges and rewards of a

UN assignment are many and varied. It is without question a unique tour of duty which is only limited by the imagination of the officer.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.  
Maj. Leonard Blevins  
Cmd. and Gen. Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

(Maj. Blevins completed a UN tour as senior UN military observer in the Sinai desert in November 1989. Maj. Adolph spent six months serving with the UN Military Observer Group Egypt and six months assigned to Observation Group - Lebanon. Both are SF officers currently attending CGSC. — Editor)

### **Send beret to museum**

I would like to use your forum to get something off my chest that has always been aggravating but recently became even more so.

The late President John F. Kennedy awarded the green beret to Special Forces soldiers, a small, elite unit of highly dedicated professionals with specialized training in the art of unconventional warfare.

The green beret, a mark of excellence and a symbol of distinction, was sought after by America's best soldiers. Once earned, it was proudly worn by those who proved themselves worthy.

I understand that Department of the Army started awarding the Special Forces tab to be a visual designator of that select group of men who have earned the title "Special Forces." I also understand that non-Special Forces soldiers assigned to one of the SF groups would want a green beret to look like the other soldiers in the unit.

However, many supporting units not actually assigned to an SF group, but assigned to 1st Special Operations Command (now Army

Special Forces Command), have exchanged their maroon berets for green ones and sewn on their own flash and unit crest.

The quality of soldiers that are wearing a green beret in these supporting units, male or female, while good enough to be in that unit doing his or her job, hardly qualifies them to be Special Forces.

My suggestion for a solution to the problem of putting all soldiers of such a diversified command in common headgear would be to retire the green beret to the JFK Special Warfare Museum, while it still represents that which it has symbolized, and put all the soldiers under the BDU cap. I wonder how many would stay if this were to happen?

I need to mention that this is my personal opinion, and while shared by many, does not necessarily reflect the opinion of my command or the U.S. Army.

SFC William A. Easterling  
1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group  
Fort Bragg, N.C.

(For uniformity, the 1st Special Operations Command [now Army Special Forces Command] put all its soldiers in the green beret in April 1990, according to Maj. Craig Barta, USAFC public affairs officer. When the command became the Army Special Forces Command, it adopted the arrowhead shoulder patch formerly worn only by the SF groups, and that, too, is now worn by all members of the command, including headquarters and support personnel, Barta said. Only the SF tab and the SF branch insignia remain what President Kennedy called, "a mark of distinction." For more on the SF tab and the new Army SF command, see this issue's "Update" section. — Editor)

Because of production delays, this is the first issue of *Special Warfare* since Vol. 3, No. 1, which appeared in August 1990. We regret any confusion which the jump in issue numbers may cause among those who catalog or collect our publication. — Editor

# Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors In Contemporary Conflict

by Col. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.



The end of the Cold War has ushered in a new world order, and with it a need for new military strategies. The national strategy of containment has served its purpose; new national-security objectives will require new military strategies with military capabilities to match.

The virtual insolvency of the Soviet Union and the relative decline of U.S. economic dominance can be attributed in large part to the over-extensive military commitments of these superpowers during the Cold War. One or the other was destined to fall, not because of inferior military forces or political ideology, but by spending beyond its means. Such "overstretch" is not new; it has been the underlying cause of the fall of great powers since the 16th century.<sup>1</sup>

With the Soviets now relegated to a lesser role, the dominance of the U.S. is being challenged by the growing economic strength of Japan, the European Common Market and a newly unified Germany.

They owe their strength, ironically enough, to the U.S., which has provided their defense needs since World War II. As a result of this largess, U.S. national strategy is now constrained by mounting trade and internal budget deficits — this at a time when economic strength is as important an index of world power as military strength.

The threat environment has changed dramatically. There is no longer an "evil empire" to justify U.S. military intervention. The familiar bipolar hegemony of nations has given way to a new nationalism, creating a multipolar free-for-all for world power. In this uncertain geopolitical environment, economic policy and diplomacy will likely be the primary means of power projection — but they have their limits. The military instrument of national power will remain relevant, but it will have to be closely integrated with political and economic instruments to be effective.

In spite of its success, Desert

Shield/Storm is likely to be the exception that proves the rule for most future military operations. That rule is that U.S. combat forces should not be committed in peacetime unless the following conditions are met: vital national interests are at stake; political and military objectives are clearly defined; the size of the force is related to those objectives; and there is public and congressional support for the commitment. Even if these conditions are met, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.<sup>2</sup>

Unlike its predecessors Urgent Fury (Grenada 1983) and Just Cause (Panama 1989), Desert Shield/Storm, because of its large scope, extensive collateral damage, and its purpose to protect national-security objectives of debatable priority, is likely to be the exceptional case.

There are few other peacetime scenarios that would justify such a massive deployment of combat forces to such a distant and deso-

late region. Likewise, there are few other places on this earth where 500,000 U.S. forces could be effectively isolated from local civilians with whom culture clashes would otherwise be inevitable.

Large-scale conventional deployments, other than temporary shows of force, are economically burdensome and have a politically limiting effect on U.S. national-security policy. Not only are such deployments expensive, but maintaining the force overseas indefinitely is even more so, creating strong political and economic pressures on policy makers to initiate offensive action when other less expensive options (in both lives and money) could achieve U.S. objectives. Political pressures such as economic sanctions and embargoes take time to work, but time can be the enemy when maintaining 500,000 troops in a hostile environment overseas.

There are other options available to policy makers that are less expensive, less dangerous and more compatible with peacetime diplomacy. Clandestine or covert special operations are limited in size and scope by their nature and can address specific targets more effectively than conventional combat operations. Most other non-contingency peacetime military operations are joint ventures between the Departments of Defense and State which contemplate a limited number of regionally oriented U.S. military personnel having extensive contact with civilians in the area of operations. In any contemporary scenario requiring a sustained U.S. military presence overseas, even contingency combat operations, public support is critical to mission success:

"Of the lessons that demand attention, the foremost concerns the role of the people in warfare. ... (C)ivilians ... may be the medium within which the conflict occurs; they may sustain the combatants or double as fighters themselves; or they may constitute a strategic objective whose support determines

war's outcome — but almost without exception in modern wars, the people play an integral part. ... Popular will forms the center of gravity of a nation's ability to wage war."<sup>3</sup>

There are two dimensions of the popular will or public support required for military operations: one in the area of operations and the other back home. Col. Harry Summers has described the vital role of U.S. public support and its relationship to national strategy in the Vietnam War,<sup>4</sup> and Col. A. J. Bacevich is among the visionary military leaders who have recognized the importance of civilian support to U.S. military and political objectives in the area of operations.<sup>5</sup>

Civil Affairs personnel are the interface between U.S. military forces and local civilians. The primary CA peacetime mission is to mobilize public support in the area of operations in support of U.S. military and political objectives.<sup>6</sup> The Army's CA personnel are front-line diplomat-warriors, serving as an extension of both the U.S. military and diplomatic corps.<sup>7</sup>

The importance of CA support at the tactical level varies with the relative priority of military and

political objectives, and that priority varies according to the intensity of conflict. During medium- and high-intensity conflict, military objectives at the tactical level predominate to the exclusion of political objectives. Enemy forces represent the center of gravity, and mission success depends upon the application of overwhelming military force to take and hold strategic ground and ultimately destroy the enemy (or its will to resist). In this environment civilians are obstacles to combat operations, and their support is secondary to military objectives. Minimizing civilian interference with combat operations is the primary CA mission during wartime and is only a secondary, combat-support role.

In peacetime low-intensity conflict, mission objectives are more political than military, requiring a role reversal for CA and combat forces. In the ambiguous and often violent peacetime environment of LIC, the center of gravity is political legitimacy for the supported government or group. Achieving that legitimacy requires mobilizing and maintaining civilian support for military and political objectives,



Photo courtesy Terry Henry

Members of the 96th CA Battalion discuss problems with members of the village of Tocumen, Panama, following Operation Just Cause.



a primary CA mission. Mobilizing public support in LIC requires that the force that is determinative in combat be restricted to prevent collateral damage.

LIC describes a violent competition for political power, usually in autocratic (or superficially democratic) regimes which lack effective mechanisms for the peaceful transition of political power. Even where the means to political authority are violent, however, the legitimacy of political authority ultimately depends upon public support: "The struggle between the insurgent and the incumbent is over political legitimacy — who should govern and how they should govern. (Accordingly,) one of the principal elements in this struggle is the effort to mobilize public support. Whoever succeeds at this will ultimately prevail."<sup>8</sup>

Evolving joint defense doctrine recognizes the dominance of the political instrument in LIC, and that political legitimacy is an imperative for military operations in LIC. Legitimacy is described as "the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict," and is derived "from the (public) perception that authority is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes."<sup>9</sup>

The legitimacy of military operations (operational legitimacy) is both a cause and effect of the public support required for political legitimacy. Public support is necessary for the legitimacy of sustained military operations, and operational legitimacy is necessary for public support. Collateral damage caused by the excessive use of military force can undermine the public support necessary for political legitimacy. For that reason, the restricted use of force is a LIC imperative which "refers to the judicious, prudent, and thoughtful selection and employment of forces most suitable to the mission. Excessive violence can adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede

the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals."<sup>10</sup>

Not only is the restricted use of force imperative for public support, but the public perception of legitimacy is essential for sustained U.S. military operations overseas. Since the Vietnam debacle, the U.S. public has been especially sensitive to issues involving the legitimacy of U.S. military operations overseas, and Desert Shield/Storm is no exception. The public mood is reflected by Congress, and congressional support is essential for any sustained U.S. military commitment overseas.<sup>11</sup>


To achieve legitimacy, CA support emphasizes command compliance with legal and moral standards affecting civilians.<sup>12</sup> Advising the command on legal obligations to civilians is an operational-law responsibility of the command judge advocate, so that there should be close coordination between CA and legal-staff elements.<sup>13</sup> Some operational-law issues shared by CA and legal-staff elements are: the limitations of military necessity and proportionality in the use of force which threatens civilian life or

property, the acquisition of civilian property and labor, and property- and resources-control measures. Because of the overlap of CA and legal issues, a command or staff judge advocate with CA and operational-law expertise can provide CA as well as legal-staff support.<sup>14</sup>

## History

Since its inception, military history has provided illustrations of the importance of public support and legitimacy to military operations,<sup>15</sup> but it was not until World War II that CA was officially born. As the Allies drove into Germany in World War II, newly liberated areas required the establishment of temporary governments to provide essential public services to civilians. Combat leaders were quick to recognize CA diplomat-warriors as force multipliers, relieving their combat troops for battlefield duty.<sup>16</sup>

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower initially requested 960 CA officers, and that request was later increased to thousands of personnel. Of these, approximately 200 were highly qualified lawyers, most of whom were assigned to military-



Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, allied commander-in-chief during World War II (left), requested thousands of Civil Affairs officers to serve in Europe. Here he leaves a briefing with Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, commander, 5th Army.



government duties. In addition to CA lawyers serving in military government, there were instances in which commanders cognizant of the close relationship between operational law and CA support had their staff judge advocates perform CA staff functions as well.<sup>17</sup>

During World War II, CA was considered synonymous with military government. Early doctrine distinguished the two terms by operational environment: operations in friendly countries were considered to be CA, while those in occupied enemy territory were military government. During World War II, CA operations (now known as civil administration) were conducted in North Africa, France, Holland, Belgium and the Philippines, while military-government operations were conducted in Sicily, Austria, Germany, Okinawa, Japan and Korea.<sup>18</sup>

Even though early doctrine distinguished CA and military government, it was not until 1959 that military government became a subordinate function of CA. That year the Joint Chiefs of Staff made CA an all-inclusive term, with military government one of its mission areas. That definition has remained essentially unchanged.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to joint doctrine, Army doctrine was slower to distinguish CA from military government.<sup>20</sup> It was not until December 1985 that the Army recognized significant peacetime mission areas for CA and military government as only part of the wartime CA mission.<sup>21</sup>

In spite of the Army's doctrinal lag, CA was recognized as a major element of counterinsurgency support during U.S. involvement in Vietnam. As the conflict in Vietnam escalated, however, the role and priority of CA changed. The evolving role of Special Forces in Vietnam illustrated the contrast between peacetime and wartime CA support. Initially the focus of SF was advisory, with an emphasis on civilian support. After 1965, however, when the conflict escalated with



Photo by Richard R. Johnson

SSgt. Thomas McNiff, an SF medic, coaxes a Vietnamese child to open her mouth during sick call at Duc Co, Vietnam in December 1965. SF advisory and medical-assistance missions waned in Vietnam as U.S. emphasis shifted to direct-action missions.

U.S. combat forces, the emphasis shifted to direct-action operations that were not as dependent upon local civilian support.

Before the escalation to conventional conflict distorted LIC concepts in Vietnam, U.S. military advisers successfully employed CA techniques. In fact, their success in motivating indigenous forces against the Viet Cong may have caused the escalation of conflict by the North Vietnamese, which in turn precipitated the deployment of U.S. combat forces. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group forces trained by SF units were effective in guerrilla warfare against the Viet Cong, but they were no match for the North Vietnamese regular forces.<sup>22</sup>

With the introduction of major U.S. maneuver commands in Vietnam, the measure of success at the operational and tactical levels shifted from political legitimacy to a more quantitative measurement: the body count. Civilians once con-

sidered essential to mission success became obstacles to combat operations, or in the dense fog of that war, the enemy.<sup>23</sup>

Even then, CA was not forgotten. When the U.S. Marines arrived in 1965, their Combined Action Platoon Program successfully employed CA techniques to achieve civilian support of their combat operations. Unfortunately the extensive collateral damage caused by combat operations in an ambiguous environment, coupled with widespread corruption in the South Vietnamese government, neutralized any civilian support gained by CA operations.

It was not until 1967 that Army CA units began supporting combat forces in Vietnam. They met with limited success, with their activities primarily in support of general-purpose conventional operations rather than special operations directed at political legitimacy. Also, in 1967, Ambassador Robert W. Komer took charge of the Civil Operations and

Revolutionary Development Support program, called CORDS, and through it managed for the first time to coordinate all military and civilian agencies in pacification and nation-building in Vietnam. By then, however, it was too late to salvage the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government or prevent the erosion of public support for the war in the U.S.<sup>24</sup>

Despite failures in Vietnam, in other LIC environments of that era, U.S. forces successfully conducted CA activities. Special-action forces (now referred to as security-assistance forces) composed of SF, CA, Psychological Operations and other elements tailored to the needs of the area, quietly but effectively supported counterinsurgency operations in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. That there were few successful insurgencies in the regions where these unique units functioned from the 1960s to the early 1970s is the best evidence of their effectiveness.<sup>25</sup>

In the wake of the “Vietnam syndrome” of the 1970s, all of the special-action forces were dismantled, and with them all but one of the active-component CA units. It was

not until the early 1980s that there was renewed interest in CA as a component of peacetime military operations, and U.S. military interventions, first in Grenada in 1983 (Urgent Fury) and later in Panama in 1989 (Just Cause) gave CA personnel an opportunity to prove their relevance. Unlike the Vietnam experience, these combat operations enjoyed wide public support in the U.S. and the areas of operations because of their surgical nature, clear military success, and quick withdrawal of combat forces once military objectives were achieved.

Following brief combat operations in Grenada and Panama, CA personnel helped make the transition from military to civilian control. They contributed to the legitimacy of the fledgling governments by helping them provide essential services to civilians dislocated by combat operations.

In Grenada, CA personnel worked with the Grenadian government and the United States Agency for International Development to re-establish essential services and helped with a longer-term project to improve school facilities.<sup>26</sup>

In Panama, CA personnel once again proved their value as force

multipliers; they were involved from the initial airborne assault and performed extensive combat-support roles before assuming post-combat civil-administration support functions.<sup>27</sup>

The verdict on the Panama intervention is not yet in. While there has been little criticism of military operations per se, there has been criticism of the decision to use such a large combat force to accomplish limited U.S. political objectives. Collateral damage to civilian persons and property was not excessive for the size force deployed, but if a smaller force could have accomplished the same objectives, then collateral damage was excessive to the extent it could have been avoided. Whether the amount of force used in Panama was legitimate and appropriate will ultimately be decided by the Panamanian people, who will determine the political future of their country and its relationship with the U.S.

Unfortunately, anti-U.S. sentiment seems to be growing in Panama. A recent poll by the Panamanian newspaper *La Prensa* indicated that Panamanians believe that the problems left over from the intervention outweigh the benefits. The president of the Panama Bar Association, Jose Alberto Alvarez, has stated: “Of Bush’s objectives, only one was really achieved — getting rid of Manuel Noriega ... (and) they could’ve captured him without an invasion, without destroying the country.”<sup>28</sup>

A Panamanian senator critical of the U.S. military intervention had some advice for U.S. policy makers concerning Desert Shield/Storm: “They better do everything differently in Iraq. Here, they found an army that didn’t fight and people who applauded them in the streets. Over there, they’ll find an army that fights and people who hate Americans. This time the Americans won’t win over hearts by giving out C-rations and chocolate.”<sup>29</sup>

Although coming from a former Noriega cabinet member, this



Photo by Stephen Kopels

Montagnard villagers work on a dam near Thuy Tu, Vietnam in 1968. Materials were supplied by CORDS, supervision by Civil Affairs personnel.



Photo by Vince Warner

U. S. soldiers distribute emergency food supplies to Panamanians during Operation Just Cause in December 1989.

advice should give U.S. policy makers pause. Achieving political objectives that require public support in a hostile environment will be difficult, no matter how decisive the military victory.

Whether the population is friendly or hostile, however, mobilizing public support for military and political objectives will continue to be the CA mission. Performing this mission in contemporary threat environments such as Southwest Asia and Latin America without the familiar Soviet threat to drive U.S. security policy will require new national strategies, doctrine and force structure.

### Doctrine and force structure

With the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command in 1986 and its subordinate commands in 1989, there are new force structures to provide CA in contemporary military operations. Unfortunately, there is no national strategy to guide military planners in preparing CA doctrine. In spite of this lack of direction, however, doctrine is being developed for joint CA operations at the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Army is developing its own

doctrine at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C.<sup>30</sup>

Evolving CA doctrine reflects a priority for peacetime military operations, the most likely environment for protecting U.S. security interests in the near term. The four CA mission areas listed in draft joint CA doctrine are not new, but they are adapted to support peacetime military activities and operations.<sup>31</sup>

The first CA mission area, support for general-purpose and conventional operations, includes CA wartime support missions previously known as command support, but these functions have application in peacetime LIC as well. They include the preparation of CA assessments, estimates and annexes which provide a picture of the cultural environment in which operations are anticipated; identifying and acquiring civil resources, human and material, to support military operations; assisting commanders to comply with lawful and humanitarian obligations to civilians; minimizing civilian involvement in combat; assisting with humanitarian and disaster-relief activities; supporting noncombat-

ant evacuation operations; and providing command liaison with civilian authorities.<sup>32</sup>

The second CA mission area, support for special operations, includes support for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. Together they represent the competing forces in LIC: UW supports insurgency (resistance force) activities, while FID supports counterinsurgency (internal defense and development) activities. UW is distinguished from insurgency only by its strategic objectives; unlike an insurgency, UW has international objectives. Aside from providing support to opposite sides in LIC, UW and FID differ in another respect: FID activities are usually overt, while UW activities are usually covert. Both UW and FID share the same objective, however: to mobilize the civilian support necessary for political legitimacy, and to deny that support to the opposition.<sup>33</sup>

The third mission area of CA, civil administration, also has applicability in LIC. Civil administration assists friendly governments in providing essential public services during peace or war; in occupied territory during wartime, civil administration is referred to as military government. Civil administration relies heavily upon the 20 functional areas of CA which represent essential government services.<sup>34</sup>

As demonstrated in Grenada and Panama, civil administration has obvious application following combat in peacetime contingency operations, and CA personnel assisted in the restoration of government services in Kuwait after its liberation from Iraqi occupation. Civil administration has an important role in FID and UW as well: the provision of essential services is a prerequisite for the legitimacy sought by the competing forces in LIC.<sup>35</sup>

The fourth CA mission area is support for the domestic civil sector, which includes emergency and disaster relief within the U.S.<sup>36</sup> Although similar to CA activities conducted overseas, the issues of legiti-



Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Philippine flood victims await delivery of U.S. emergency food supplies.

macy and public support for domestic CA activities are not as complex. Legal constraints, however, can be even more involved for domestic CA activities, such as disaster relief, than for the same activities conducted overseas.<sup>37</sup>

Civic action, humanitarian and civic assistance, and disaster relief are CA activities which are not limited to any one CA mission area. These activities are similar to caring for civilians that have been displaced by the ravages of war, and beyond meeting legal obligations have the same objective: to meet essential human needs and mobilize public support for U.S. military and political objectives. These activities have been the mainstay of U.S. nation-building activities since the 1960s, complementing diplomatic and economic assistance during peacetime.<sup>38</sup>

The force structure for CA is being modernized to provide a capability that can perform these CA mission requirements. For the first time, all active and reserve CA units have been consolidated in a single command: the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command at Fort Bragg. In addition, a new "L" series

table of organization and equipment is being phased in which will provide CA FID/UW battalions tailored to meet the special requirements of LIC.<sup>39</sup>

One major problem remains: 97 percent of CA personnel are in the Army Reserve, as are the new CA FID/UW units, and they must be mobilized to become operational. Since mobilization is not likely during peacetime (Desert Shield/Storm considered the exception), these CA units may not become operational until the law is changed. Meanwhile, the 96th CA Battalion at Fort Bragg, the only active-component CA unit, will continue to be tasked to provide CA support for FID/UW and quick-reaction CA support for peacetime contingency military operations.

## Summary

Dramatic changes in the geopolitical environment will undoubtedly change the focus if not substance of current U.S. military strategies. Given the changing world order and U.S. economic restraints, new national strategies will emphasize the integration of military operations with U.S. diplomatic and foreign-policy activities. Whatever the

strategy, public support in both the U.S. and the area of operations will continue to be an essential ingredient for the legitimacy of U.S. military operations.

The CA diplomat-warrior can assist the commander to mobilize public support in the area of operations, but is not a substitute for the conventional combat soldier. There will always be a need for military force to protect vital U.S. security interests. When civilians are involved, however, CA personnel are a valuable force multiplier. As citizen-soldiers, CA personnel can relate to civilian and military concerns both in the area of operations and back home, helping their commanders achieve the legitimacy required for mission success.

Achieving U.S. security objectives in a transitional geopolitical environment will require more military options than the direct application of overwhelming military force. The military instrument of national policy must complement and often be integrated with the diplomatic instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In helping to achieve U.S. security objectives in war and peace, the CA diplomat-warrior can be a vital defense asset, serving as an extension of both the U.S. military and diplomatic corps. ✕

---

Col. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., USAR, is an attorney with offices in Prosperity, S.C. Currently assigned as the staff judge advocate for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command at Fort Bragg, he served as the assistant staff judge advocate for the JFK Center for Special Warfare in 1968 and later as the judge advocate and civil affairs legal officer for Special Action Force-Asia. He holds a BA from the Citadel, an MPA and a JD from the University of South Carolina, and is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College.

# Notes:

<sup>1</sup> For an extensive and well-documented history of the relationship between economic and military power since 1500, see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).

<sup>2</sup> These criteria were prepared by former Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger in 1984; see David T. Twining, "Vietnam and the Six Criteria for the Use of Military Force," *Parameters*, Winter 1985, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> A.J. Bacevich, "New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism," *Parameters*, December 1990, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1989), chap. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Bacevich, p. 19; see also William S. Lind, et al., "The Changing Face of War Into the Fourth Generation," *Military Review*, October 1989, pp. 5-11.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), defines Civil Affairs as "Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: **a.** matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied; and **b.** military government: the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory."

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the "diplomat-warrior," see Barnes, "The Diplomat Warrior," *Military Review*, May 1990, p. 55.

<sup>8</sup> See Michael T. Klare, "The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military Doctrine for Low Intensity Warfare," in Peter Kornbluh's *Low Intensity Warfare* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). For a discussion of the concept of legitimacy in LIC and its relationship to civilian support, see Barry Crane, et al., "Between Peace and War: Comprehending Low Intensity Conflict," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1989, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (final draft, January 1990), chap. I, p. I-26.

<sup>10</sup> JCS Pub. 3-07, chap. I, p. I-28.

<sup>11</sup> Summers, chap. 2.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, December 1985, p. 1-1.

<sup>13</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs* (initial draft, May 1990), chap. I, p. I-6.

<sup>14</sup> See U.S. Army Special Operations Command Circular 27-90-1, *Special Operations Forces Law of War Program Deskbook* (23 April 1990), chap. 4, app. B, for a summary of those laws applicable to civilians in time of war; for a discussion of the interrelationship of legitimacy and public support, and the overlap between the functions of the SJA and G-5, see Barnes, "Legitimacy and the Lawyer in LIC: Civil Affairs Legal Support," *The Army Lawyer*, October 1988, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> See Stanley Sandler, "Seal the Victory," in this issue of *Special Warfare*.

<sup>16</sup> Ralph R. Young, "Snapshots of Civil Affairs: A Historical Perspective and Views," unpublished paper presented at the 39th Annual Conference of the Civil Affairs Association, San Antonio, Texas, 5 June 1986.

<sup>17</sup> Col. Ted B. Borek, "Legal Services During War," 120 *Military Law Review* 1988, pp. 35-40.

<sup>18</sup> Gen. William Richardson, commanding general, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Draft Memorandum to Gen. John Wickham, Army chief of staff (Subject: Civil Affairs Modernization), dated June 1986, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3-15.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> FM 41-10.

<sup>22</sup> Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years: A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), chaps. 10 and 13; Shelby L. Stanton, *The Rise and Fall of an American Army* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1988), chaps. 1 and 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> William R. Berkman, "Civil Affairs in Vietnam," a paper written for the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 28 December 1973.

<sup>25</sup> Simpson, chap. 18.

<sup>26</sup> See Delbert L. Spurlock, "Grenada Provides Classic Case," *The Officer*, August 1984, p. 17; also, Barnes, "Grenada Revisited: Civil Affairs Operates in Paradise," *The Officer*, July 1985, p. 14.

<sup>27</sup> See article, "Civil Affairs in Just Cause," in this issue of *Special Warfare*.

<sup>28</sup> See David L. Marcus, "Panama: Still in Turmoil," feature article from *Dallas Morning News* published in *The State*, Columbia, S.C., 16 December 1990, p. D-1.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> The initial draft of JCS Pub. 3-57 was published in May 1990; a preliminary draft of FM 41-10 was published in June 1990.

<sup>31</sup> See JCS Pub. 3-07, chap. II.

<sup>32</sup> JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II, pp. II-2 - II-4; also FM 41-10, chap. 2.

<sup>33</sup> JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II p. II-4; also FM 41-10, chaps. 3 and 4.

<sup>34</sup> The 20 CA functional specialties are: civil defense, labor, legal, public administration, public education, public finance, public health, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply, economics and commerce, food and agriculture, property control, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, arts, monuments and archives, civil information, cultural affairs, and dislocated civilians. FM 41-10, Appendix A.

<sup>35</sup> JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II, p. II-5; also FM 41-10, chap. 5.

<sup>36</sup> JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II, p. II-6.

<sup>37</sup> See generally, Army Regulation 500-60, *Disaster Relief*.

<sup>38</sup> See Col. Ronald Smith, "Civil Affairs in Support of the Unified Combatant Command: A Proposal for USCENCOM," in this issue of *Special Warfare*; also, Barnes, "Civic Action, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Disaster Relief: Military Priorities in LIC," *Special Warfare*, Fall 1989, p. 34.

<sup>39</sup> See Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, "Converting from H to L Series TOE: An Impossible Task for CA?"; also, Maj. Robert Brady, "The CA FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for SOF in LIC Operations," both in this issue of *Special Warfare*.

# The Civil Affairs FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for SOF in LIC Operations

by Maj. Robert G. Brady

While the Army considers Civil Affairs units to be special-operations forces, these units were originally organized and have remained primarily dedicated to the support of conventional forces in wartime.

Although support to Special Forces and Ranger units has been task-organized on an ad-hoc basis for years, primarily by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at Fort Bragg, N.C., there are no Civil Affairs units designed specifically to support other SOF or to perform independent missions at the lower end of the strategic continuum — in peacetime competition and conflict. This situation will change with the scheduled activation in FY 92 of Civil Affairs foreign-internal-defense/unconventional-warfare battalions.

Civil Affairs FID/UW battalions will be specialized units capable of planning and conducting special civil-military operations in support of national-security objectives. They will provide the National Command Authority and the theater commanders-in-chief, the CINCs, to whom they will be apportioned, with the capability to employ specialized, regionally oriented and linguistically qualified Civil Affairs teams to train, advise or assist indigenous

forces in FID and UW.

U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. European Command are each scheduled to be apportioned one reserve-component FID/UW battalion. The only active-component CA unit, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, will remain a general-support battalion which can also conduct CA support of FID and UW. Modifications to the table of organization and equipment will be necessary because the 96th will remain apportioned to all five theaters and will retain its two missions of supporting conventional contingency operations and supporting SOF in LIC.

## Mission

In foreign-internal-defense operations, the FID/UW battalion will provide Civil Affairs technical advice and assistance to the theater special-operations command and to Special Forces groups, battalions and detachments. The battalion will also advise and assist indigenous military forces and national governmental agencies in population and resource control and in the development of civic-action and civil-assistance programs. It will be able to assist the CINC in

mobilizing U.S. military assets and units under his control to assist nation-building efforts.

In unconventional-warfare operations, FID/UW battalions will provide training, advice and assistance to Special Forces elements and to indigenous resistance movements. They will plan and help conduct population-and-resource-control programs and the organization of auxiliaries, the internal support elements of resistance movements. They will also assist in the development of civic-action programs and in the execution of political warfare.

Political warfare is the term for activities which help U.S.-sponsored resistance movements extend their political influence. It includes actions such as assisting the movement to establish a government structure in areas which it controls. It also includes helping the resistance to select, train and operate political-agitation teams in enemy-held territory.

By assisting in political warfare, the U.S. can support a mass-strategy insurgency, versus a predominantly military strategy. The mass strategy combines military power with political and social organization to supplant the government in



insurgent-controlled regions of the country. Through their own political organs, the insurgents organize the population to raise and support larger guerrilla units, eventually becoming strong enough to overthrow the government through force of arms.

## Organization

The Civil Affairs FID/UW battalion consists of 216 soldiers. Commanded by a lieutenant colonel, it has 23 majors, 42 captains and 118 NCOs. The rank structure is necessary because of the sensitivity and complexity of its missions. The FID/UW battalions will be composed of a battalion headquarters detachment, a general-support detachment and three direct-support detachments.

The active general-support battalion will have four direct-support companies, one per theater, with one company dual-tasked to support EUCOM and LANTCOM. At the time of this writing, the Army Special Operations Command had established a requirement for a fifth DS company to alleviate the double tasking.

Both AC and RC battalions can operate as single units, as separate detachments, or as task-organized teams or specialists deployed for specific missions. FID/UW battalions will include experts such as entomologists, dentists, veterinarians, physician's assistants, preventive-medicine specialists and engineers, as well as members of the Judge Advocate General, Medical Service Corps and Civil Affairs branches. The AC battalion will not have entomologists or dentists, but it will have a heavy representation of Special Forces.

## DS detachments

The direct-support detachments provide training, assistance and technical advice to Special Forces detachments, indigenous military forces, civilian government agencies and resistance movements in planning and conducting civic action,

population and resource control and political warfare. They consist of a detachment headquarters, seven direct-support teams and a civic-action team.

Each of the seven direct-support teams consists of a Civil Affairs-qualified captain and three NCOs. In the reserves, these NCOs will be specially trained Civil Affairs sergeants of the new MOS 38A, now under development. In the active battalion, these NCOs will be SF operations-and-intelligence NCOs (18F), medics (18D) and engineers (18C). They will advise and assist both indigenous forces and SF operational detachments.

The civic-action team consists of a Civil Affairs officer, an engineer, a veterinarian, a physician's assistant and an environmental-sciences officer. It will help indigenous forces develop and implement civic-action programs by providing skill in the technical areas of light-construction

engineering and medical support, including disease prevention.

In FID these teams will be employed independently as mobile training teams to indigenous battalion- or company-level organizations or to augment SF elements. There they will assist in developing local civic-action projects, population and resource controls and public-education programs.

In UW they will assist in the selection, training and operations of political-agitation teams; development of auxiliaries; and the establishment of population and resource controls. They will provide advice and assistance to indigenous resistance movements and U.S. Special Forces detachments on the establishment and operations of resistance government at the local level.

## GS detachments

The RC battalions' general-support detachment will contain many




U.S. soldiers perform veterinary medicine in a Central American village. Medical and veterinary civic-action projects will be part of the mission of the new Civil Affairs FID/UW battalions.

U.S. Army photo



# Civil Affairs in Support of SOF


## FID/UW BATTALION



## 96th CA BATTALION



## DIRECT-SUPPORT DETACHMENT



## GENERAL-SUPPORT DETACHMENT



of the unit's specialized skills. It will consist of a detachment headquarters, a civil-assistance team, a public-health team and a dislocated-civilian team.

The civil-assistance team consists of 11 Civil Affairs officers and a JAG officer. Its primary mission will be to assist in planning and developing U.S. support for nation-building activities. Specifically, it can assist in developing public-transportation systems and in planning and implementing public-safety activities, public-education programs, and population and resource controls at province and district levels.

The public-health/dental team consists of preventive-medicine specialists, Medical Service Corps officers, dentists and veterinarians. The team assists in determining the medical requirements of civilian populations in designated regions and can also give limited medical support and training to indigenous personnel. Civil-assistance and public-health teams will closely coordinate their operations with the United States Agency for International Development and any other U.S. relief organizations. For certain peacetime missions, the teams may be placed under the opera-

tional control of USAID.

The dislocated-civilian team consists of Civil Affairs and Military Police officers and NCOs. In FID this team will plan and coordinate humanitarian support for dislocated persons such as refugees and evacuees. For UW operations it will continue to perform this mission but will also have a critical role in assisting to consolidate and organize refugees to aid recruiting and auxiliary development for UW campaigns.

## Concept of employment

In the past, Civil Affairs units focused their efforts in FID on

assisting the host-nation military improve its relationship with the population through civic action. This was often expressed as “winning the hearts and minds of the people.” CA units had no target or objective expressed in military terms and therefore had considerable difficulty in explaining their role to military commanders. This lack of understanding hampered CA-unit efforts, and their priorities and concerns were often the first sacrificed in any conflict with conventional military objectives.

In order to focus the efforts of CA units, their primary objective needed to be expressed in military terms. Therefore, the objective of the CA FID/UW battalions was defined as the disruption or destruction of the vital supporting link between the civilian population and the enemy. This basic principle remains the same whether the unit is engaged in FID or UW. Specific targets which the FID/UW battalions will attack at the grass-roots level are the enemy’s non-military vulnerabilities: political, economic, social-cultural and ideological.

## Vulnerabilities

Political vulnerabilities are of two types. The first is internal contradiction in the enemy’s political platform and conflict between that platform and the legitimate goals and aspirations of the local population. The second is loss of control or influence over segments of the population, either because of the military situation or because of physical remoteness of the population segment.

— In FID, enemy political vulnerabilities are attacked by assisting host-nation military forces or government agencies to establish command-information and public-education programs to counter the enemy’s political message and to publicize any government reforms. Political vulnerabilities are also attacked by helping the government establish strong population-control measures to help isolate the

auxiliaries and the guerrillas and identify the political cadres. The level of assistance is determined by the U.S. ambassador, based on requests for assistance by the supported government, and is closely coordinated with the U.S. Information Agency.

— In UW, political vulnerabilities are attacked by providing advice and assistance in the selection, training and operations of resistance political-agitation teams. When required, CA FID/UW elements will exploit the enemy’s lack of political control over regions of territory or elements of the popula-

---

“... the objective of the CA FID/UW battalions was defined as the disruption or destruction of the vital supporting link between the civilian population and the enemy. This basic principle remains the same whether the unit is engaged in FID or UW.”

---

tion by assisting the movement to establish an overt resistance government. When the enemy maintains partial control, CA elements may assist in the establishment of a local covert shadow government.

Economic vulnerabilities are defined as shortages of important consumer goods and services required by the population under enemy control and shortages in raw and finished materials required by the enemy for the prosecution of its war effort. Included in this category are vulnerabilities associated with an enemy’s dependence on one or two critical products for foreign-exchange earnings.

— In FID, economic vulnerabilities are attacked by assisting host-

nation government agencies establish and operate resource controls to deny the enemy vital materials. Economic vulnerabilities are also exploited by pacification programs that emphasize civic action and developmental-assistance projects in zones adjacent to areas under enemy control.

— In UW, the enemy government’s economic vulnerabilities are attacked by coordinating military operations with strikes, boycotts and sabotage by front organizations. The goal is to sever the resources of the countryside from population centers under enemy control. Attacks on critical economic targets must be carefully managed to avoid impoverishment of the rural community under guerrilla control. By the same token, the value of destroying the overall economy must be carefully weighed for its political value in terms of its effect on the movement’s claims of legitimacy. CA elements will assist the auxiliary in developing plans to redirect economic activity to support the guerrillas and the civilian population under resistance control. This can be done by establishing war-production facilities and by developing alternative markets for civilian-produced goods.

Social-cultural vulnerabilities are ethnic, religious or class disparities between the hierarchy or membership of enemy organizations and the population they are attempting to control.

During FID operations, these vulnerabilities are exploited by advising and assisting indigenous military or civilian agencies to establish population-control measures which will identify and isolate the enemy’s infrastructure. They can also be exploited by establishing command-information programs and passive civilian surveillance organizations.

In UW, social-cultural vulnerabilities are attacked through the operations of political-agitation teams, and through population-control measures and the establishment of overt resistance government in

areas controlled by the guerrillas.

Ideological vulnerabilities often appear as contradictions between political theory and doctrine and the reality of their implementation. Marxist governments and insurgent organizations are particularly vulnerable in this area, but rural populations are often unaware of the convulsions the communist world is undergoing today. Communist propagandists exploit this lack of understanding with a barrage of perversions of history and distortions of current events. The American adviser, accustomed to avoiding political questions, is often hamstrung by his inability to place military operations in the context of ideology. In the political struggle of LIC, soldiers must be able to discuss basic political theory intelligently with their counterparts and represent well the position of the U.S. government. SOF in particular must understand the nature of the competing ideologies and be prepared to assist indigenous forces in exploiting their enemy's ideological vulnerabilities. Elements of CA FID/UW battalions will assist other SOF to understand the nature of the ideological struggle by giving pre-mission briefings and training as well as advice and assistance during the conduct of operations. Working with PSYOP elements, they will advise indigenous forces on weaknesses of the enemy's ideological arguments and help them to devise ways to exploit these weaknesses while advancing arguments for democracy.

### **A pitfall to avoid**

In FID, when combatting an insurgency in its beginning or early-middle phases, CA assets and supporting resources must be concentrated in key areas rather than employed piecemeal throughout the nation. Often, the senior commander has no centralized control over his limited Civil Affairs assets and allows them to be employed supervising give-away programs planned by maneuver commanders with no

## **LIC Fundamentals for CA**

When the first draft of FM 100-25, *U.S. Army Special Operations Forces*, was being developed, its writers put a considerable amount of thought into producing a set of rules to guide the employment of SOF units. Operational guidance from the U.S. Special Operations Command included tenets for LIC, and these were put in the frame of reference of the FID/UW battalion. These fundamentals are discussed below as they apply to Civil Affairs units engaged in LIC operations.

*Primacy of political objectives* — This is probably the most important of the LIC fundamentals. Virtually all Civil Affairs operations within the context of FID and UW are conducted to advance critical political objectives. CA specialists must be trained to recognize the significance of all SOF and conventional military operations within the context of the larger political struggle. The senior CA specialists attached to the theater special-operations command, Special Forces units, or conventional units should serve as political advisers for their supported commanders. Their primary role should be to ensure that national and combined political objectives are transmitted to and carried out at the very lowest level of operation.

*Legitimacy* — In LIC, legitimacy is the crucial element for the development and maintenance of local popular and international support. Without this support it will be impossible to maintain U.S. assistance for a government in FID or a resistance movement in UW. The concept of legitimacy in LIC includes, but goes beyond strict legal definitions contained in international law. For a government or a resistance movement, legitimacy is determined by the people of the contested nation and by the international community, based on their collective perception of the rightness or wrongness of the cause and methods of the movement.

There are three types of legitimacy which a supported government or resistance movement must either possess or achieve: moral, political and legal. The cause and the methods of the movement or government affect each of these three aspects of legitimacy. In LIC the majority of all operations are conducted to win popular support, or at least acquiescence. All LIC operations are either coercive or persuasive. The goal of legitimacy dictates that coercive efforts be precisely targeted and that persuasive efforts be wide-ranging.

*Unity of effort* — LIC operations are conducted by the Departments of State as well as DoD. Often, the Army may play only a supporting role in the total effort. In FID in particular, USAID and USIA may have the leading role. CA elements should ensure that all operations support the objectives of these agencies. At the same time, during all contacts with the supported nation's military, CA elements must stress the importance of unity of effort with their civilian counterparts.

*Adaptability* — LIC is characterized by a wide range of conflict conditions: from assisting peaceful internal development to advising indigenous military forces in major counterinsurgency operations. The conditions of conflict can change based on military success or defeat, a change in enemy tactics or fluctuating levels of U.S. support. CA units remain prepared to adapt their operations to changing realities and to assist indigenous military forces in adjusting their tactics as well.

*Persistence* — Conflict is a common condition among developing nations. U.S. response to threats to its lesser-developed allies will vary from case to case, as will resourcing. CA planning must recognize the requirement for patience and continuity of effort. Programs that remain dependent upon U.S. funds can be self-defeating if the population becomes dependent on them and funding is lost. CA operations should not initiate development programs that are beyond the economic or technological capacity of the host nation to maintain without U.S. assistance.

*Discriminate Use of Force* — Of all the tenets of LIC, one of the most crucial is that deadly force be applied in a judicious and precise manner. All U.S. advisers must emphasize the consequences of gratuitous violence and its negative impact on perceived legitimacy and progress toward political objectives. While good troop behavior and discipline are vital, equally important is the controlled use of firepower. CA advisers must be prepared to address this issue with both host-nation officers and other U.S. advisers who may turn too quickly to massed indirect fire or air power.

training in Civil Affairs.

Civil Affairs units usually conduct decentralized operations under the operational control of a multitude of units, both SOF and conventional. But the battalion headquarters, while it possesses no capability to conduct independent operations itself, can play a key role in orchestrating ongoing Civil Affairs operations by augmenting the special-operations command or the security-assistance organization of the country team. These organizations, whether augmented by the battalion headquarters or not, must be responsible for developing a plan for the employment of Civil Affairs assets and coordinating it with embassy USAID and USIA representatives.

### Peacetime roles

In spite of the FID/UW battalion's vital role in conflict, its most important mission may be in normal peacetime competition. When there are no "enemy vulnerabilities" to target, the mission will be to support an ally's internal-development programs.

Helping to eliminate the causes of unrest or assisting in the reconstruction of a rural economic system formerly based on the production and export of narcotics may be the biggest contribution to national security these battalions can make. Individual specialists and direct-support teams can perform specific missions for the theater commander, the country team or the special-operations command. The CA FID/UW battalion's mission in internal development will be to advise and assist host-nation forces to plan and conduct military civic-action programs. They will also be able to coordinate U.S. military civic assistance, in the form of engineer and medical elements, with host-nation and USAID development plans.

### Training

If CA FID/UW battalions are to be effective, they must be characterized by their members' depth of under-

standing of the dynamics of the societies in which they operate. For the active component, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers are now part of the Army's newest functional area, FA 39. The four-part training strategy for this functional area will approximate that of the foreign-area officer.

The training, which does not have to be completed in any particular sequence, consists of language training, either at the Defense Language Institute or at Fort Bragg through a contract program taught to DLI standards; the 15-week Regional Studies Course; either the PSYOP or Civil Affairs Officer Course; and graduate schooling. Each student in the RSC, taught at Fort Bragg, will participate in five seminars: Africa, Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, with concentration in one. Both the PSYOP and CA officer courses consist of six weeks of intensive studies with several written examinations and graded practical exercises and written requirements.

Graduate schooling is a one-year cooperative degree program taught under contract at Fort Bragg and results in a master's degree in international relations. Thirty students per year will be fully funded by the Army. All other officers must obtain a graduate degree on their own, concentrating in a discipline related to the functional area as approved in DA Pamphlet 600-3.

While individual training is crucial, unit training will be vital to the successful interaction between these Civil Affairs units and other SOF elements. Both reserve and active-duty units must regularly train and operate with other theater-apportioned SOF, particularly Special Forces and PSYOP groups and battalions. A habitual training relationship will build trust and a mutual understanding of each other's mission. Without mutual support between all U.S. elements engaged in an advisory relationship with indigenous forces, successful interaction will never be possible.

Cross-training, however, should not be limited only to other SOF elements. Because their operations must be closely coordinated with, and at times support, operations and programs instituted by USAID and USIA, members of CA units should train, if possible, with those agencies as well.

### Conclusion

Rather than filling the traditional Civil Affairs role of minimizing civilian interference, the FID/UW battalion can provide the SOF commander and his indigenous counterpart with the ability to motivate and mobilize crucial segments of the population.

CA organizations are dependent, more than any other military force, on clear-cut political guidance. With that guidance, and with proper training and resources, the CA FID/UW battalions, though few in number, will be force multipliers whose impact will be reflected not by the traditional measure of military power, but by the conflicts they help to prevent and the lives they help to save. ✕

---

Maj. Robert G. Brady is currently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He formerly served as the Branch 18 manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A Special Forces officer, he has served in a variety of command and staff assignments with the 10th SF Group, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 82nd Airborne Division. Maj. Brady has been a contributor to the writing of FM 100-25, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, and FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

# Civil Affairs in Support of the Unified Combatant Command: A Proposal for USCENTCOM

by Col. Ronald M. Smith

The ambiguous environment of low-intensity conflict presents a number of challenges to U.S. strategic interests — challenges that can and are being met by using Civil Affairs assets. In some regions of the world, however, these assets are not being used as fully as they might to deter the causes of LIC.

In the region assigned to the U.S. Central Command, CA units have important missions under current CENTCOM operational plans but extremely limited opportunity to gain first-hand experience and training in their assigned region.

---

This article is an updated version of a paper originally prepared in 1989 while the author was attending the Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Department of Defense or its agencies.

This article proposes a proactive program of humanitarian and civic assistance within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility which would improve the training and readiness of Civil Affairs units and personnel, and would contribute to the elimination of the causes of unrest and insurgency in a volatile portion of the Third World.

## Historical perspective

Like the U.S. policy on dealing with LIC, doctrine for Army Civil Affairs units is currently evolving. Until recently, many soldiers associated with Civil Affairs have thought of themselves as part of the Civil Affairs community only — a community which traces its origins back to Alexander the Great.

Alexander tended to assimilate desirable customs of conquered peoples and permitted the continuance of other cultural customs in con-

quered lands. From ancient times to this country's more recent subjugation of the American Indian, military units have carried out policies and actions similar to modern Civil Affairs, establishing relations between the military and the civilian authorities and populace. These relations were mainly conducted in terms of conqueror and conquered, the apparent idea being to insure a pacific populace under the rule of the conqueror.

With World War II and its aftermath, Civil Affairs in its modern form emerged. During the war, particularly in Europe, the U.S. Army established military governments to administer territory wrested from enemy control. These temporary governments were intended to provide essential public services in liberated areas. Actions by Civil Affairs personnel relieved combat troops for battle-front duty and con-

tributed to the conclusion that Civil Affairs was a "force multiplier."

Doctrine at that time distinguished Civil Affairs and military government by operational environment. Operations in friendly countries were considered civil affairs, and those in enemy territory were considered military government.<sup>1</sup> Doctrine now has evolved to the point that military government, currently incorporated under the umbrella term "civil administration," is subordinated to Civil Affairs as just one of the missions within Civil Affairs' capabilities.<sup>2</sup>

### Current perspective

Of the capabilities that Civil Affairs can offer the commander, probably none is of more critical importance to USCENTCOM than direct support to U.S. forces in the form of host-nation support.<sup>3</sup> As a part of their operational planning, Civil Affairs personnel perform area assessments which identify from open sources the logistics-and-services capabilities of each of the host nations in the AOR. The acquisition of logistics and necessary services, to the extent that it is possible through HNS, frees critical air and sea transport resources which would otherwise be needed to move that support from CONUS to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, a distance of more than 7,000 miles.

However, unqualified acceptance of the area assessment can lead to an over reliance on HNS being available and the creation of "hollow" logistics support based on the simple belief that "HNS will be there." This could have a serious impact on military operations. For example, an Air Force wing might not take the heavy equipment and materials necessary for runway repair because of presumed HNS support. If the support turns out not to be present in the quantity or condition needed, air operations could be severely affected or curtailed because damaged runways cannot be repaired in a timely manner.

The area assessment should not

be relied on for operational planning purposes until it has been validated through on-site surveys by Civil Affairs personnel. But many of the countries in the USCENTCOM AOR allow little or no opportunity for CA personnel to visit and validate the area assessment, presenting a problem for effective Civil Affairs operations.

During Exercises Bright Star 85 and 87, major USCENTCOM exercises held within the AOR, a small number of Civil Affairs personnel taking part were given a limited opportunity to interact with host-nation nationals in a few countries. Although such participation was valuable in training those few Civil Affairs personnel allowed on the exercise, it did not afford a structured, long-term training opportunity.

In addition to using Civil Affairs assets to validate HNS or to operate military governments, a commander-in-chief of a unified com-

batant command could use some or all of the Civil Affairs' 20 functional specialties to assist a friendly civilian government to provide services to its people.<sup>4</sup>

In sum, Civil Affairs units, both Army and Marine, have contingency and current missions in support of USCENTCOM, but little or no opportunity to accomplish on-the-ground training necessary to make them true force multipliers for USCENTCOM.

### Regional considerations

The USCENTCOM area of responsibility includes the Arabian Peninsula and extends to Egypt in the west, Kenya in the south and Pakistan in the east. Per-capita income within the region ranges from more than \$27,000 in Qatar to approximately \$600 for Egypt and \$300 for Somalia.<sup>5</sup> Between 1974 and 1987, the United States provided \$23 billion in economic and mili-



Photo by Eric Vetesy

A Panamanian boy watches while Army PFC Walter Jasnieski of the 536th Engineer Battalion lays bricks for a school in Panama's Darien Province.

tary aid to Egypt. As demonstrated by the Bright Star exercises, there now is clearly a closer military relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. Somalia, too, is of significant military interest to the U.S. because of its strategic location on the Horn of Africa.

Afghanistan is on the threshold of transformation now that Soviet troops have been withdrawn. Its entire infrastructure suffered significant damage during nine years of Soviet occupation and the Mujaheddin response to it. Its strategic location, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Iran, means that Afghanistan is of more than casual interest to the United States. Clearly, Afghanistan needs assistance in rebuilding. There are other examples within the USCENCOM AOR, e.g., Somalia and Sudan, of countries' need for assistance in their efforts toward internal development.

### Low-intensity conflict

LIC has recently attained enhanced visibility, if not greater clarity, as to what it is and as to its scope of impact as a concept. The term is defined, with slight variations, by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. Army.<sup>6</sup>

These definitions — all of which are useful descriptions — range in substance from active terms such as “terrorism, subversion, and insurgency” involving “military action below the level of sustained combat,” to the more benign “political-military confrontation ... below conventional war and above the routine competition of states.”

Col. Rudolph Barnes Jr. comes closer to the heart of the matter when he describes LIC as “an environment of political transition.”<sup>7</sup> He has further noted that LIC “reverses traditional priorities, subordinating military force to political objectives.”<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless,



Photo by Eric Vetsy

U.S. troops of the 536th Engineer Battalion construct a school in the Darien Province of Panama.

the military can have a role in this environment, particularly in terms of countering insurgency in LIC situations.

### FID/IDAD

A review of the definitions for LIC indicates a common theme of the existence of an identifiable, ongoing confrontation. Thus, much has been written about how to react to confrontation (active or violent insurgency) within LIC. However, this view seems to accept the notion that the initiative to act is in the hands of those mounting an insurgency and that the U.S. response in those instances may be only reactive in nature — even though it recognizes that those reactive measures may contain proactive elements.

If Barnes is correct that the real LIC environment is one of political transition, then there should be proactive measures which can be taken to arrest, or avoid, the development of active confrontation. In any event, U.S. application of proactive measures would place the initiative in U.S. hands.

Nation building or internal development is already recognized as a means of countering active insurgency. This approach has been

referred to, in part, as foreign internal defense when viewed from the U.S. perspective.<sup>9</sup> Host nations taking similar measures to counteract internal instability are said to be involved in internal defense and development.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the objective of internal development is common to both terms, the only difference being in whether the matter is acted on from a U.S. perspective (FID), or from that of the host nation (IDAD).<sup>11</sup>

FM 41-10 states that, “In FID, military civic action consists of operations that involve military forces in short-term projects useful to the local population. ... Projects should fit into current or programmed internal development programs.”<sup>12</sup> But just as conditions exist within a country which provide at least part of the impetus for an active insurgency, most, if not all, of the same conditions are present prior to the initiation of active insurgency. Because it involves no major outbreak of violence or active insurgent activity, this phase of insurgency is referred to as latent or incipient insurgency.<sup>13</sup>

Absent internal development and civic action, the risk remains that conditions of latent or incipient in-



urgency will lead to active insurgency or the destabilization of the country.

## Program proposal

The conceptual basis then for the proposed program is that the U.S. can take the initiative in countries within the USCENTCOM AOR with latent or incipient LIC environments and establish a proactive program of humanitarian and civic assistance. The program's objective would be to contribute to the assisted nation's internal development, thereby arresting or eliminating conditions conducive to an active or violent insurgency.

In this regard, the U.S. would do well to adopt the Arab philosophy that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." In other words, the U.S. should be sophisticated enough to understand that U.S. interests are served in the long run whether the assisted country acts consistent with U.S. interests or simply does not act in concert with those against the U.S.

The underlying concept of the program proposal is that most of the countries within the AOR are in need — some more than others — of internal development. USCENTCOM should expand its participation in humanitarian-and-civic assistance activities, including employment of Civil Affairs assets, whose personnel, acting in an advisory capacity, can contribute significantly to a country's internal development.

In November 1985 the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised the commanders-in-chief of the unified combatant commands that in planning and executing cooperative programs with friendly nations, "consideration should be given to the utilization of Reserve Components to the maximum extent possible."<sup>14</sup> (Emphasis added.)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, abbreviated ASD/ISA, has been designated to serve as the single point of contact within DoD and with other executive agencies.<sup>15</sup>

The draft DoD directive, designated 2000.xx, which implements the humanitarian-assistance authority contained in Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 20, Section 401, et seq., and which verifies the ASD/ISA as the DoD single point of contact, confirms DoD policy that H/CA activities must promote the security interests of both the U.S. and the country in which the activities are carried out.

The directive also confirms the specific operational readiness skills of the forces participating. The activities also must complement, not duplicate, any other social or economic assistance that may be provided by any other U.S. department or agency and should serve

---

"(T)his program should not be subject to the criticism that it is just another program in which Americans tell the locals how to run their country. ... It must be seen by the host nation as a genuine offer of assistance to its managers and leaders ..."

---

the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country.

Humanitarian and civic assistance, in conjunction with authorized military operations, is defined as: medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; construction of rudimentary surface-transportation systems; well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.<sup>16</sup> It is the sense of the Congress that such assistance to developing countries facing the potential of LIC is a valid military mission.<sup>17</sup> Civil Affairs units have

personnel with the technical expertise to provide advisory assistance in all of these areas.

The above-referenced DoD directive sets out the procedures to be followed by the unified commanders in long-range planning and budgeting for H/CA activities. Under the proposed program, USCENTCOM would assign priorities to the countries to be assisted and coordinate projects with the country team before submitting them to Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD/ISA. The country team would be in the best position to identify projects which would benefit from Civil Affairs advisers.

To be consistent with U.S. objectives, this program should not be subject to the criticism that it is just another program in which Americans tell the locals how to run their country. Rather, it must be seen by the host nation as a genuine offer of assistance to its managers and leaders in the development of their country. Accordingly, the Civil Affairs functional specialist would act more as a personal staff adviser to the responsible local manager or official. Not only would this contribute to the maintenance of personal dignity and local prestige of the advisees, but this approach should result in the development of personal relationships which would be invaluable to U.S. forces should they ever have to enter the country.

## Manpower

The bulk of Civil Affairs assets are within the reserve components and are assigned to USSOCOM for commitment in support of U.S. commands and U.S. national objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict. There are three Army Civil Affairs commands. The Marine Corps Reserve currently has two Civil Affairs groups,<sup>18</sup> but these Marine CAGs have not been assigned to USSOCOM.<sup>19</sup>

The staff of USCENTCOM is extremely limited (1-2 personnel) in Civil Affairs expertise. The Army

element of USCENTCOM, USARCENT (Third U.S. Army, or TUSA), has been delegated authority for Civil Affairs matters. One Civil Affairs command (Army Reserve), commanded by a brigadier general, is assigned to USCENTCOM, and its commander is dual-hatted as the TUSA assistant chief of staff for civil affairs (G-5) upon mobilization. The USCENTCOM staff would delegate to the TUSA G-5, augmented by CA-command personnel, the task of translating general requirements identified by the country team into specific requirements.

Specific requirements for Civil Affairs assets would be passed to the Army Special Operations Command as the Army component of USSOCOM, which, similar to U.S. Forces Command in the case of requests for other reserve-component units, would determine the forces available to meet the requirements. Funding aspects of the program will be addressed below.

At this point in the process, with requirements known and the forces necessary to meet those requirements identified, scheduling for and implementation of the H/CA mission(s) would be the next logical steps. These responsibilities should fall to the staff of the Civil Affairs command, since the missions would provide the command with invaluable training in the deployment and employment of Civil Affairs assets over a wide geographic area. Civil Affairs personnel and units then would be deployed to meet the identified H/CA mission requirements.

In addition to the responsibilities associated with implementing the proposed HICA program, there are several bureaucratic factors which could seriously affect or impede the process.

## **Bureaucratic factors**

### *Department of State*

State Department participation, particularly by the country teams, will be critical to the success of this proposal. Therefore, it would be

useful for the Department of State to designate a single point of contact (possibly the regional bureau, the Office of Politico-military Affairs, the Agency for International Development, or the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance), to be responsible for encouraging U.S. embassies and their country teams in the USCENTCOM AOR to identify H/CA needs which could be addressed through the program. Clearly, each embassy will have to be committed to the program as a means of furthering U.S. interests within that country. The office of the ASD/ISA should be staffed to provide professional

---

“As a part of the country team, Civil Affairs assets committed to H/CA missions can contribute to the success of the embassy, while gaining professional training and development which could well be invaluable to USCENTCOM should conditions advance to the stage of active insurgency or worse.”

---

advice to DoS as to the Civil Affairs functional specialties and their use in LIC.

If an embassy cannot identify viable H/CA missions or is located in a country which does not want or need the skills of Civil Affairs functional specialists, the embassy could take advantage of these skills to assist its embassy staff, e.g., to prepare studies within the functional task areas.<sup>20</sup> Regardless, if the proposed program is to succeed, the State Department must appreciate and support the utility of Civil

Affairs as a non-lethal means of advancing U.S. interests in the USCENTCOM AOR. As a part of the country team, Civil Affairs assets committed to H/CA missions can contribute to the success of the embassy, while gaining professional training and development which could well be invaluable to USCENTCOM should conditions advance to the stage of active insurgency or worse.

### *ASD/ISA*

The ASD/ISA, as the single point of contact with other executive agencies, should affect coordination and liaison with the State Department to obtain support for the proposed form of H/CA. Given the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict to establish policy guidance for special-operations forces, the ASD/ISA should also coordinate with ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that Civil Affairs participation in H/CA is properly prepared and monitored.

Further, the ASD(SO/LIC) is in the best position to assure the appropriate level of visibility and support within USSOCOM and its Army component, USASOC. Close coordination and cooperation between the active and reserve components is also critical to the viability of this proposal and, therefore, should be of particular interest to ASD(SO/LIC) in its oversight role, as well as to the ASD/ISA.

### *USCENTCOM*

As the unified combatant command with the regional responsibility for U.S. military interests in the Middle East, USCENTCOM recognizes that preserving the peace has equal importance with preparing for wartime contingencies. In this regard, using Civil Affairs assets in H/CA activities in the region could represent a relatively inexpensive way, in terms of personnel and attendant costs, to advance U.S. interests while enhancing USCENTCOM wartime capabili-

ties. With such a commitment, USCENTCOM also stands to benefit from a closer working relationship with the regional country teams.<sup>21</sup>

## Funding

In this time of scarce fiscal resources, the central question is who pays the costs of providing the Civil Affairs functional specialists to their overseas locations? A good part of the Civil Affairs personnel costs are already funded — pay and allowances for these Reservists can be met with annual-training funds. These monies also cover the costs of moving the Reservists from home station to the overseas embarkation point and back. However, the costs of transportation overseas and back, and subsistence and housing while overseas, are currently borne by the overseas command receiving the overseas-deployment-training assets — in this case, USCENTCOM.

There is a limit on the length of annual training for Reservists, normally 17 days (travel inclusive), but with DA approval the period can be extended to 22 days. This does not mean that the commitment of Civil Affairs assets would be limited strictly to these periods. Reservists can also be activated, with their consent, for periods of active-duty-for-training of up to 179 days without a DA exception to policy. Each day of ADT is referred to as a man-day space and must be budgeted to include travel and per-diem costs.

If USCENTCOM wished to increase the availability of manpower, budgeting for additional man-day spaces could be a means of accomplishing this objective. In addition, with Department of Army approval, a number of active-guard-and-reserve positions could be created, which would allow for full-time support to the administration of the proposed H/CA program by selected Reservists.<sup>22</sup>

The limited funding problem can be solved in at least three ways by USCENTCOM, by Department of State (USAID), or by USSOCOM.

Pursuant to the DoD directive on H/CA activities and using the statutory authority of 10 U.S.C. 401, et seq., USCENTCOM would submit its five-year plan for H/CA, to include Civil Affairs participation, with associated costs to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD/ISA. Obligations or expenditures under this authority are currently limited to \$16,400,000 for fiscal year 1991.

If requirements for this and other H/CA activities exceed this amount, DoD could either seek expanded obligation and expenditure authority or alternative financing. In the latter event, another source of funding could be through reimbursement to DoD by the U.S. Agency for International Development, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2392(c). This section and the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) require reimbursement which is fair to both agencies for direct and indirect costs of the performing agency, which are attributable to accomplishing the requesting agency's work.<sup>23</sup>

The obvious limitation to this funding authority is the ability of USAID and its parent agency, the

U.S. International Development and Cooperation Agency, to obtain appropriations to pay for reimbursement.

A third method of funding would address the limitations of the two methods discussed above. Under 22 U.S.C. 2392(c), DoD, the "owning" agency, may enter into an agreement with DoS which states that DoD does not require reimbursement for the services of its personnel in a given civic or humanitarian project. This approach is based on recognition that DoS and DoD objectives in undertaking similar activities may complement each other, but that DoD can achieve a substantial training benefit while aiding DoS efforts in conducting assistance programs under its authority.

The predominant DoD interest under the proposal would be to improve Civil Affairs training for mobilization missions within the AOR and to validate the availability of projected HNS in support of USCENTCOM operation plans. Under this approach, assuming funds were not available under H/CA funding authority or through reimbursement, USSOCOM conceivably could fill the void.<sup>24</sup>




Photo by Mike Edrington

Modern heavy equipment of the Army's 20th Engineer Brigade stands in sharp contrast to nearby Honduran ox carts.

Civil Affairs activities during Operation Just Cause included making cost estimates for projects necessary to rebuild Panamanian government facilities, such as this Panamanian prison.



Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

In any event, the funding issue is solvable. The relatively minor cost of the proposed program — even if the additional funds needed (over those provided as a part of annual training) were provided by DoD — is really minimal in contrast to the potential benefits of the program, if it is successful in reducing or eliminating threats of an active insurgency.

## Benefits

Many of the Civil Affairs functional specialists do the same type of work in civilian life as in their military duties and can contribute substantive, practical experience, as well as advice to civilian authorities. The national or local governments of the host nation would be the beneficiaries of expert advice, at no expense, which they could use to develop their country. CA soldiers are also culturally sensitized to assist in a way that maintains the dignity of

those whom they are advising.

The primary benefit of this proposal to the U.S. is that it represents a practical means of implementing the Civil Affairs Master Plan proposal that there should be a “cohesive and coordinated interagency structure for CA activities to achieve U.S. strategic interests.”<sup>25</sup>

As discussed above, the State Department and ASD/ISA, at a minimum, must be involved in the program. A close working relationship between the various embassy country teams and USCENTCOM would necessarily develop under a successful Civil Affairs H/CA program. Such a relationship would be most beneficial should a crisis arise which requires military assistance or intervention in any of the countries affected by this program.

Certainly equal to the benefit of H/CA activities to Civil Affairs training and professional development would be the long-term bene-

fit derived from internal-development activities accomplished by the host nations. If the program were fully successful, active insurgency would not begin, much less flourish.

A successful Civil Affairs H/CA program will mean that Civil Affairs personnel will spend considerable time in several of the countries within the USCENTCOM AOR. Debriefing of these personnel by psychological-operations and military-intelligence personnel could prove highly valuable, and it would be naive not to recognize this potential. However, this program would not be for the purpose of military intelligence or solely political considerations, but rather for the purpose of providing meaningful training to CA personnel and to afford them the opportunity to obtain on-the-ground validation of their unclassified area assessments in those countries of greatest HNS interest.

Host-nation support, as a means of supporting USCENTCOM forces, has taken on a substantive and critical role in the successful implementation of USCENTCOM operation plans. USCENTCOM cannot permit itself to rely on unvalidated area assessments of the availability of needed HNS — it must be assured that the support will be there, as validated by Civil Affairs personnel. Given the fact that many of the countries in the AOR are otherwise sensitive to the presence of U.S. forces within their borders, it would seem prudent to use Civil Affairs H/CA activities as a vehicle for gaining access to validate the HNS estimates.

For the program to be successful, or even accepted, the perception and the reality must be that the purpose of the H/CA mission is to help and assist the host nation. Accordingly, in no circumstance should Civil Affairs personnel be tasked to carry out a PSYOP or intelligence-gathering mission, either overtly or covertly. Any perceived short-term benefit which might be gained by using Civil Affairs personnel for

these missions would surely be negated by the potential long-term impact of the targeted country canceling the program.

Adverse reactions to such activities could spread to other countries in the region, resulting in the cancellation of H/CA, regardless of whether such activities were pursued in those countries. PSYOP could, however, render valuable assistance to Civil Affairs personnel in the effective "selling" of the program to the host nation.

In the final analysis, the success of this form of H/CA activities will depend, in large part, on the trust established between USCENTCOM (through Civil Affairs personnel) and host-nation personnel.<sup>26</sup> A betrayal of that trust could have a significant adverse impact on this program.

If accepted, and properly coordinated, the proposed Civil Affairs H/CA program could be of significant benefit to the State Department and to the U.S. embassies in the USCENTCOM AOR. The program would provide a reservoir of highly trained, culturally acclimated manpower to assist the host nation at minimal cost to the United States. If there is no need for direct Civil Affairs assistance to the host nation, the same skills could benefit the embassy by providing assistance to its staff — again at minimal or no cost to the State Department.

## Conclusion

As the term is defined to include conditions short of armed or hostile insurgency, a LIC environment exists in most, if not all, of the countries within the USCENTCOM AOR. To be sure, there are pockets of wealth and affluence; but, on balance, there is widespread poverty, disease and joblessness in these so-called Third World countries.

In his speech of Dec. 7, 1988 to the United Nations, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the conditions present in the

Third World and urged new efforts to address those problems. He proposed that this be done in partnership with the United Nations.

Given the fact that a majority of the member nations do not have representative democracies as their form of government, it is not yet clear what is the true meaning of Gorbachev's statements, particularly in terms of addressing the conditions which are conducive to active insurgency. The United States can ill afford to wait. As stated by Dr. William J. Olson, director of the Low-Intensity Conflict Organization, ASD(SO/LIC):

"There are no shortcuts in deal-

---

"The main thrust of doctrine in the LIC arena is oriented toward reacting to active insurgencies. The proposed Civil Affairs H/CA program ... represents an attempt to address the problems and conditions associated with LIC in a proactive way ..."

---

ing with the riddle of LIC; but if this country is ever to effect a coherent and sustained effort, if it is not to painfully relearn anew all the hard lessons and if it is to address the LIC challenge to its long-term interests, then it must face up to the need to develop and sustain the institutional elements, the concepts and the ongoing educational programs required to make LIC a serious component in our strategy. There is no guarantee of success even if all these things are done perfectly, but failure is a certainty if nothing is done."<sup>27</sup>

The main thrust of doctrine in the LIC arena is oriented toward

reacting to active insurgencies. The proposed Civil Affairs H/CA program takes one step back from active insurgency and represents an attempt to address the problems and conditions associated with LIC in a proactive way while they are still "in transition," with the objective of forestalling active insurgency. Done successfully, this proposal will require far less of the national treasure than dealing with the potential impact of an active or, worse, successful insurgency.

At the very least, this program would directly affect the warfighting capabilities of USCENTCOM because of the significant reliance on the availability of host-nation support. At the same time, it would provide USCENTCOM, and other regional unified combatant commands, with an initiative which could be a significant tool in preserving the peace and in supporting U.S. policy interests in the Third World.

It is in the vital national-strategic interest of the United States to encourage the development of stable, representative democracies in the Third World and to encourage that development by assisting host-nation governments in meeting the internal-development needs of their peoples. Civil Affairs possesses capabilities which can be a practical means of achieving that goal.

The fact that the bulk of resources would come from the reserve components does present substantive problems. However, they are problems which can be addressed and solved if there is a commitment by the Departments of State and Defense to actively support the program.

The program proposed here can provide a practical means to meet, and perhaps best, the challenges presented by the problems of internal development to nations in the Third World. If the United States does not respond to these challenges, others, who do not necessarily support the development

of representative democracies, most surely will.

#### Postscript:

From Jan. 1-Feb. 19, 1990, Colonel Smith served with the Civil Affairs Task Force as J-5/ Deputy Operations Officer in support of Operation Just Cause and Operation Promote Liberty in Panama. Based on that experience, he offers the following postscript to his article:

My experience in Panama convinced me that at least two concepts outlined in my article have been validated. First, although Civil Affairs personnel did not work with the U.S. Agency for International Development in

advising local authorities on various projects funded by USAID, as suggested in my article, they did provide to USAID assessments of needs, including cost estimates, necessary to rebuild the country of Panama. These assessments were then assigned priorities by CA personnel and were used by USAID to determine the obligation of funds as they become available.

Secondly, CA personnel worked closely with the U.S. Embassy in Panama as the interface between both the military and the embassy and the various Panamanian ministries. CA personnel were also integrated into the staff of the embassy, to include, for example, acting as the air attache to civil aviation for the embassy. Thus, I

am more convinced that a peacetime relationship between the CA community and the Department of State should be established along the lines suggested in my article.



Col. Ronald M. Smith, currently assigned to the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, Md., graduated from the U.S. Army War College Resident Program in June 1989. He has served in Vietnam as a Quartermaster officer and in Germany as a Judge Advocate. He has held various positions from platoon level through battery commander to staff at the corps and theater-army level.

#### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Col. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., "Civil Affairs, A LIC Priority," *Military Review*, September 1988, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*, pp. 1-4 to 1-5 and 5-1 thru 54 (hereinafter referred to as "FM 41-10").

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, see pp. 2-9 to 2-12 for a discussion of the role of Civil Affairs in HNS.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Appendix A. The 20 functional specialties are civil defense, labor, legal, public administration, public education, public finance, public health, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply, economics and commerce, food and agriculture, property control, public communications, public transportation, public works and utilities, arts, monuments and archives, civil information, cultural affairs, and dislocated civilians. See also *Field Manual 100-16*, pp. 11-4 thru 11-11, for another discussion of what tasks each of these functional specialties includes. However, it should be noted that the term "displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees" (DPRE) has been supplanted by the current term, "dislocated civilians" (DC).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes*, November 1987 (Qatar), December 1987 (Egypt), November 1986 (Somalia).

<sup>6</sup> The Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1989*, 11 February 1988, p. 58.) has noted that "LIC involves indirect, or ambiguous, aggression such as terrorism, subversion, and insurgency." The Deputy Secretary of Defense (U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive No. 513B.4, 4 January 1988, p. 1.), in addressing the authority and responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC), defines LIC as "political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition of states." The Army variously describes LIC in the same words as the DoD Directive, i.e., FM 100-20 (Final Draft), p. 1-1, and as involving "military action below the level of sustained combat between regular forces," FM 1001, p. 11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1 provides yet another slightly distinguishable view by defining LIC in terms of a "limited political-military struggle" ranging from "diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency," which is "generally confined to a geographic area" and is "often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence."

<sup>7</sup> Barnes, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Barnes, "Legitimacy and the Lawyer in Low-Intensity Conflict

(LIC): *Civil Affairs Legal Support*," *The Army Lawyer*, October 1988, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (hereinafter referred to as "JCS Pub 1"). JCS Pub 1 defines foreign internal defense as "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free or protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, *Field Manual 100-20, Low-intensity Conflict (Final Draft)*, pp. 2-14 thru 2-25 (hereinafter referred to as "FM 100-20").

<sup>11</sup> From the author's perspective, there is an inconsistency between FM 100-20 and FM 41-10. For example, FM 100-20 includes FID in its glossary of terms, but discusses only IDAD in the text of the manual. While it is important to recognize IDAD for what it is, because FM 100-20 is written for use by U.S. forces, it would appear that FID also should be discussed in conjunction with IDAD and that cross reference should be made to Chapter 3, FM 41-10.

<sup>12</sup> FM 41-10, p. 3-6.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3-2 to 3-3.

<sup>14</sup> William H. Taft IV, U.S. Department of Defense, *Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al.*, Subject: "Unified Commanders' Conduct of Cooperative Programs with Friendly Nations," 20 November 1985.

<sup>15</sup> Casper W. Weinberger, U.S. Department of Defense, *Memorandum for Secretaries of Military Departments, et al.*, Subject: "DoD Implementation of the Provisions in the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Relating to Humanitarian Relief," 20 December 1985.

<sup>16</sup> Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 20, Section 405.

<sup>17</sup> The legislative history for Public Law 99-661 (10 U.S.C. 401, et seq.) states that "(t)he committee believes that the provision of humanitarian and civic assistance activities to the civilian populace of developing foreign countries potentially confronted with low intensity conflict should be explicitly recognized as a valid military mission." (Emphasis added.) U.S. Code and Congressional News, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6482.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Civil Affairs Master Plan Coordinating Draft*, undated, p. ES-4, and *Final Draft, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs*, FM 41-5, Chapter 3.

<sup>19</sup> Apparently after some interservice disagreement, it has been

determined that the reserve-component Marine CAGs are a part of the two "embarked" Marine Expeditionary Forces. However, 10 U.S.C. 167(b), Assignment of Forces (to SOCOM), provides that "(u)nless otherwise directed by the Secretary Of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command." (Emphasis added.) The author is not aware that the Secretary has so excepted the Marine CAGs. In any event, the facts indicate that the particular USCENTCOM designated Marine Reserve CAG in question is stationed in Los Angeles, Calif. Its personnel are trained by the Army. When mobilized, it will have an Army Civil Affairs company (soon to be battalion) attached to it to help provide support to the MEF. Further, such separateness has the potential for promoting competition for scarce resources within the AOR because the Marine and Army Civil Affairs units have not worked and coordinated together in peacetime. Secondly, the splitting of this single function of Civil Affairs along service lines does not promote jointness. Accordingly, in the author's opinion, this decision should be revisited.

If the Marine CAGs were assigned to USSOCOM, this would facilitate the CINCCENTCOM, pursuant to authority under Paragraph 3-26d, JCS Pub 2, establishing a "functional component command" under the 352nd Civil Affairs Command to address Civil Affairs matters for USCENTCOM. The criteria for establishing a functional component command are found in Paragraph 39a. In a message change to JCS Pub 1 [JCS Msg, Subj: JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)- Terminology, dated 291626Z Oct 87], the term "functional component command" is defined as a "command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time."

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Col. Wesley A. Groesbeck, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Ga., 10 November 1988.

<sup>21</sup> As the responsible command, USCENTCOM should consider forming a functional component command, as referenced in Note 19 above, with the mission of conducting the proposed program. This

command could be formed out of existing assets of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command and the Marine CAG. Such a command would not only assure full Marine participation in H/CA activities, but would provide for better wartime planning for the employment of Army and Marine Civil Affairs units.

<sup>22</sup> The obvious concern with the use of Reservists in H/CA activities is their limited time on-station. However, there simply are no active-component assets available because of the heavy commitment of the one AC Civil Affairs battalion to other real-world missions. Secondly, with forethought and planning, the author believes that viable missions could be identified which would lend themselves to the incremental commitment of Civil Affairs Reservists.

<sup>23</sup> Guidance in this area can be found in various Comptroller General opinions including 57 Comp. Gen. 674 (1978), 63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984), and 63 Comp. Gen. at 22-26, among others.

<sup>24</sup> Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 167(e), CINCSOCOM, among other functions, has responsibility for "(B) Training assigned forces ... (F) Ensuring combat readiness ... (and) (H) Ensuring the interoperability of ... forces" by monitoring the preparedness of SOF assigned to other unified combatant commands to carry out assigned missions. The author believes that a strong case has been made that probably the only way Civil Affairs personnel can be fully trained and prepared to perform wartime missions is for them to get in-country and to practice their skills with host-country nationals during peacetime. Assuming this interpretation is accepted as valid, the CINCSOCOM has authority to propose funding of "selected operations" pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 167(f) and 166(b)(4). These budget proposals are submitted as Program 11 funding. In the author's view, this approach appears most viable in terms of visibility, prioritization and as a counter to generalized budgetary objections and constraints.

<sup>25</sup> CA Master Plan, p. 5-1.

<sup>26</sup> Critics may charge that a "bond of trust" will be an unlikely development over a short 2-3 week period. In the short term and with no follow-up, this probably is so. However, the proposal assumes a long-term relationship through an incremental infusion of Civil Affairs personnel.

<sup>27</sup> Dr. William J. Olson, "Organizational Requirements for LIC," Military Review, LXVIII, January 1988, p. 16.



# *Civil Affairs in Operation Just Cause*

U.S. military activities in Panama during Operation Just Cause included a variety of special operations, and no SOF were more involved than Army Civil Affairs.

Civil Affairs involvement in the operation actually preceded the call to arms in December 1989. In the summer of 1988, senior officers from the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, an Army Reserve unit headquartered in Pensacola, Fla., and oriented toward Latin America, were tasked by the U.S. Southern Command's director of plans and policy to provide assistance in planning the Civil Affairs role in a contingency plan. The contingency operation would overthrow Manuel Noriega's Panama dictatorship and assist the Panamanians in establishing a democratically elected government.

During the next 18 months, relations between the governments of

Panama and the United States continued to deteriorate. Although the status of the Panama Canal had been addressed in part by the treaty of 1977, and the Canal scheduled to come under Panamanian control by the end of the century, the rise of General Noriega in 1983 had brought new tensions. Noriega ruled through a combination of electoral fraud, brute force and intimidation. In early 1988, he was indicted as a drug trafficker by a grand jury in Miami.

Despite his overwhelming loss of the May 1989 elections, Noriega seemed determined to hang on. By summer, sentiment in the Bush administration had hardened against Noriega, and Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordered Gen. Maxwell Thurmond, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, to prepare

for the invasion of Panama.

In Panama, Noriega became increasingly unstable, and when forces murdered an American Marine and arrested and beat a naval officer and threatened his wife with rape, President Bush had had enough. On Dec. 17, he ordered that Operation Just Cause be implemented.

## **Just Cause**

The night of Dec. 20, 1989 saw thousands of American paratroopers descending into Panama, and some of the first soldiers to see action were members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Fort Bragg, N.C.

Soldiers from the 96th, the Army's only active-duty Civil Affairs battalion, accompanied members of the 75th Ranger Regiment who jumped in at H-hour at the Torrijos-Tocumen airport. As the

Rangers seized the airfield and cleared the air terminal and nearby barracks of the Panamanian Defense Force, soldiers from the 96th ran collection points for prisoners, wounded and civilians. They later advised conventional brigades on civil-military operations, as well, but their primary job was to re-start the country.

Maj. Harold E. Williams, commander of Company A, 96th CA Battalion, was one of seven soldiers from the 96th who jumped in with the Rangers. "Our mission was to help the Panamanians get their country running again," Williams said. "To do that we had to be on the ground during the initial invasion to coordinate with the military intelligence, military police and ground-forces commanders. We continued activities during ongoing operations to render humanitarian assistance."

"Four other 96th CA soldiers air-landed at H+46 minutes with Rangers at Rio Hato," Williams said. "They controlled non-combatant civilians in and around the air field. They guarded the civilians' safety and ensured their non-interference with the ground tactical operations."

"After we parachuted onto Tocumen Airport, half of us went with the Rangers while they cleared the Panamanian Defense Force infantry barracks, and the other half went with Rangers while they cleared the international air terminal," Williams said.

At the PDF barracks, Cpl. Ricardo Barros performed the first civil-affairs action of processing detainees during the invasion, according to Williams.

At the air terminal the Rangers detained about 400 civilians and many PDF soldiers, Williams said. "Our role with the detainees was to do a field interrogation and search for information of immediate tactical value, and to safeguard them pending disposition."

"For example," Williams said, "Through questioning, Sgt. Miguel

Barbosa-Figueroa, from Co. A of the 96th discovered that eight Department of National Investigations agents were still hiding in their office. Barbosa-Figueroa and another soldier captured them and recovered 12 weapons.

"We also helped figure out which prisoners were really innocent bystanders, and which people in the civilian crowd actually should be prisoners," Williams said.

Company A immediately began to deal with problems that emerged with the detained civilians.

"The problems we encountered included feeding them, giving medical care for the shocked elderly, allowing people with diplomatic passports to leave, allowing firemen access to work on fires in the building, recording civilian names and surveying civilians who had critical skills we could use," Williams said. "As the 82nd Airborne Division soldiers arrived, we directed them to the various locations where we had prisoners and civilians so they could start handling and processing them."

### Call for volunteers

Despite the effectiveness of their early actions, the 96th simply did

not have the people to accomplish what was to be a major CA mission. The original CA plan, named "Blind Logic," had foreseen this problem and called for the commitment of the 361st. But when the National Command Authority decided not to call up any Army Reserve units, the Army had to fall back on individual volunteers. The U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command began to identify CA specialists and structure the force that SOUTH-COM needed.

Within 24 hours of the initial insertion of U.S. forces into Panama, USAR SOC had informally notified its major subordinate headquarters throughout the United States to begin soliciting volunteers for a CA staff for Panama. More than 600 Reserve soldiers answered the call, and this number would grow to thousands before the operation was completed. By Dec. 23, USAR SOC had selected 25 individual reservists, from various CA units, who had the necessary military experience and who were willing to spend 139 days on active duty.

Numerous civilian and military personnel at Fort Bragg worked to



Photo by Gerry Grey

CA reservists bound for home following Operation Just Cause. The diverse nature of the group mirrors the makeup of the volunteer reserve CA force.

get these soldiers, and those who would follow, to Fort Bragg and processed for overseas deployment. They had the initial 25 CA soldiers, led by Col. William H. Stone, deputy commander of the 361st, in Panama by Dec. 26.

Meanwhile, USAR SOC was arranging for the deployment of the next increment. In contrast to the selection process for the CA staff, USAR SOC was now primarily interested in reservists' civilian skills. Information on the volunteers, as well as the demands from Panama, was fed into a computer data base to identify the necessary experts in health, public works and utilities, public safety, dislocated civilians, public communications, transportation, and administrative and communications skills.

Col. Bruce Bingham of the 353rd CA Command's staff in New York was enjoying the holidays when the news came. "It was Christmas Eve day, and I was home watching the Giants play football when the phone rang," said Bingham. "The Army wanted my management skills." Specifically, the Army wanted Bingham to research companies it suspected of having strong ties to Noriega and to do research for a number of U.S. companies who did not know how and where to pay Social Security benefits, "an important source of cash for the country," Bingham said. He was given two and a half days to get ready to go to Panama.

Along with other reservists, he was transported to Fort Bragg, processed and shipped to Panama. By January 1990, the second increment of more than 80 personnel was in-country.

## Stabilization

In Panama, once the airport and air terminal were secure, the next priority for the 96th was to stabilize the airport and get it functioning again. Company A stayed at the airport for the next two weeks, getting things back to normal.

"We served as airport manage-

ment, engineer staff, immigration and customs, labor boss for locally hired civilians, diplomatic protocol, and community relations," Williams said. "Panamanian civilians literally couldn't get onto the airport grounds without written permission from one of us."

"We selected 154 civilian workers which the 82nd hired to clean up the airport and negotiated their wage," Williams said. "We re-established the local health clinic in Toc-

## 96th CA Soldier Earns Combat Experience

Cpl. Ricardo Barros of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion performed the first combat civil affairs action during Operation Just Cause.

Barros, 25, from Company A, parachuted in with the Rangers at Torrijos-Tocumen Airport at H-Hour, Dec. 20 and went with them to clear the nearby Panamanian Defense Force barracks. Noticing a wounded civilian fireman near the runway, he tried to escort him to a medical station.

"But when I got to him he said he wanted to go to his room in the barracks to get his identification card," Barros said. "The barracks were already cleared by the Rangers so I notified my team leader that I would escort him to his room.

"On the way to his room I was talking to him in Spanish, trying to get information from him," Barros said. "When we got to his room it was very dark. Suddenly I heard two other men yelling in Spanish from another room.

"I found myself in a very difficult situation," Barros said. "I was alone with my prisoner in a secure building. The first thing I did was to safeguard my prisoner by telling him to lie on the floor and not move."

After tying his prisoner's hands with flexible plastic handcuffs, Barros went to check the other room. "I went into their room weapon-first. But it was pitch dark. I saw nothing. I would be lying if I said I wasn't scared — I was dead scared."

Deciding not to use a grenade because of possible shrapnel injury to other soldiers outside, Barros entered the room with his rifle and a flashlight. "I found a Panamanian hiding under a bed, so I knelt down and instructed him to come out with his hands where I could see them. He lay on the floor spread-eagled and I told him not to move or I'd shoot." Another man then came out of a wall locker yelling, "Don't kill me please!"

Barros took time to identify the two and saw that they were civilians. "They came out peacefully and I processed them as prisoners," Barros said, "But it was an experience that I will never forget."

—SSgt. Kirk Wyckoff, PAO, USAJFKSWCS

umen to relieve the pressure of civilian visits to our military clinic in the airport lobby. And we supervised the return to work of Panamanian airport employees."

Company A soldiers also helped evacuate third-country nationals leaving Panama for their home countries, coordinating with foreign embassies, consulates, the International Red Cross, Panamanian airport officials, U.S. Customs and the Air Force.

"We helped evacuate more than 5,000 civilians in a five-day period," said Capt. Victor M. Feliciano, from Company A. Civilians were evacuated to 12 different countries in Europe, South and Central America and the Caribbean.

As reserve-component units arrived, they began the task of rebuilding the airport, which had been severely damaged during the fighting.

"The airport was a shambles," said Capt. William Dyson of the 450th CA Company. "Everything was shot up, torn out and in pieces. It had to be almost totally rebuilt from the bottom up." The project was so extensive that Dyson moved his cot and duffel bag to one of the hangars and lived at the job site for about a month, until the project became more manageable. During this time he filled roles from air traffic controller to operations officer to customs reorganizer.

After their job at the airport was finished, members of the 96th CA continued to perform a variety of missions. Members of Company A went with the Rangers on a stability mission near the town of Alcalde Diaz.

There they performed law-and-order functions with Rangers, Special Forces and MPs that included setting up roadblocks, making identification checks, hunting for arms caches and suspected criminals, and working with the local government to restore public services.

"In two towns in the area we served as the interim sheriff until local officials could be appointed," Williams said. "We mediated among political parties to seat a slate of political officials."

The Civil Affairs soldiers helped the Panamanians bring their resources together so they could help themselves, according to 1st Sgt. Rudy Segura, of Company A.

"We began surveying the people to find out what their needs were," Segura said. "First we identified and assisted local civic leaders such as mayors and legislators. We helped

the people get paint and lumber so they could start rebuilding their homes. All the medical clinics had been looted, so we organized temporary medical clinics and assisted churches."

In Colon, on the Atlantic side of Panama, the 96th CA soldiers dealt with another difficult situation.

"Colon is a city that has a very low standard of living," said Capt. Kenneth R. Carter Jr. from Company A. "It has high unemployment and a large criminal element. Colon wasn't assaulted until D+3. By that time the PDF had released all 380 prisoners from jail, and they fled into the countryside. There they joined approximately 1,000 more criminals and members of the Dignity Battalions.

"We helped seal off the city and went on police actions with Special Forces soldiers," Carter said. "And we drove with the MPs on patrols, but we only recaptured 25 criminals.

As U.S. humanitarian-assistance efforts began, members of the 96th also monitored shipments of food and medicine which arrived from the U.S., making sure they were delivered to the proper destinations.

## Government

One of the primary missions for the Reserve CA soldiers, now organized into the Civil Military Operations Task Force, or CMOTF, and under the command of Colonel Stone, was to get the Panamanian government functioning. President Endara's fledgling administration had requested the assignment of American military personnel to act as advisers to each of his ministries. Stone organized a number of his personnel into ministry teams and placed them under the operational control of Brig. Gen. Bernard W. Gann, director of plans and policy for SOUTHCOM. Teams were organized for finance, public



Photo by Mark Williams

A U.S. soldier distributes emergency supplies of food to two Panamanian women during Operation Just Cause.

works, health, justice, and the office of the President, to name a few. In all cases, Gann gave strong and specific instruction that U.S. soldiers were to act as advisers, not managers.

An embassy team coordinated with the American embassy, as the ambassador had full authority when it came to relations with the Endara government. Unfortunately, the classification of Blind Logic had made prior coordination with the embassy impossible. Further, the reduction of embassy personnel had left the embassy short-handed, with no one specifically charged to coordinate with SOUTHCOM.

In the end, the embassy official designated as liaison officer to the military, Frank Foulger, found the CA embassy team a tremendous resource and credited the Civil Affairs personnel with getting many Panamanian governmental functions up and running.

Lt. Col. James Carr, a member of the 354th CA Command, was assigned to work in the palace alongside the Panamanian equivalent of the White House chief of staff. Qualified as a foreign-area officer and fluent in Spanish, Carr had worked for numerous federal agencies and local governments, had served an internship at the United Nations, and had worked with Vietnamese and Cuban refugees.

One of Carr's most critical duties was insuring the proper routing, processing and action on requests between U.S. agencies and Panamanian ministries. When Julio Harris, a Panamanian official from the Ministry of the Presidency, needed to learn more about U.S. government agencies, Carr borrowed a copy of the U.S. Government Manual from a U.S. employee at the Panama Canal Commission to get Harris started in the right direction. The manual gave the Panamanians the structure for the various departments, as well as wiring diagrams and names,

addresses and telephone numbers of points of contact.

## Dislocated civilians

Of a priority second only to the functioning of the Panamanian government was that of assessing the damage to El Chorrillo, a poor section in the heart of Panama City where several thousand civilians were left homeless. This district was where the Comandancia, the headquarters of the Panamanian Defense Forces, had been located, and although the district had taken some damage from American firepower, it took considerably more when fleeing members of the PDF deliberately set fire to the area.

"The people of El Chorrillo had no place to live and nothing to eat," Williams said. "So they went to the Balboa High School stadium where they had received assistance in previous catastrophes."

"Blind Logic," the CA operations plan, had assumed that the CMOTF would take control of the dislocated-civilian camp, but the delay in the commitment of reservists made this impossible initially. Therefore, an ad hoc arrangement took care of some 5,000 people

until members of the 96th CA could be freed from other duties on D+4. Under the control of Company D, commanded by Maj. Michael Lewis, the DC camp rapidly took shape at Balboa High School.

The CMOTF role began with the establishment of a 14-person DC team supervised by Col. William W. Graham, a civil engineer and industrial hygienist. The DC officer for the 361st CA Brigade, he had run one of the DC areas at Indiantown Gap, Pa., during the Mariel boat lift in 1980.

"The operation had all the characteristics of a logistical nightmare," recalled Maj. Vincent Thomas, a member of the 354th CA Command who was involved in the resettlement operation. "Civilians slept in the gymnasium, in tents outside the school, underneath parachutes, and anywhere else they could find a place." The civilians received one hot meal and two meals-ready-to-eat each day. Medical and other volunteer support largely came from Panamanian physicians, nurses, church organizations, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts and other volunteer civic associations. Graham and his team acted




Photo by Mark Williams

This aerial view of Panama City shows the damage to the Comandancia (center), Manuel Noriega's headquarters.

as support to the 96th until the DC camp moved.

The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army and Panamanian Ministry of Transportation had all agreed to house the dislocated civilians in a hangar at Albrook Air Force Station so that Balboa High School could resume normal operations. At Albrook, a large aircraft hangar was designated to be refurbished as the DC facility, with a small building nearby to be the health clinic.

The DC team had a major role in this conversion. Graham requested and received construction experts from the CMOTF. A representative of the American Office of Federal Disaster Assistance established standards of construction and provided materials for construction of cubicles inside the hangar, and Air Force engineers provided construction support.

Graham also had access to a database on all residents of the camp, which enabled him to call on Panamanian workmen for assistance. The CA team compiled demographic information about the DC camp and selected civilians with the necessary skills to help build the more permanent facility. Laborers were paid for their work.

During all this time the CA planners worked with the local leader of El Chorrillo, getting his input on policies and rules. "A lot of these people were neighbors," said Sgt. Maj. Ramon Gonzalez, 353rd CA Command, who had worked with Cuban refugees at Indiantown Gap. "They knew one another, they got along well and they had an elected district leader. He wasn't allowed to assume his position under Manuel Noriega." The CA team began to prepare the hangar a few weeks after opening Balboa, and the laborers built 509 cubicles in the hangar to house the homeless civilians.

On Jan. 19, the entire DC population, now approximately 2,500, moved to Albrook. Graham took command of this camp for a week, after which he turned it over to the International Red Cross, the




Photo by Vince Warner

Temporary shelters set up on the ball field of Balboa High school house dislocated Panamanian civilians.

American Red Cross and the Panamanian Red Cross. In all, more than 11,000 DCs were, at one time or another, residents of the camps at Balboa and Albrook.

Urban planners assigned to the CMOTF surveyed the El Chorrillo area and determined the number and square footage of public and private structures, identified known historical, religious and cultural buildings, and developed information on the commercial and business facilities in the district. The information was turned over to the Agency for International Development for possible assistance projects.

### Public health

Assistance to Panamanian health authorities involved two officers, assigned to the Ministry of Social Services and the Ministry of Health, respectively, and a public-health team working under the operational control of the SOUTH-COM surgeon. In charge of coordination was Col. Jerry D. Huggins, a Reservist and health-care specialist employed by the U. S. government in Panama and called up for Just Cause.

The major difficulty in improving

the Panamanian health system was the split of authority between two ministries. The Ministry of Social Services had responsibility for the two major hospitals in Panama City and was funded directly from withholding taxes on salaries. The Ministry of Health was a welfare program whose funding was erratic, but it had responsibility for some 23 clinics in Panama City. The two agencies had joint responsibility for some 36 hospitals and 24 rural health facilities. Coordination between the two agencies was poor.

Huggins wanted to interest the Minister of Social Services, who controlled the vast bulk of funds, in the problems of non-Panama City hospitals. He took the minister on a tour of the hospital in Colon to show him garbage piled outside and sewage flowing through the kitchen. Improvements followed.

The Ministry of Social Services also had two warehouses, one full of food and one full of medical supplies donated by the United States and other countries. Citizens and organizations made their needs known to local clubs or the Catholic Church who, in turn, forwarded requests to the warehouses, but the



Photo by John Sell

An elderly Panamanian woman is vaccinated by a nurse during a joint exercise between U.S. troops and the Panamanian Ministry of Health.

system needed transportation, which Huggins was able to arrange.

## Law and order

Of particular importance to the future of Panama was the administration of justice. Col. Kenneth D. Strong, designated by Stone as chief of the Civil-military Operations Center, organized a public-security section. Its leader, Lt. Col. Richard C. Harris, sorted out the specialties of its members, who were lawyers, judges, police officers and corrections officials, and organized them into three teams: law-enforcement, corrections and judicial liaison.

The judicial liaison team's first mission was to review the records of the 5,000-6,000 Panamanians detained by American forces. Detainees included looters, members of the PDF, members of Noriega's paramilitary "Dignity Battalions," and others who had somehow fallen into the American net. Working with the Panamanian government, the team completed the review, and most of the detainees were released by Jan. 20. The judicial team also assisted the Panamanian government in getting its

courts back into operation.

The corrections team assessed the major prisons. American forces had broken into many facilities to search for and free jailed opponents of the Noriega regime, and, in some cases, the damages had made the prisons unusable. Repairs had to be organized, food provided to the inmates, and guards hired.

The mission of the law-enforcement section, and of the entire CA effort once the Panamanian government was functioning, was the establishment of a loyal, civilian police force. Prior to the American invasion, Noriega's Panamanian Defense Force had functioned as the police force and was widely known for its abuses. With Noriega out of power and the PDF eliminated, both legally and as an organized force, there were no police available to maintain law and order.

President Endara was determined that the only organized force in the country would be a civilian police. Although U.S. national police agencies and civilian contractors began assisting in the establishment of police academies, national laboratories and other facilities for the long term, it was

essential to get a police presence back on the streets in the meantime, and many of the Reserve Civil Affairs personnel brought into Panama after the initial insertion were experienced police officers.

The Endara government accepted the fact that initially, the members of the new police force would have to be drawn from the ranks of the old PDF. They were the only source of semi-trained and experienced manpower available, and the government considered it better to have them where they could be controlled and co-opted rather than leave them without a stake in the new regime. However, Civil Affairs personnel were to help inculcate in the new policemen a responsiveness to law and civilian authority and to ensure that they had at least minimal training in basic police techniques.

The first task was to identify police who were still loyal to Noriega. Panamanians assisted by identifying those who had committed abuses. Civil Affairs soldiers interviewed citizens to get the information, which was relayed to the State Department. Any evidence of abuses or loyalty to Noriega, or a known criminal background, meant immediate removal from the police force and possible detention.

The CA law-enforcement team trained the new police force, the Fuerzas Publicas de Panama, or FPP, beginning with redefining the concept of what police were. "The PDF didn't know how to do police work," said SFC William Helmick, of the 450th CA Company. "They were infantry soldiers, not public servants." The team's goal was to train a cadre of Panamanian policemen who would, in turn, train others.

One of the most elementary and important things that CA soldiers taught the new police force was basic patrolling. The old PDF patrols were done hastily and with the intent of restraining the citizens. New patrol techniques emphasized the idea of protecting the citizens. Team members also taught basic police reporting, and



## Standing-Up a Law Enforcement System

Operation Just Cause gave Portland, Ore., police sergeant Robert Kauffman ample opportunity to draw from his 15 years of police experience in ways he couldn't even imagine when he volunteered for duty in December 1989.

Kauffman volunteered for 139 days to support Civil Affairs missions in Just Cause. He was one of six members from the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade in Portland, deployed to Panama Dec. 29, 1989.

"Our first look at Panama was eerie," Kauffman said. "We stayed in recently vacated dependent housing. There were still tricycles in the yard, Christmas decorations up, and soldiers roaming around during the dawn-to-dusk curfew."

"After an initial briefing from the SOUTHCOM J-5, our data sheets were used to sort our civilian skills and to assign us with various ministries and projects," Kauffman said. "I went with the Ministry of Government and Justice."

Kauffman's team's main mission was to "stand-up" the new police force, the Fuerzas Publicas de Panama. "Our problems in standing-up a working police force were overwhelming," he said. "For instance, where do you find 13,000 note pads and pens? How do you reproduce any paperwork? Forms were nonexistent. Everything started from scratch with no budget."

One major challenge was changing a military defense force into a working police department "We knew a number of former PDF members were nothing more than gangsters, guilty of murder, torture and extortion," Kauffman said. "In addition to regaining law and order through the creation of a Panamanian police force, we had to weed out the undesirables."

After the FPP was reconstituted, and a number of undesirables purged, the next major task was to transform the 13,000 infantry troops to police officers. "A team of us developed the '20-Hour Quick Fix,'" Kauffman said. "We trained them in police patrolling, arrest procedures, as well as statute and constitutional law. We added a healthy dose of police ethics, from our perspective as well as that of the new Panamanian government. We translated it into Spanish and developed a 'train the trainer' approach, creating a cadre to spread the message."

Kauffman's experience convinced him of four areas of concern for future Civil Affairs operations: "First, we were in desperate need of up-to-date, detailed area assessments. There is a need for area assessments which are living documents with current maps, for example. Second, we could have saved time if we had an inkling of what to bring. We won't always be fortunate to have a PX down the street, or a well-stocked Army supply system. Third, even with the significant number of Spanish-speaking soldiers in CA, and the commendable English skills of many Panamanians, our lack of language training and proficiency created problems when communicating. We were setting up national policy and dealing with complicated issues. Survival, or tourist, language doesn't cut it. Language proficiency in units must be stressed. And finally, we discovered first-hand the incredible number of skills needed to re-establish a government. These skills aren't found the active component. It reaffirmed my belief that more accurate pinpointing of a spectrum of skills is needed so we can step in as we did and make a difference."

— Lt. Col. Susan Schenk, Civil Information Officer  
364th CA Brigade, Portland, Ore.

Helmick instituted a system for reporting crimes, which had not existed before

The old PDF, as a military unit, was armed with rifles, most of which were later collected in a cash-for-weapons program. As police, the FPP had to learn to carry and use sidearms, and CA soldiers helped give firearms training.

Despite the intensive screening and training, many Panamanians still associated the uniformed police with the old PDF, and uniforms for the new FPP turned out to be a major issue. "The Endara government wanted to eradicate any identification of the civilian police force as paramilitary," said Capt. David Elmo of the 353rd CA Command, who was involved in rebuilding the police force. "The U.S. tried to help. They provided surplus green fatigues. The only problem was that the PDF had also worn green fatigues, and the people saw no difference."

"To gain public confidence in this new police force which we had established, it was imperative that we outfit them with different uniforms," Helmick said.

Law-enforcement-team members researched different catalogs from the U.S. and helped evaluate a sample uniform which was found unsatisfactory because of its color and thickness. In the end, funds set aside for the uniforms were put into the local economy by having Panamanians make the new uniforms.

To further emphasize the distinction between military forces and public servants, many of the CA soldiers "civilianized" themselves as well, working in civilian clothes and driving civilian vehicles, according to SFC Daniel Svrcek of the 353rd CA Command. "We worked for a long time in civilian clothes. They wanted to play down the military. The emphasis was on putting civilian skills to use."

By the end of January, more than 200 members of the new Panamanian police force, and an equal number of judicial police, had received a 20-hour basic police-training course.

Despite the brevity of the course, it did get a police presence back on the streets of Panama with some concept of proper police procedures and respect for civilian rights.

## Area assessments

Members of the CMOTF also participated in area assessments to determine the extent of collateral damage to outlying areas during the invasion. Teams assessed roads, generators, utilities, schools, churches, hospitals, and the availability of food, water and medical and other supplies. They met with local leaders to determine the problems and passed the information to SOUTHCOM headquarters in Panama City.

While collateral damage was minimal outside of Panama City, effects of the invasion were felt throughout the country because of disruption to supply routes and the consequent imbalance between areas of supply and areas of demand. Many Civil Affairs missions helped alleviate the effects of this imbalance by arranging to transport the supplies to where they were needed.

On San Blas Island, for example,

a diesel-powered generator was the only source of electricity. The supply of fuel had been cut off as a result of the invasion, but fuel was waiting at the ports. Citizens were shutting off non-essential electric equipment, but such things as hospital operations were being affected. A CA team arranged for shipment of diesel fuel.

In Union Sentenia, a remote village with no electricity, villagers had a 3,000-pound surplus of slaughtered beef. Without refrigeration, the meat would spoil and become a major health hazard, and the leaders of the village asked that the surplus be taken to feed the dislocated citizens of El Chorrillo. The CA team arranged for a Blackhawk helicopter to transport the meat.

## Problems

The Civil Affairs mission during Just Cause was not without its problems. The decision not to call up a Reserve CA unit required some changes in plans. General Gann, director of plans and policy for SOUTHCOM, had planned on CA personnel arriving ready to work within D+2. Because of the time required to solicit volunteers,

he got 25 headquarters personnel at D+6. Further, he had planned on the CMOTF working for the combat headquarters, Joint Task Force South, but General Thurmond, the SOUTHCOM commander, directed that the CMOTF work directly for his headquarters.

Unfortunately, this chain of command was not clear to all of the headquarters involved, and the CMOTF initially received taskings from the American Embassy, SOUTHCOM staff, Stone's own personnel assigned to Panamanian ministries, JTF-South and U.S. Army-South.

Another problem caused by lack of a unit call-up was that the Reserve CA personnel did not really make up an Army unit. They had been sent to Panama as individuals assigned to U.S. Army-South. The CMOTF had no existence so far as Army systems were concerned. Without a unit identification code, funding sites, and all the other ways into the Army system, the CMOTF found great difficulty accomplishing many standard unit functions. For example, equipment and supplies could not be requisitioned, nor could orders be cut to put personnel on temporary duty. Both the G-1, Lt. Col. Allen D. Mills, and the G-4, Lt. Col. Lilia Vannett, found themselves unable to access the system. Vannett got furniture from an old Panamanian Defense Force facility and office space from the Panama Canal Commission. Necessary vehicles had to be leased, creating an enormous amount of paperwork.

Within the CMOTF, the fact that it was composed of individuals from across the country instead of from a single unit meant that soldiers required a few days to adjust to working with each other.

Based on their involvement in Just Cause, members of Civil Affairs units brought back a number of lessons learned:

- CA did numerous area assessments, which implied to civilians that the needed work and repairs



Photo by Paul Sweeney

Spec. Frank Wallace, U.S. Army-South Law Enforcement Activity, watches as his PNP counterpart questions a suspected mugger in Panama City.



Photo by Gerry Grey

Villagers of Union Sentenia crowd around a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter which has come to pick up surplus slaughtered beef. The village donated 3,000 pounds of meat to feed displaced civilians in Panama City.

would be done. When the assessments went through channels, they were ranked in importance and implemented depending upon available funds. Only a small number of the recommendations were actually funded. The overall planning must address a way to fund and perform the work that the assessments indicate must be done.

- Greater tactical CA is needed, with more CA assets at the battalions. The battalions were the ideal place for CA to do its job of preventing problems before they occur. Most of the preventable damage happened during the invasion, when CA assets were least available.

- Knowledge of language and culture is essential. Translators and interpreters on hand were sometimes overburdened, and many CA actions are best accomplished when soldiers speak the language of the host country.

- An area study is critical before going in-country.

- "Smart book" and FM 41-10 must be available. These references were both used constantly.

- Reservists should take only photocopies of personnel records to

active duty, not the originals. In-processing at Fort Bragg began with all finance and personnel records being sent back to home stations. Soldiers then completed the forms to create new records.

- Personnel should be familiar with sidearms as well as M-16s before deploying. There was no time to train in-country.

- There should be an interface between Reserve CA units and the 96th CA Battalion for intel missions, etc. The overall OPLAN did not write many of the CA assets into the flow of communication from the 96th. Reservists sometimes got information either by accident or by electing to sit in on 96th CA briefings.

- Personnel must be prepared for a fluid, rapidly changing environment in which the exact mission for each team may not always be clear or have specific tasks.

- Personnel absolutely must be physically fit.

## Conclusions

Despite the complications caused by lack of a Reserve-unit call-up, the Civil Affairs activities during

Just Cause were an exemplary effort of active and reserve-component soldiers working together.

Captains Williams and Carter of the 96th's A Company summed up CA activities during the operation: "We were instrumental in assisting the local government in all areas," Carter said, "including developing, equipping and training the police force; developing the public health and sanitation programs and coordinating the new government's initiatives with our plans for developmental assistance."

Williams points out that the U.S. normally uses civic action such as road building, well drilling and medical treatment to help a foreign government gain the allegiance of its population. But in Panama, the traditional concept of civic action didn't apply — the people were nearly 100-percent behind their government already. Instead, the U.S. strategy was one not of giving supplies and services, but of teaching the Panamanians to acquire them through their own efforts.

"In Panama we needed to route all our efforts through the Panamanians to reinvigorate the systems that atrophied under Noriega," Williams said. "And to allow the new government to show its citizens that it can deliver the goods."




---

This article was compiled by the staff of Special Warfare from the work of several authors: Lt. Col. Jeffrey Greenhut; Capt. Gerry Grey, PAO, 354th CA Brigade; Capt. Cynthia Crosson, PAO, 353rd CA Command; Capt. Robert N. Gable, 486th CA Company; Lt. Col. Susan Schenk, 364th CA Brigade; Capt. Terry Henry, 96th CA Brigade; and SSgt. Kirk Wyckoff, PAO, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Special thanks for photos from the Directorate of Training Support Center, Fort Clayton, Panama; and PAO, U.S. Army-South.

# Seal the Victory: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs

by Stanley Sandler

The delegation of prominent Mexican merchants, local civic leaders and church officials exchanged nervous glances as they were ushered by an unsmiling U.S. Army orderly into the presence of the American general. After all, here was the commander of an army of foreign invaders now deep inside their chaotic nation.

After they sorted themselves out, the delegation's leader cleared his throat and came out with it: Would the distinguished and humane generale graciously accept the dictatorship of the Federal Mexican Republic?

With some difficulty Gen. Winfield (Old Fuss and Feathers) Scott concealed his astonishment as he courteously responded that as an officer in the United States Army he had no political ambitions, although he was flattered by the offer.

This rather bizarre episode was the direct result of Scott's General Order No. 20, promulgated at Tampico, Mexico, on Feb. 19, 1847, declaring martial law over those areas under Scott's control. But GO No. 20 went well beyond the usual behave-yourself-or-else type of or-

ders. Scott forthrightly proclaimed that, in exchange for their docility, civilians were to be protected in their persons and property, any requisitions would be paid for in cash, and all priests and magistrates were to be saluted by U.S. troops. Scott meant every word of it; a civilian Army employee who had violated a Mexican woman was, on Scott's order, publicly hanged.

But Scott was, after all, in Mexico to wage war, and the military results of GO No. 20 were equally impressive. Mexico's second city, Puebla, fell to him without a shot, and Scott's military progress to Mexico City was speeded by an almost total absence of guerrilla activity against his long and vulnerable supply lines.

Gen. Zachary (Old Rough and Ready) Taylor, on the other hand, wasn't about to bother about such details as Civil Affairs. Consequently, his raw and undisciplined troops were harassed by Mexican guerrillas.

Today's U.S. Army Civil Affairs rightly considers General Scott the "Father of Civil Affairs," even though at the time, of course, there

was no such official organization, and most of today's CA duties were carried out by provost-marshal troops until World War II.

Unfortunately, the Scott-Taylor lesson wasn't always taken to heart. During the U.S. Civil War, the Union "political" general, Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the occupation of New Orleans, hanged a Confederate agitator who had hauled down the U.S. flag. But worse was to follow: Certain womenfolk of the Crescent City took it upon themselves to harass Union troops, denouncing, hissing or jostling the "bluebellies."

The enraged Butler issued GO No. 28, a very different article indeed from Scott's GO No. 20: "It is ordered that henceforth when any female shall in word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded as a woman of the street plying her avocation."

A howl of rage reverberated through the Confederacy: "Southern womanhood in danger!" A price was put on Butler's head of \$10,000, dead or alive. But the ladies of New Orleans had their own, more private response, painting Butler's truly ugly mug on the bottoms of their chamberpots!

Butler's besmirched historical reputation as an Army Civil Affairs officer could be redeemed by his conduct toward the escaped slaves in his jurisdiction. A New England abolitionist in civil life, Butler, for all his bungling insensitivities, genuinely wanted to help the wretched runaways.

When pressed by slave owners for the return of their property as provided for in the Fugitive Slave Act, the lawyerly Butler blandly responded that the act applied only to the United States, not to the Confederate States of America, which had seceded from the Union. Petitioners couldn't have it both ways. Butler went further, putting the able-bodied to work, and establishing an early form of social secu-

city — those blacks unable to work received a small stipend, financed by a levy on the wages of those who could.

Three decades later, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, American soldiers found themselves in places that most of them couldn't even find on a map. Nonetheless, order had to be restored, public health established and the way paved for eventual self-government. In Cuba, Gen. Leonard Wood put the island nation on its feet, cleaned up the cities and encouraged Cubans to elect their own leaders and draw up a liberal constitution, smoothing the way for Cuban independence.

The process was much more difficult in the Philippines. There the Filipino patriot Emilio Aguinaldo raised insurrection against the Americans. Eventually the U.S. Army defeated Aguinaldo in the field, but it concurrently established local self-government and police forces, public health services, schools and a Philippine defense force. This civil-military velvet-glove policy, with a Krag rifle in one hand and a schoolbook in the other, broke not only the military power of the rebels, but by 1902, their hold over the population as well.

In the aftermath of World War I, the U.S. Army administered its first major military government of an enemy population. It was all unplanned until nearly the last hour, even though Germany's military defeat was hardly an unforeseen fortune of war. Still, the German Rhineland occupation lived up to Gen. John J. Pershing's mandate of a "just, humane and disinterested" administration.

World War II saw many changes in U.S. Civil Affairs policy. For more than a year after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt insisted that Civil Affairs be removed from the Provost Marshal Corps and put under some civilian agency, such as the State or Treasury Department. FDR was acting in the hallowed American tradition

of civilian supremacy, and it was not until March 1943 that Secretary of War Henry Stimson was able to convince the President that the historical record and wartime exigencies demanded the modification of that tradition.

On March 1, 1943, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division, CAD, was activated under Maj. Gen. John Hildring. CAD personnel soon found themselves encountering problems in the field unimagined in their classrooms at the University of Virginia's School of Military Government. The Italian town of Adano desperately needed a bell for its church, the center of town life — the local Civil Affairs major finally scrounged one from a U.S. Navy destroyer. On a broader scale, the Italian fishing fleet was in fairly good shape, and supplied an important slice of the food needs of the liberated areas. But it needed fuel to put to sea. Could CAD justify the diversion of valuable petroleum to help civilian fishing boats put to sea?

Then there were the political conundrums. Granted, the mayor of a particular town was a fascist, but hadn't everyone had to be a fascist to hold any kind of government job?

He seemed to know his stuff, and anyway, with whom would we replace him? Then there are those gangs of armed teenagers swaggering about. They claimed to be partisans who had been fighting the "fascist swine" since before America even came into the war, but they may actually have been just bandits, or communists with their own fish to fry.

Despite these and many other problems, the 10,000-plus personnel of CAD took charge of more than 80 million allied, co-belligerent, enemy, refugee and partisan civilians, without one documented example of violent opposition.

One of the most sophisticated and gratifying of the CAD's accomplishments in WWII's European Theater of Operations was the rescue and restoration of thousands of works of European art and culture looted by the Nazis. Scores of civilian and military CAD personnel located and meticulously identified treasures ranging from statues to musical scores. Soon after V-E day, trains headed for Poland, Italy, France, Belgium, etc., with the rescued cultural heritage of Europe.

Contrast this record with that of



National Archives

Gen. Zachary Taylor (right center) giving orders to charge the Mexican batteries at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma, May 9, 1846.

the Germans in the same war. One contemporary German writer, with unconscious irony, illustrated the bankruptcy of the Wehrmacht's "civil affairs" policies: "To lock men, women, and children into barns and set fire to these, does not appear to be a suitable method of combating bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population."<sup>1</sup>

Army Civil Affairs emerged from the war and took up the military governments of Germany, Japan, Austria and Korea. The Army's rehabilitation of the first two countries was so effective that within one decade after the end of the most destructive war in history, those countries had emerged as global economic competitors.

Why was guerrilla warfare unheard of against American occupation troops in the aftermath of WWII? Was it simply a matter of the totality of the defeat of the fascist powers? If so, why were the Soviets fighting to completely subdue occupied territories well into the 1950s? Enlightened American policy, established by the national command authority and senior military commanders and implemented by Civil Affairs officers, made allies out of enemies and probably saved thousands of American lives.

The Korean story was not so happy. The Korean people resented both U.S. and Soviet military government, arguing, logically enough, that they had been among the first victims of Japanese aggression. In 1948 the last U.S. troops were withdrawn, but they would soon be back.

The Korean conflict, erupting in 1950, was fought amid a subsistence agrarian economy, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel soon found that fertilizers and draft animals were more important than electrical-power systems or railroads. Their duties were simplified in this war by the fact that there was only one functioning, legal government of the Republic of Korea throughout the conflict. CA officers were thus spared the vexing definitions of "collaborator" vs. "freedom

fighter" and "government exile" against "Quisling" that so plagued their WWII predecessors from St. Lô to Manila. In Korea, U.S. Army Civil Affairs enjoyed the satisfaction, however brief, of governing the only communist capital, Pyongyang, to fall to the forces of freedom to date.

During the Vietnam conflict Civil Affairs was before the U.S. public as never before in the well-worn phrase "winning the hearts and minds of the people." Here was another subsistence agrarian economy, the cockpit of an ideological struggle, and a U.S. military victory would prove hollow without a broad base of civil support. Civil Affairs' greatest success came in South Vietnam's central highlands, where CA troops worked closely with U.S. Special Forces in securing large areas of difficult terrain by winning the confidence of local tribes.

By 1966, each Special Forces A-Detachment in the highlands was augmented by a CAPO — a Civil Affairs-Psychological Warfare officer. The Army, however, did not make pacification a high-priority concern until May of 1967, when the civilian-controlled Civilian

Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program was taken over by Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. Three regular Army Civil Affairs companies, the 2nd, 29th and 41st, carried the burden throughout the U.S. involvement in the war, and according to the Army's Vice Chief of Staff at the time, they were "worth their weight in gold."

This was war-in-peace with an enemy who was everywhere and nowhere, and with no foreseeable end to it all. CA's work had to be effective and lasting. Its programs in the central highlands of well-drilling, market roads and bridges, public health clinics, school building and public education were undoubtedly successful because they were tailored to the local economy, which was not skewed, as elsewhere in South Vietnam, by large numbers of free-spending GIs.

But all Special Forces protection duties were turned over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam by 1971, and the final collapse came four years later in the face of a massive armored, conventional campaign by the regular army of North Vietnam.



Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

A Civil Affairs mobile training team assists Vietnamese civilians with well-drilling operations in An-Phu hamlet, Binh-Duong Province, in the 1960s.



After Vietnam, U.S. Army Civil Affairs kept its skills honed with numerous civic-action projects, primarily in Central America in the face of renewed Marxist guerrilla activity. Useful projects were also carried out in such Asian nations as Indonesia and Thailand.

And when the call came for Operation Urgent Fury, the rescue of the tiny island nation of Grenada, Army Civil Affairs was early on the scene. One CA spearheader from Company A, 96th CA Battalion, was on board the second C-130 to touch down, and other members of Company A landed with the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters. Their most pressing job was to care for civilians evacuated from combat areas. During the next two days, often using commandeered Cuban material, they fed, sheltered and returned to their homes about 20,000 Grenadians.

By mid-November, U.S. Army Civil Affairs was concentrating upon post-hostilities reconstruction. CA officers worked closely with the interim Grenadian government and the U.S. Agency for International Development to identify and correct life-threatening problems in water supplies, sewage, electricity and public health.

Individual CA Reserve specialists on 45-day active-duty tours were called in for road construction, water-plant operations, telephone repair, finance, education and tourism. The overwhelming popularity of the U.S. intervention eased the task of the CA troops; still, Army CA had its work cut out in a nation run down by four years of erratic and sometimes brutal Marxist control.

As in past wars, Civil Affairs soldiers, active and reserve, in Panama's Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty found themselves faced with a multitude of tasks, many simply unimagined before hostilities. Troops of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion jumped in during the initial assault and quickly assumed the operation of Torrijos-



Photo by Harry Hargett

Dislocated Panamanian civilians set up temporary shelters on the ballfield at Balboa High School during Operation Just Cause in 1989.

Tocumen International Airport, for example. Another first-time task for Army Civil Affairs in Panama was the tracking down and restoration to their owners of dozens of automobiles that had been used by U.S. troops during Just Cause. Even in Third World countries, such amenities as airports and automobiles are now vital to restoring normal civil life. CA troops also established a large displaced-civilian camp in Panama City.

In all its wars the U.S. Army has rediscovered the basic principle that civilian populations cannot be ignored. Military victory is not enough. Civil Affairs' proud legacy of caring for defenseless people caught up in war has fulfilled its motto: "Seal the Victory." ✕

ry and the history of technology in the 19th and 20th centuries, he holds a master's degree from Columbia University and a doctorate from London University's Department of War Studies. He has published a book and numerous articles, some of which have appeared in *Military Review* and *Military Affairs*.

#### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Paul Blackstone, "German Psychological Warfare Against the Soviet Union," in William E. Daugherty and Morris M. Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Office of Operational Research, 1958), p. 270.

Stanley Sandler is the command historian for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A specialist in military history, naval histo-



# Converting from H- to L-Series TOE: An Impossible Task for Civil Affairs?

by Lt. Col. Larry Wayne

Conversion to the new Civil Affairs force structure in 1992 will be smoother if commanders and units plan ahead

Force reductions in the active component, reductions in paid drill strength for the Reserve, plans to reduce the number of forward-based units, and the implementation of new force structures all point to one thing — the Army is changing!

All of these changes will have some impact on Civil Affairs units. The most significant is the conversion from the H-series table of organization and equipment, or TOE, to the L-series TOE.

The effective date, or E-date, for conversion is Sept. 16, 1992, but transition from the H-TOE to the L-TOE can start as early as September 1991. Transition is the period given to allow units to initiate needed personnel and equipment requisitions under the new force structure. This period also gives the personnel and supply systems time to react to such requisitions.

The TOE is not an authorization document; it serves only as a base from which to develop the modified table of organization and equipment, the MTOE. In some cases only minor modifications to the

TOE are necessary. The Civil Affairs L-TOE is programmed for modification sometime during the second or third quarter of fiscal year 1991.

Upon implementation, the L-MTOE will dictate major changes for units. The unit strength that is affected the greatest by these changes is the Civil Affairs group converting to the brigade structure.

Under the H-MTOE the group is authorized 152 personnel. The L-TOE, converting at an Authorization Level of Organization - 2, or ALO 2, calls for a loss of 32 personnel upon conversion — leaving 120 personnel.

Other major changes in the L-TOE are the elimination of lieutenant positions, except for general-officer aides; a greater number of Civil Affairs branch-specific officer positions; and a Civil Affairs enlisted military occupational skill. The enlisted MOS will replace the "D" suffix used in the H-MTOE to identify Civil Affairs enlisted positions. The bulk of the D-suffix-coded H-MTOE positions are in MOS 71L.

How can the commander and his senior noncommissioned officers make this transition easier? Is it an impossible task when viewed within the context of so many personnel changes? Not if commanders keep their units informed and involve their key officer and enlisted leaders.

Planning is the first step. "Don't wait for the L-MTOE," said Brig. Gen. Joseph Hurteau, commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command at Fort Bragg. "Take the H-MTOE and accomplish a line-by-line comparison with the L-TOE."

Remember, only minor modifications may occur to the LTOE, and the impact of waiting is more adverse than the minor adjustments that may occur from the modification process. During the next 12 months, carefully scrutinize each personnel action.

Should a unit experience a turnover in a position that will disappear under the L-TOE, it should give careful consideration to leaving that position vacant. Look at junior officers and enlisted who are qualified to move into the next higher-graded position under the L-TOE. Review L-TOE positions to determine where reclassification training can benefit a soldier by offering upward career progression. This will have a positive impact upon transition, since the soldier can be assigned to the new position at that time. This planning also provides the soldier time to tackle the reclassification training and will improve overall unit readiness on the L-series E-date.

Between now and the E-date, schedule as many privates, privates first class and specialists for the D-suffix course. The Special Warfare Center and School has resident D-suffix classes and plans to conduct mobile-training-team classes during fiscal years 1991 and 1992.

On E-date, personnel trained in these classes can transition to MOS 38A, the new enlisted MOS, and fill many of the positions at the PFC

and specialist levels in the L-MTOE. Also, schedule officers to complete the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course and then request branch transfer to the Civil Affairs branch. Review personnel records for officers who have already completed the CAOAC and have been awarded the additional-skill identifier 5W. These officers are qualified to transfer to the Civil Affairs branch and fill the Civil Affairs branch-specific positions in the L-MTOE.

Commanders should reorganize their units, before the transition date, using the L-TOE as a guide. As long as the commander does not exceed the personnel requirements, grade structures or equipment authorizations detailed in the H-MTOE, he should reorganize his unit to meet the demands of his mission. Some units have already reorganized, and many other units are in the process of reorganization.

In the L-TOE, there is an increase in the number of Skill Level 1 personnel. This increase was the result of having to conform to the Army's standards-of-grade-authorization model for MOS 38A. Units have expressed concern over the number of E-3 and E-4 enlisted personnel. However, the Civil Affairs enlisted MOS entrance requirements are designed to provide the field with the requisite quality of personnel to perform tasks at Skill Level 1.

An analysis early in the MOS-development cycle revealed that in order to have an accession MOS, which would accept lower-enlisted soldiers before they are trained in another MOS, a trade-off was necessary at the lower-graded positions. A non-accession MOS would present severe recruiting difficulties for units, resulting in constant strength problems. The accession MOS also provides the units with the versatility to train their future senior enlisted soldiers.

The Civil Affairs enlisted MOS standards of grade authorization present some restrictions at the senior-noncommissioned-officer

level. This is significant when viewed within the context of the total force, realizing that a great percentage of the sergeant-first-class slots are in the foreign internal defense/unconventional warfare battalions.

Also affecting the assignment of unit personnel, at the senior NCO level, is the number of full-time manning position requirements. The Special Warfare Center and School is currently conducting an extensive review of the enlisted grade structure to determine whether the imbalances can be adjusted prior to, or during, the modification process of the L-TOE.

Equipment changes from the H-MTOE to the L-TOE are not expected to cause any major problems, except in the area of storage. Unfortunately, unit storage is not something that the L-TOE can fix.

Many hours will go into planning for conversion from the H-MTOE to the L-MTOE. This effort will be rewarded upon implementation of the new force structure through the reduced number of problems the unit commander and his personnel will face. There is no way to avoid personnel turbulence created by major structure changes. The earlier a unit starts aligning its personnel to the new structure, the less the transition will affect the soldier. ✕

---

Lt. Col. Larry Wayne is currently the Civil Affairs Integrator for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Before assuming his current position, he served at the SWCS as the Civil Affairs PropONENT in the Special Operations PropONENT Office and as the director of training, doctrine and literature in the Civil Affairs Department. A graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, he has served as the S-3, 489th Civil Affairs Company, Knoxville, Tenn., and as chief of both the Civil Affairs and Military Intelligence Branches at the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center, St. Louis, Mo.

# The Truth

## About Promotion To Major:

A No-nonsense guide  
for officers facing the major's  
promotion board

by Lt. Col. (P) Thomas H. Davis III

For the month of September and most of October last year, I sat at a desk and looked into a microfiche reader for eight hours a day. During that time I attempted to place a numerical value on the careers of several thousand Army captains. The purpose of this marathon was to select officers for promotion to the rank of major. It was not fun.

What I'm about to discuss applies only to the board I sat on. Other selection boards consider different criteria in determining their lists. It's important that you keep this in mind while reading this article.

### Methodology

The board consists of three panels of six-seven members each. The total number of individuals on my board was 20. The good news is that the board spends about 40

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, based on his experience on a recent promotion board. While they concern Special Forces officers in particular, the information can be of benefit to officers of all branches.

minutes on your file. The bad news is that this equates to less than two minutes per board member.

Each member assigns a numerical value to the file from 1-6. Every number has three possible values, e.g., 4-, 4, 4+. Once all three panels have voted the files of all officers above, in, and below the promotion zone, the board totals the scores and forms an order-of-merit list.

Each officer has a number on the list from one to whatever. The board then draws a "cut line." Generally speaking, those above this line are promoted; those below it are not. There are certain floors set for shortage branches, gender and race. If these floors are not met by the above-, in-, and below-the-zone officers, they can have an impact on who gets promoted.

Each board member has a different philosophy on how he or she votes a file, but generally speaking, it goes something like this:

- A vote of 1 is a vote for "show cause."
- A vote of 2 or 3 is a "do not promote" vote.
- A vote of 4 is one that could go

either way.

- A vote of 5 or 6 is a "definitely promote" vote.

Incidentally, no one knows where the cut line will be until after the board has voted on all the files and has tabulated the results. The result of this is a pretty fair assessment of how well an officer has done relative to his or her peers. Having gone through the process, I believe that it's about as fair a system as can be devised.

The hard truth is that if all your officer evaluation reports place you "with the pack" (center of mass), you probably won't get promoted. If you are a combat-arms officer and have a below-center-of-mass report in command, you are in serious trouble — I don't care if the general does love you.

### Procedure

Remember, each board member has less than two minutes to look at a file. Here's what happens:

1. Open the file and look at the picture. (More about this later.)
2. Check the officer record brief to see if the officer has had a

Special Warfare

branch-qualifying assignment, e.g., for combat arms, a company/battery/troop/ODA.

3. The first panel member to vote on the file looks at the C&D data. If there are any really bad (Article 15s, general-officer letters or reprimands) or really good (Legion of Merit, Soldier's Medal) items there, they are noted on a separate sheet of paper and included with the file. This ensures that all panel members are aware of the information.

4. Scan the OERs (mainly those the officer has had as a captain) and look in priority at:

- Job title and number of months.
- Senior rater's profile.
- Where the rater has placed the "X."
- The numbers on the front.
- The first and last sentences in the senior rater's narrative and what the rater said in the potential block (to identify the really "fast burners" or to aid the board members in making a decision if there is a close call on promotion).

My friends, that's it. If I led you to believe that anything more was done on your reports after about the first week, it would be a lie. Notice I qualified that statement with, "after about the first week." In the beginning, most folks really try to read some of the files. Unfortunately, they get so far behind that they realize this will not work and revert to the method I've described.

## Advice for officers

So what can you do or not do to increase your chances for promotion?

- Do the very best you can in every job you get.
- If you slip in one job, such as ODA command, try to get another one, and don't screw it up!
- Don't write a letter to the board explaining why you got some 2s or were below center of mass on an OER. If you were below the mark on only one OER, chances are most of the board members won't let this influence their decision. If you write a letter, you're only calling the board members' attention to the

fact that you've had a problem, which will cause them to look for other problems you may have had.

- Unless you really have a killer OER, think carefully before you try to appeal it. If the OER wasn't referred to you and your appeal isn't successful, you'll only highlight that report for the board.

- Don't let your records go before a board without a DA photo! Branch will screen your file to ensure that your photo is up-to-date. You might also want to check to make sure that your records are in order several months before the board is due to convene.

- If your rater or senior rater fails to mention promotion on your report, ask them if this omission was done intentionally or if it was an oversight. It's OK if it was intentionally left out, but it would be a shame if it had just been forgotten.

- Make sure that your ORB is up-to-date, especially the entries for your command positions.

- Every job you do counts, but the ones that count the most are those in your branch.

- When your DA photo is taken, make sure that you wear your SF tab. If you are branched Special Forces and do not wear your tab, you will cause some folks to wonder about your commitment to the branch. If you're authorized a Ranger tab, by all means wear it, too.

- Don't have your DA photo taken wearing hair under your nose. Of the 20 board members, there are bound to be a few who just don't like officers who wear a mustache. Most members know that the word is out about not having your DA photo taken with a mustache. They assume that anyone who insists on having his picture taken with one is just thumbing his nose at the board.

- Don't worry about commanding a company. ODA command is looked on as equivalent to company command for SF officers. I had my doubts about this before I sat on this board, but I am now convinced that this is the case, and your SF

representative on each board will reinforce the fact.

- It is absolutely essential that you successfully command an ODA for 18 months, plus or minus six months, to get promoted to major. If promotion is your primary concern, then additional commands as a captain are counterproductive. No matter how good you were in previous commands, if you have one screwup in your present command, your promotion will be at risk.

- When you review your ORB prior to consideration for major, make changes as neatly as possible. Do not use a magic marker to highlight items on the ORB that you think should be noticed. This tends to insult the board members and makes you look self-centered.

## Advice for raters

There's really very little raters can do to help push their captains ahead. About the best they can do is to key in on potential within that portion of the report. Keep the words to a minimum. Comments like "must command a battalion," "promote below the zone," and "select now for C&GSC" will help. If you fail to mention promotion or schooling, place your X's to the right of the left-hand side of the report or give less than 1's on the front, it will hurt but not necessarily kill. If you want to help, convince the senior rater to place the officer above his center of mass. In the duty title of the report, put "Commander" or "ODA Commander." The first sentence of the duty description should read something like, "Serving in an O3 command position within Special Forces."

If an OER is due on one of your officers and the senior rater has not been in the rating chain long enough to comment and you really want to help the officer, select your words for the potential block very carefully. Consider the following:

"Promote below the zone to MAJ." "Must select first time considered for C&GSC." "A future battalion commander."

If you have an officer who has to be taped or is close to the weight limit according to AR 600-9, and he is in good physical condition, make sure you comment on this, e.g., "Can bench press in excess of 300 pounds," "Runs 10Ks in under 45 minutes," "Completes 12-mile rucksack march with 65 pounds in under three hours," etc. Additionally, if the officer has to be taped, you must mention that he meets the body-fat standard according to AR 600-9. Place these remarks on the front of the report.

When you recommend an officer for the Command and General Staff College, use the capital abbreviation "C&GSC" as opposed to writing it out. Likewise, when you mention promotion, use "promote to MAJ" or "promote to O4," instead of "promote to major" or "promote to next higher grade." It will be more likely to catch the eye of the board member in this form, and it's not considered a gimmick.

### **Advice for senior raters**

The school solution for a senior-rater profile is to have a few individuals below the center of mass, the majority in the center of mass and a very few above the center of mass. Such a profile is easy to read and definitely lets the board know who you want passed over and who you want to attend C&GSC and command battalions. This is OK if you are senior-rating majors or captains-promotable. If you are senior-rating junior- to mid-grade captains, there will be several that you have placed in the center of mass who would be great majors and lieutenant colonels. Unfortunately,

they might not make it that far, given the promotion rates we are dealing with now and will be dealing with in the future.

For the Special Forces battalion commander, a profile built up from the fourth or fifth block, with a few below center of mass, a medium-sized center of mass, and an above-center-of-mass which is almost as large as the center of mass, is what we need to have. This profile, with the proper last sentence, will also identify the really fast burners. The group commanders are going to be the ones who pick officers for battalion command when they senior-rate them as majors. If you restart your profile and are building a new one from the bottom up, state in your first sentence, "I have restarted and am in the process of building my profile."

When you write your portion of the report, key in only on potential. The most important sentence in your narrative is the last one. The next most important is the first one. Write more than one or two sentences, but don't fill up the space completely. Fill in your portion from one-half to no more than three-fourths of the space allocated, and use regular-size type.

The earlier advice concerning abbreviating C&GSC and MAJ/04 also applies to senior raters. Also, you should not allow reports to be typed on a dot-matrix printer; they are very hard to read in that form.

Reports that do not have input from a senior tend to have a negative connotation. A senior-rater option should be strongly considered if the rated officer is in a command position and will have 90 days or

more into the rating period. For all other rated officers, senior-rater options should be strongly considered upon the departure of the senior rater after 180 days or more into the rating period.

The "one to grow on" philosophy may help your profile, but it doesn't always help the rated officer. On our board, this was done so often by senior raters that some of the board members interpreted it to be an overall center-of-mass performance.

Finally, any senior rater who (after having read this paragraph) gives an officer below-center-of-mass and then writes, "He is ready for promotion now," "One of the very best," "select for C&GSC," "unlimited potential," "a future battalion commander," or other such laudatory comments is a gutless wonder! Y'all can quote me on that one. ✂

---

Lt. Col. (P) Thomas H. Davis III is currently the J-3 for the Special Operations Command - Korea. He has spent 17 of his 22 commissioned years in Special Forces and has commanded five ODAs that specialized in HALO, scuba or mountain operations. Additionally, he has commanded two companies, a TO&E battalion (3/5th SFG), and a training battalion (2nd Bn., 1st Special Warfare Training Group). He has served as a 41 (personnel manager) at a battalion, group, mechanized infantry division and the 1st SOCOM headquarters. He holds a BA degree from the University of Georgia and a master's degree from the University of Southern California.

# Military Qualification Standards System: Army Framework for Leader Development

To develop its officers as leaders, the Army has established a system which gives officers, school commanders and unit commanders a common framework for leader development.

The Military Qualification Standards System identifies common and branch-specific training requirements for officers. It has two components: the military-task-and-knowledge component identifies critical battle-focused tasks, skills and knowledge, and the professional-military-education component establishes responsibilities and standards for professional development and education.

MQS covers officer training from precommissioning to promotion to colonel and is organized into three stages. MQS I is taught at the commissioning sources: the U.S. Military Academy, Reserve Officers Training Corps and Officer Candidate School. It establishes minimum military skills on which to build a branch qualification. MQS II covers company-grade officer training and is

accomplished through officer basic and advanced courses, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, known as CAS3, and operational assignments. MQS III applies to field-grade officers and is currently being formulated by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Leader development under MQS is a product of three factors: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development.

- Institutional — School commanders are most directly involved with institutional training. Schools identify officer-performance requirements at particular levels and train them to perform those duties.

- Operational — Unit commanders have the flexibility to establish officer leader-development programs which complement unit training programs based on the mission-essential task list. MQS does not require commanders to train tasks which do not support their unit METLs. Commanders must tailor both their MQS task-training program and the professional reading program to support METL-based unit training plans.

- Self-development — Self-development involves the individual officer — the one ultimately responsible for personal development as a leader.

## MQS II

MQS II applies to company-grade officers in the active and reserve components. Its goal is to prepare company-grade officers to accomplish the wartime tasks, to provide the basis for promotion to major and attendance at Command and Staff College-level schooling, and to prepare officers for positions of greater responsibility.

The military-task-and-knowledge component consists of company-grade officer common and branch-specific tasks. The professional-military-education component consists of a reading program and, for selected officers, advanced civil schooling.

Common and branch manuals support MQS II training. Branch manuals focus on branch qualification; common manuals concentrate

on company-grade-officer critical tasks.

## SF branch manual

Designed to support and complement resident instruction received in the OAC and the SFQC, the Special Forces Branch manual describes tasks critical for Special Forces captains. SF officers must be capable of planning and executing the five SF missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism.

Since they may also support conventional forces, SF officers must also understand their role in the Air-Land Battle and retain the company-level conventional skills from their accession branch. Because SF units are area-oriented to various theaters, their battle focus may vary, and the specific SF-group METL will require knowledge of a variety of common and special-operations tasks.

The SF manual contains Infantry branch tasks — these may also need to be tailored to fit individual needs, but proficiency in these tasks is essential. It also contains SF branch tasks which are organized in the battlefield operating systems.

Appendices to the SF manual include an SF branch reading list, a training site matrix which cross-references individual tasks to major training locations, a list of references required in training of all tasks and a glossary of key terms.

MQS II common and branch manuals have been fielded to officers and unit commanders through pinpoint distribution. SF officers receive both Special Forces and Infantry branch manuals. After the initial distribution, newly commissioned officers will receive the manuals in their officer basic courses. ✕

---

Information for this article was furnished by the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine and by the Army Command and General Staff College.

## SOLLMIS:

### *New data base preserves SOF lessons-learned*

A computer data base now makes it possible for special-operations soldiers to share their lessons-learned and to profit from the historical and contemporary experiences of other SOF units.

The Special Operations Lessons Learned Management Information System provides a single library of lessons-learned to aid special-operations units in planning their training and operational missions. Developed at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the system, called SOLLMIS, also provides SWCS training developers a source of information to assist them in developing SOF doctrine, training, organization and materiel.

Developed by the SWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization and programmed by Spec. Michael Foster of the SWCS Information Management Office, SOLLMIS is a user-friendly, fully automated library containing observations and experiences of soldiers assigned to special-operations and security-assistance missions.

Users will make selections from a succession of menus in order to find or enter data, according to Lt. Col. Michael R. Harris, chief of the SWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, which developed SOLLMIS. They will need to type data into the program only when they are recording observations, lessons learned or recommendations. Since there are no codes or commands to memorize other than a password, users will not need extensive training or experience to use the data base.

SOLLMIS categorizes data according to a number of factors, including climate, terrain, geographic region, mission and SOF elements involved. The extensive categories give the program more "search" capability, Harris said. In addition, the data will include points of contact so users can follow up on recommendations.

The idea of capturing experience onto a data base is not new — the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has a system known as CALL, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System, or JULLS. However, these systems currently contain very little in the nature of SOF-unique data, Harris said.

Each of the other systems has been searched for SOF-related observations, and those found have been placed into the SOLLMIS data base, Harris said. The main sources of SOLLMIS data will be special-operations active and reserve-component units, military groups, security-assistance organizations, mobile training teams and historical analysis.

CALL and JULLS will also be continuously searched for SOF-related information. This eliminates the need for SOF soldiers to search other systems for SOF data, and makes SOLLMIS the single-source, official data base for SOF observations, Harris said.

Currently, there are approximately 230 lessons-learned in

SOLLMIS, Harris said. These are already being used to brief security-assistance teams whom the SWCS Security Assistance Training Management Office has sent to countries throughout the world.

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has begun fielding the Special Operations Command Information Management System, called SOFCIMS. This system will provide standard hardware and software for all active-component Special Forces groups and the headquarters of USASOC and the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The SOLLMIS data base and program will be loaded on designated SOFCIMS hardware. SF detachments which already have laptop computers will load the SOLLMIS program onto their laptops. Using the system, detachments will upload and download SOLLMIS records by modem or diskette at the SF group operational centers.

While in preparation for deployment, detachments will be able to download pertinent lessons-learned from SOFCIMS, and upon return to home station, they will be able to upload new lessons-learned into the system. Periodically, lessons-learned compiled at the SF-group level will be forwarded to U.S. Army Special Forces Command for evaluation and transfer to SWCS to update the master SOLLMIS data base.

Eventually, SOLLMIS will be available to SOF units through a computer network as well as by telephone modem. The system should be completed during FY 91, Harris said, but he emphasizes that soldiers do not have to wait. Units with specific needs — to get more information about any of the systems or to submit lessons-learned, for example — can contact Lt. Col. Michael R. Harris or Carlee Cummings; Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization; USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Phone AV 239-4114/3538, commercial (919) 432-4114/3538. ✕



Special Operations Lessons Learned  
Management Information System

Page

Record Number 001

Classification: Unclassified  
Mission Area: Special Operations  
SO Mission Activity: Direct Action  
SO Element: Special Forces Operational Detachment A  
SO Spt Elem: Theater Special Operations Command  
Mission Support Event: CAS  
Battlefield Ops: Maneuver (includes direct fire, movement, close combat)  
Environment: Terrain: D = Desert  
Elevation: M = Midlands (3000 - 7000 ft ASL)  
Climate: A1 = Hot Dry (90-120f/32-49C) (3-8% humidity)

Operations Area by Theater/Country: CENTCOM:  
PACOM:  
EUCOM: SY = Syria  
LANTCOM:  
SOUTHCAM:  
CONUS:

Observation Type: Historical Analysis

Distribution System: SOLLMIS

Functional Area: Doctrine; Joint; Training

Observation/Issue: On the morning of 12 October 1973 the Israeli Defense Force commander on the Golan front received intelligence that a large Iraqi troop and equipment convoy would move that night from Baghdad to Damascus. At 1000 hours on 12 October, the decision was made to execute a contingency plan to interdict the Iraqi convoy by helicopter-transported paratroopers. At approximately 2300 hours, a lone IDF CH-53 lifted off from Israel with 12 paratroopers and an internally loaded, jeep-mounted, 106mm recoilless rifle. To avoid detection by Syrian radar and the air defense sites, the helicopter flew low-level north along the coast of Lebanon and inland to the ambush site, which was located 100 kilometers northeast of the Golan front on the Baghdad-Damascus Highway. The landing zone was reached by 2400 hours. After the paratroopers off-loaded, the helicopter was parked several hundred meters from the highway in a covered position. Demolitions were emplaced on the bridge, and mines were employed forward of the Israeli ambush position. Shortly after 0100 hours on 13 October, the Iraqi convoy arrived. Expecting no threat at night over 100 kilometers behind the battle lines, the Iraqis had their tracked vehicles on carriers and their troops in buses. The attack was initiated when the bridge was blown and the convoy was further blocked front and rear by the 106mm recoilless rifle. The Israelis withdrew under the cover of an air strike on the immobilized convoy.

Lesson Learned:

1. Closing the intelligence, targeting, mission tasking, preparation, and launch cycle is a major achievement. Turning intelligence into action is the first challenge.
2. The attack was on a column in march order far enough in the rear to feel safe. This increased the probability of success and the psychological impact on the enemy.
3. Mines and stand-off weapons were used to enhance the effectiveness of the demolition attacks.
4. The demolition created an obstacle to the front of the column while the 106mm recoilless rifle knocked out the rear vehicles, trapping the target for the follow-up air strike.
5. The coordination and integration of the Special Operations and Battlefield Interdiction is the critical lesson to be learned. Without the follow-up air strike, the damage would have only been minor and the SO units' breaking contact much more difficult. Without the SO team, the aircraft would have had to fly a dangerous and inefficient flight profile (search and attack targets of opportunity). Instead, the SO team fixed the target location and time, allowing the aircraft to plan and fly the safest penetration route.

Recommendations: SO and USAF doctrine for interdiction be integrated to provide the intell flow, targeting and coordination procedures to support joint deep interdiction.

Exercise/Nickname: 73 Arab-Israeli War

Date: 10/10/90 Organization: DOES, JFKSWCS

POC: LTC Harris Phone: (000)-239-1207 AV: yes

References: John F. Sullivan; John S. Wood, Edward Cezell, Desert Warfare Lessons Learned Study, DARCOM, Alexandria, VA, March 1984, p. 79-80.

Sample SOLLMIS entry

# Opinion

## Special Warfare

### **LIC, Counternarcotics and Small-Scale Agriculture**

*by Capt. Michael Ligon*

The U.S. “War on Drugs” is a political misnomer. The fight against the drug problem is actually an example of low-intensity conflict.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. has a three-pronged approach to counternarcotics: CONUS education and treatment; border interdiction; and OCONUS source disruption.<sup>2</sup> We have social agencies to provide drug education and treatment and military means to interdict the drug flow into the U.S. The weak link lies in not having a viable economic alternative to offer drug-producing nations.

Clauseswitz stated that there is no such thing as a purely military strategy to war,<sup>3</sup> and U.S. doctrine on internal defense and development states that the military in and of itself is not a nation-builder.<sup>4</sup> In the war on drugs, a purely military approach is not the answer. Indeed, Peruvian and Colombian leaders view the U.S. military approach as “politically volatile, sparking fears of escalating the violence and eventual direct U.S. involvement leading to a ‘South American Vietnam.’”<sup>5</sup>

Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian revolutionary, described the peasants as the core of a rural guerrilla movement since they know the country, can act as couriers and guides, and can provide hiding places, information and food supplies.<sup>6</sup>

The small farmer who raises the coca or poppy crop shares many of these characteristics and is the core of drug production. Until we remove the logistical support base for the drug cartels — the small farmer — we will be on the defensive in the drug war.<sup>7</sup>

We must first understand the problems facing the small farmer. According to one source, “About 60 percent of the world’s farmers own less than 11 acres of land and 35 percent less than 2.5 acres. This means approximately one billion farmers in the world must support their families with what they can produce on plots of 2.5 acres or less.”<sup>8</sup>

Traditionally, these farmers dedicate their land to growing a cash crop which they sell in order to buy food. This is just the opposite of how it should be — farmers should be able to feed themselves first. Being unable to provide for his family creates the farmer’s dissatisfaction with the government. This can induce him to join a “war for national liberation” or supplement his income by growing the coca leaf or the heroin poppy.

Although Peru and Bolivia have been especially vocal in pushing the U.S. for a crop “substitution” program, such a program would not meet their goals.<sup>9</sup>

Crop-substitution programs sponsored by the United Nations in Thailand have met with mixed success — efforts to replace opium with rice, coffee or kidney beans have not eliminated the need for the farmers to barter for basic necessities nor provided a nutritional diet.<sup>10</sup> Nor have they reduced farmers’ dependence on a narrow range of export crops subject to foreign tariffs and world market prices.<sup>11</sup>

The Benson Institute for Small-Scale Agriculture, a nonprofit organization headquartered in Provo, Utah, has a program that suggests a solution to the dilemma. Since 1976, the Benson Institute has taught small farmers to allocate certain amounts of their land to crops needed to provide a well-balanced diet.

Using this system, a father of eight and a father of seven in Portoviejo, Ecuador, were able to feed their families nutritionally and still raise their average annual income from \$169 to \$1,135 — almost an 800-percent increase. Ecuador’s President Leon Febres Cordero was sufficiently impressed with the program to request that it be implemented on a national scale.<sup>12</sup>

Start-up costs for each farmer average \$50-\$150 — easily repaid the first year. The next problem is to find the money at an interest rate the farmer can afford. The Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Microenterprise, or Prodem, a private organization based in Cambridge, Mass., has been disbursing low-interest loans to market vendors in the “informal sector” of La Paz, Bolivia, for more than two years.

Vendors in the informal sector, that segment of the city’s economy considered outside the mainstream, are normally trapped by having to buy produce on credit (for as much as 10 percent a day!) from truckers who haul the produce from the countryside. Prodem has found that with an initial loan of as little as \$50 at three-percent interest, vendors’ incomes increase 50-100 percent.<sup>13</sup>

A program combining the Benson Institute’s small-scale agriculture program and Prodem’s financing techniques could reduce the drug crop and eliminate the small farmer’s economic dependency on the drug trafficker. In the long-term, it would also improve the quality of life for a major portion of the population in most Third World countries.

Institution of such a program would meet with resistance from insurgents, drug-traffickers and bureaucrats protecting their turf, and

coordinated political emphasis and military support would be required.<sup>14</sup> Without political resolve the program would go nowhere. With it, the host-nation government would be perceived by the farmers as being responsive to their problems. With this perception, the political, economic and political tide turns in favor of the government, and ground-level intelligence sources will surface and become a combat-multiplier. Army Special Forces introduced this approach as the "hearts and minds" theory in South Vietnam.

According to Col. Wesley Groesbeck, "The 'hearts and minds' theory affirms that if support can be gained, people will withhold information and material support from the insurgents (and drug-traffickers), refuse to do their bidding, give information about insurgents to government functionaries, support public programs and volunteer assistance so that the war will be won."<sup>15</sup>

The final draft of FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, articulates the integrated organizational approach necessary for counterinsurgency and counternarcotics. The most important unit in that approach is the regional area control center, a sort of forward operating base consisting of political, economic and military representatives concentrating on one region of the country. It is the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all counterinsurgency (and counternarcotics) programs.<sup>16</sup>

Plugging in the Benson/Prodem strategy at this level would involve either of two approaches: government grants, either U.S. or bilateral U.S. and host-nation agreements, which would enable Prodem and the Benson Institute to expand to meet the need worldwide; or training of Civil Affairs specialists in the agriculture process at the Benson Institute and soliciting funding for farmers through the U.S. Agency for International Development or other governmental lending institutions. Once Civil Affairs specialists learn the small-scale concept, they can use in-country USAID sources for technical advice.

Because of the political sensitivity of deploying conventional U.S. units OCONUS for source interdiction, units trained in low-level diplomacy should be used to apply the Benson/Prodem solution. Three are required: Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. SF detachments deployed as advisers could train counternarcotics forces to provide security for the farmers and put the cartel on the tactical defensive.<sup>17</sup>

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion is ideally suited to implement the program. By managing a program similar to the SOFHAT (special-operations forces humanitarian assistance teams) approach of the late 1980s, the 96th could play a critical role in the counternarcotics effort. The third leg of the triad would be the 4th PSYOP Group. By disseminating themes of self-sustenance, health

and family stability versus working in the acid pits of the drug laboratories, PSYOP could be a great influence in turning the perceptual tide of the farmers toward the government. Indicators of effectiveness would be the number of farmers who opt for the new technique and the amount of intelligence they provide against the insurgents/traffickers.<sup>18</sup>

The military services augment other U.S. government agencies by supporting the State Department's cultural exchange program of U.S. and foreign military personnel. They also support USAID "by administering military aspects of security assistance affecting Civil-Military action and through Humanitarian and Civic Assistance."<sup>19</sup>

By including the small-scale agriculture program in the cultural exchange program, the U.S. could offer an effective economic alternative in the drug war. As Congress looks for ways to do more with less, these programs are not only exponentially cost-effective but can prevent the need for greater assistance at a later date.<sup>20</sup> ✕

---

Capt. Michael R. Ligon is an SF-qualified MI officer currently serving as an intelligence officer in the Special Operations Command-Korea. His previous assignments include enlisted service with the 5th SF Group and commissioned service with the 7th SF Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

---

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> "The Army and CounterNarcotics," Unclassified DoD policy briefing to the President dated 2 July 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Harry G Summers Jr, *On Strategy* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), p. 169.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (final draft — 4 August 1989), p. 2-16. (Final version of FM 100-20 published in December 1989 — Editor)

<sup>5</sup> "Peru spurns cash for troops in drug war," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 17 September 1990, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Carlos Marighella, "The Urban Guerrilla," published in *Havana in Tricontinental Magazine*, January/February 1970, p. 32.

<sup>7</sup> Summers, p. 177.

<sup>8</sup> Carri P. Jenkins, "Small-Scale Agriculture," *BYU Today* (alumni magazine for Brigham Young University), June 1985, p. 33.

<sup>9</sup> "Peru spurns cash for troops," p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> John McBeth, "The Opium Laws," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 March 1984, pp. 40, 42-43.

<sup>11</sup> Linda Robinson with Ana Arana, "Columbia's President Wants A Gentler Drug War," *U.S. News and World Report*, 30 July 1990, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>13</sup> "Hope Amid Poverty," *Insight on the News*, 28 May 1990, pp. 8-16.

<sup>14</sup> FM 100-20 (draft), p. 2-19.

<sup>15</sup> Col. Wesley A Groesbeck, "Training to Win the Hearts and Minds," *Army Magazine*, April 1988, p. 60.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> FM 100-20 (draft), p. 2-27.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, *Low-intensity Conflict*, (January 1981), p. 72.

<sup>19</sup> FM 100-20 (draft), p. 2-44.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

# Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

## E-8 selection rate for CMF 18 reflects promotion restraints

The calendar year 1990 E-8 selection rate for soldiers in CMF 18 was one of the highest in the Army, with an overall selection rate of 27.6 percent. Only two career management fields, CMF 67, with 37.4 percent, and CMF 74, with 51.9 percent, had a better selection rate, according to MSgt. Thomas Rupert, senior enlisted career adviser in the Special Forces Branch. Those E-7s not selected should realize that times are tight, Rupert said, and that not being selected doesn't mean there was any problem with their qualifications. "It does mean that promotion restraints and budget restrictions are hitting home and the select-objective line had to be drawn somewhere," Rupert said. The profile analysis below compares CMF 11 and CMF 18 and may give soldiers a better idea of where they stand:

CMF 11	Avg edu	Avg age	TIS	TIG	Avg SQT	Cons	Sel	%
Pri	13.0 yr	36.6	16.5 yr	6.2 yr	85.2	2021	106	5.2
Sec	12.9 yr	33.8	14.7 yr	3.8 yr	87.9	649	11	1.7
Total.....						2670	117	4.4

CMF 18	Avg edu	Avg age	TIS	TIG	Avg SQT	Cons	Sel	%
Pri	13.0 yr	35.5	15.3 yr	5.8 yr	78.4	57	42	73.7
Sec	13.4 yr	33.0	13.8 yr	4.4 yr	89.6	164	19	11.6
Total.....						221	61	27.6

## Reserve Civil Affairs MOS approved

The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has approved the establishment of Career Management Field 38 and Military Occupational Specialty 38A for reserve-component Civil Affairs soldiers. The new CMF was approved Nov. 16, 1990. Memorandum of Approved Change E-9104-14 was published the same date, providing the basis for initial implementation and setting transition dates for personnel and position changes. Guidance for these changes has been published in the April 1991 DA Circular 611 series. Changes to tables of organization and equipment will be included in Consolidated TOE Update 9104. Position reclassification, including revision of duty-position titles, grades and identifiers, will be accomplished during the July-September 1991 management-of-change window in all MTOEs and TDAs in effect on and after Oct. 1, 1991. All reserve-component positions requiring a soldier trained in Civil Affairs will be coded MOS 38A. Personnel reclassification, including any required revision of personnel records, publication of orders or submission of SIDPERS transactions, will be accomplished by the affected soldiers' personnel service center between Nov. 1 and Dec. 31, 1991. All RC soldiers currently classified as civil-affairs specialists by special-qualification identifier "D" will be reclassified to MOS 38A in their current grade and skill. SQI "D" will continue to be a designator for active-component CA soldiers only.

## **Sergeants Major Academy develops new Battle Staff NCO Course**

A new course at the Army Sergeants Major Academy is designed to train battalion and brigade staff NCOs to serve as integral members of the battle staff. Designed at the Academy, the Battle Staff NCO Course integrates the former Operations and Intelligence and Personnel and Logistics Courses, but its developers stress that it is a completely new course. NCOs were already learning their specific duties in the two existing courses, according to Sgt. Maj. Phillip Cantrell, one of the course's developers. What was lacking was an effort to train battle-staff NCOs to function and fight as an effective team. "Activities of the battle staff must be coordinated and directed toward a common goal," Cantrell said. "You can't make a decision in the personnel area without affecting the logistics, operations or intelligence areas, and vice versa. Without a knowledge of how the staff is interconnected, each section operates independently and perhaps at cross-purposes with each other." Combining the 10-week Operations and Intelligence Course and the two-week Personnel and Logistics Course into one six-week course means that NCOs will need to complete some of the material before they arrive, according to Sgt. Maj. Bill Smolak, chief of battle-staff course development. Students will be selected 6-8 months before course attendance and enrolled in the Army Correspondence Course program. Students will present their ACCP completion certificate to an academy faculty adviser when they report for the resident phase. All resident training will be performance-oriented, based on the ARTEPs for heavy battalion, heavy brigade and light infantry battalion. "One of the main reasons why we've combined the two courses into the Battle Staff NCO Course is that TOCs and admin-log centers fight as a team," Smolak said. "If we're going to fight that way, then we need to train that way now." — SFC Jack D'Amato, PAO, USASMA

## **Soldiers may need to reclassify to 18F**

The SF Branch at the Total Army Personnel Command reports that some involuntary reclassification of SF soldiers was necessary in order to get the 18F MOS into its maintenance stage. If commanders find themselves in need of 18Fs, Branch suggests that they search for them within their command. O&I-qualified 18Bs and 18Cs who are holding the assistant-intell-sergeant slot should be encouraged to reclassify to 18F. Applicants should submit a DA Form 4187, a copy of their Forms 2A and 2-1, and a copy of their O&I completion certificate.

## **DA Forms 4187 take six weeks to process**

The Special Forces Branch at PERSCOM encourages soldiers to be patient once they have submitted DA Forms 4187. The 4187 normally takes about five weeks to reach the SF Branch, and another week to process through the Branch, making it a six-week process from start to finish.

## **Call enlisted assignments manager for information**

Questions pertaining to SF enlisted assignments should be addressed to the specific assignment manager at the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate: Ms. Velaquez — 18B, 18C and 18D; and Ms. Holmann — 18E, 18F, 18Z and ROTC. Professional-development questions should be addressed to MSgt. Thomas Rupert. The branch chief is Capt. (P) Jeffrey Waddell. Phone AV 221-8340, commercial (202) 325-8340.



# Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

**FA 39 captains should begin career planning**

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office offers the following career-planning advice for captains in Functional Area 39, CA and PSYOP:

- All captains designated as FA 39 should contact the FA 39 assignments officer at PERSCOM, Maj. Kevin Murphy, at AV 221-3115 or commercial (703) 325-3115, as soon as they begin their final branch-qualifying assignment. This way they can be programmed to begin FA 39 training immediately upon completion of that assignment. They should also arrange to take the Graduate Record Examination as soon as possible after functional-area designation and complete at least the nonresident phase of CAS<sup>3</sup> before the end of their final branch-qualifying assignment. If not completed earlier, resident CAS<sup>3</sup> can be scheduled in conjunction with functional-area training.
- FA 39 training should normally begin no later than the seventh year of commissioned service. An officer may be PCS'd early because of the length of the training program, which can be as much as 2 1/2 years.
- FA 39 officers will not normally be considered for nominative assignments as captains because of the length of their training and the need to work in the functional area at the captain level. After training, a senior captain will usually be assigned to a PSYOP or CA unit or to another position where a field-grade FA 39 officer will be available as a mentor.

**SF participation in Acquisition Corps pending**

The SF Branch reports that a decision is currently pending at the Department of the Army concerning continued SF participation in the Army Acquisition Corps. All Army Acquisition Corps actions pending on SF officers are temporarily suspended. Once a final decision is made, all affected officers will be notified as appropriate. The Army Acquisition Corps Program was created in October 1989 to encompass the joint military and civilian management of acquisition specialists. AACP officers are screened and selected by PERSCOM and will receive repetitive assignments to prepare them to serve as systems managers, product managers and project managers.

**Statistics for 1990 O-5 promotion list**

Listed below are statistics on the FY 90 lieutenant-colonel promotion list for the Army as a whole and for selected branches:

Branch or FA	Above zone			Primary zone			Below zone		
	cons	sel	%	cons	sel	%	cons	sel	%
AV	161	2	1.2	199	112	56.2	187	5	2.6
IN	205	4	1.9	202	137	67.8	271	30	11.0
MI	115	1	.8	120	71	59.1	146	9	6.1
SF	25	2	8.0	39	29	74.3	47	1	2.1
FA39	13	1	7.6	15	10	66.6	21	1	4.7
Army	117	95	81.2	361	117	32.4	478	212	44.4

## Civilian education important for WO promotion

Civilian education is often an important discriminator on warrant-officer promotion boards, according to the PERSCOM Warrant Officer Division. To be competitive, warrant officers need two years of college credit (60 semester hours) by their eighth year of warrant-officer service. As the Army becomes smaller and promotions become tighter, boards will be even more selective. The Warrant Officer Division stresses that while it encourages warrant officers to apply for full-time civilian education, they should face the fact that the majority will have to earn college credit on their own in order to be competitive for promotion.

## Army releases figures on 1990 senior service college selection

The Army's 1990 senior-service-college selection board has selected 319 officers from a field of 5,333. Listed below are selected statistics:

Branch or FA code	eligible	selected	%
11	716	46	6.4
18	127	6	4.7
FA39	30	1	3.3

## Warrant Officer Division offers lessons-learned from promotion board

The Warrant Officer Division at PERSCOM offers the following lessons learned from the FY 90 warrant officer selection board for promotion to grades CWO3 and CWO4:

- Officer Efficiency Reports
  - Professional Attributes. Raters need to be honest with the rated officer. Professional attributes, good or bad, should be explained.
  - “Promote with Contemporaries” - or less. This block may rapidly move an officer below the pack. Check only if the officer deserves such.
  - “Usually meets Requirements” - or less. This box should be checked only if it is valid. Anything other than the “max” is adverse.
  - “Do not Promote” block - The board takes such an evaluation very seriously and in most instances will support the chain of command.
  - Senior Rater Profile. This is the most important portion of the OER. Senior raters who place all officers in the top block are not assisting the rated officer or the board. This identifies to the board that the officer is not the “best of the best,” but rather is with the pack and center of mass.
  - OERs are the most critical part of a file. Board members may spend only a few moments on each file. Raters and senior raters should make sure their comments are to-the-point.
- Referred Reports — Rated officers receiving a referred report should reply accurately. They should not make excuses or blame the rating board. Officers who fail to respond imply that they do not care. By signing the OER, the officer is acknowledging that the administrative data is correct, not that he agrees with the comments of those in the rating chain. In refusing to sign, the officer projects a hostile, unprofessional attitude.
- Photographs — Photographs are critical. The uniform should be meticulous, and awards worn should be identified on the Officer Record Brief.
- Officer Record Brief — The ORB must be updated and accurate, including height and weight. Education should reflect current degrees.
- Letters of Commendation, Orders for Awards — These should be verified as being in the officer's official file.
- Letters to the board — Letters should be short and to-the-point, limited to adding information of importance for consideration by the board.





# Update

## Special Warfare

### Army realigns active, RC SOF along functional lines

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has recently realigned into a new structure which affects the majority of the active-duty and reserve-component units in its subordinate commands.

Announcing the realignment, Lt. Gen. Michael F. Spigelmire, USASOC commander, said his command is now aligned along functional rather than component lines. The new structure was effective November 27.

Before the realignment, all active-duty Army special-operations forces were assigned to the 1st Special Operations Command, and all Army Reserve SOF to the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command.


Now all Special Forces units are aligned under the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, headed by Maj. Gen. James A Guest. Active-duty SF units are assigned to USASFC, Army Reserve SF are under USASFC's operational control, and National Guard SF units will continue their training relationship with active forces.

All Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units are aligned under the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, headed by Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau. Army Reserve CA and PSYOP units are assigned to USACAPOC, and active-duty CA and PSYOP units are under its operational control. Both USASFC and USACAPOC are headquartered at Fort Bragg.

Active Army Special Forces groups now assigned to USASFC are the 1st, at Fort Lewis, Wash;

3rd, at Fort Bragg, 5th, at Fort Campbell, Ky.; 7th, at Fort Bragg; and 10th, at Fort Devens, Mass. Two other Fort Bragg-based active units, the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion and the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, are also assigned to USASFC.

Army Reserve Special Forces groups operationally controlled by USASFC are the 11th, headquar-



USACAPOC crest

tered at Fort Meade, Md.; and the 12th, headquartered at Arlington Heights, Ill. Army National Guard SF groups are the 19th, headquartered at Salt Lake City, Utah; and the 20th, headquartered at Birmingham, Ala.

USACAPOC active forces include the 4th Psychological Operations Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, both located at Fort Bragg. Its Army Reserve units are the 351st Civil Affairs Command, Mountain View, Calif.; 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, Md.;

353rd Civil Affairs Command, Bronx, N.Y.; 2nd PSYOP Group, Cleveland, Ohio; 5th PSYOP Group, Washington, D.C.; and 7th PSYOP Group, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

Unaffected by the realignment are the 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga.; and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Ky., which continue to report directly to USASOC headquarters. The realignment has not increased the number of Army special-operations troops; however, the 3rd SF Group, activated last June, is scheduled to activate its second battalion in 1991 and its third battalion in 1992.

### 3rd/7th SFG returns to Fort Bragg

The 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group returned to Fort Bragg in August as part of a general reduction of U.S. forces in Panama.

The return of the battalion is in concert with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, according to Lt. Col. Don Gersh, public affairs officer for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The move is part of a phased reduction of U.S. forces in Panama through the year 2000.

Approximately 100 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion's Company C remain in Panama as a planning and support cell for special-operations missions with the U.S. Southern Command, Gersh said.

Special Forces first came to Latin America in the early 1960s as mobile training teams from the 7th SF Group. Company D of the 7th set up its headquarters at Fort Gulick, Panama in 1962 and formed the nucleus for the 8th SF Group, activated at Fort Gulick in

April 1963 for missions in Latin America. When the 8th was inactivated in June 1972, its troops were redesignated the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group.

## **SF, Ranger tabs can now be worn together**

Soldiers eligible to wear the Special Forces and Ranger tabs may now wear both simultaneously.

AR 670-1 was changed in September to permit soldiers to wear both special skill tabs at the same time, on an optional basis, instead of having to choose between them. The change has also affected the location in which the tabs will be worn on some uniforms.

When both tabs are worn on the Army green service uniform, utility uniforms or the cold-weather camouflage jacket, the Special Forces tab will now be centered on the left shoulder sleeve, 1/2 inch from the shoulder seam. The Ranger tab will be centered 1/8 inch below the SF tab. The unit shoulder sleeve insignia will be centered 1/8 inch below the Ranger tab.

Simultaneous wear of the tabs also extends to the full-size metal tab replicas on blue and white dress uniforms and to miniature metal tab replicas on blue and white mess and evening mess uniforms. Wear of the metal tab replicas is covered in Paragraph 29-17 of AR 670-1.

## **WIC videotape being distributed to SOF units**

The Special Warfare Center and School has produced two videotapes designed to acquaint SOF units with its training courses in waterborne and underwater operations.

An 11-minute tape on the SWCS Waterborne Infiltration Course explains course content and benefits of the training. It includes scenes from a course in progress and interviews with students, according to Maj. Richard Drake, commander of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, which conducts the course. The tape is designed to

acquaint commanders with the course so that they can program training for their units. It can also show prospective students what to expect during the course.

The six-week Waterborne Infiltration Course, conducted three times a year at the SWCS waterborne training facility at Key West, Fla., focuses on surface waterborne operations, including long-distance over-the-horizon surface infiltrations and exfiltrations, planning considerations, surface swimming, and rubber-boat and kayak operations.

Training for SOF waterborne



missions has traditionally been done by the units, Drake said, with the result being different approaches to training and different training techniques. The Waterborne Infiltration Course standardizes training and saves units' time and money — they no longer need to develop and conduct their own training, and they pay only the cost of sending students to the course. Once personnel have been trained, their entry-level waterborne skill can serve as a basis for development of unit mission-specific training.

Prerequisites for the Waterborne Infiltration Course are that an applicant be a member of an active

or reserve Army unit or selected DoD personnel, or on orders to a SOF unit; pass the Army Physical Fitness Test with a minimum score of 60 points in each event and an overall score of 206 or more (scored for the 17-25 age group, regardless of age); pass a 50-meter swim test with boots and fatigues; complete a 300-meter surface swim using any stroke; complete a 25-meter underwater swim on a single breath of air; tread water for two minutes with hands out of the water; and pass a Type-A medical examination. Because of the physical demands of the course, students should report for training in excellent condition.

The second tape, Drake said, will help SOF units to establish and conduct a two-week pre-scuba course for their members who will attend the four-week Combat Diver Qualification Course, also taught at Key West.

The pre-scuba tape explains safety and training standards and was filmed at Key West, using instructors to demonstrate various techniques and training methods. It is part of a package including a program of instruction and lesson plans, Drake said, and should help to standardize unit pre-scuba training and to lower the attrition rate of the CDQC.

SWCS has distributed the WIC and pre-scuba videotapes to all Ranger and Special Forces units, active and reserve-component, down to the battalion level. For further information on either videotape, contact David Clark, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at AV 236-6629/8639, commercial (919) 396-6629.

## **Bibliography now available on Soviet 'special forces'**

The Soviet Army Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has assembled an extensive bibliography on Soviet special-purpose forces.

"Soviet Special Purpose Forces" is an annotated bibliography of

Soviet-published books, articles and documents pertaining to special-purpose forces of the Soviet army and navy from 1918 to the present.

The list is intended for use by specialists in the field, according to Maj. James F. Gebhardt, who assembled the bibliography. Since few of the materials have been translated into English, users need to be able to read Russian and German to get the fullest use out of the bibliography.

The bibliography will be updated every 4-6 months, Gebhardt said. Single copies can be obtained by request from the Soviet Army Studies Office; Attn: ATZL-SAS; Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-5015. For more information, contact the Soviet Army Studies Office at AV 552-4434/ 4333, commercial (913) 684-4434/14333.

### **AFSOC new Air Force special ops command**

The Air Force has recently established the Air Force Special Operations Command as the organization responsible for the combat readiness of Air Force special-operations forces.

Called AFSOC, the new command was formed from the 23rd Air Force and began operation May 22. It is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Fla., as was the 23rd. A major command, AFSOC reports directly to the Air Force chief of staff and is the Air Force component of the U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

The 23rd Air Force was part of the Air Force's Military Airlift Command. MAC will continue to support the new special-operations command by operating bases at Hurlburt Field and Kirtland AFB, N.M., and by providing logistical support, transportation and communications-control systems. MAC will also support acquisition of common aircraft systems, but AFSOC will be responsible for acquiring SOF-

specific aircraft equipment.

AFSOC is composed of active-duty and reserve Air Force special-operations forces. It will also be the focal point for Air National Guard SOF readiness, coordinating with the National Guard Bureau and appropriate state governors.

Subordinate units of AFSOC are the 1st Special Operations Wing, headquartered at Hurlburt Field, which includes the 8th, 16th, 20th, 9th and 55th Special Operations Squadrons; the 39th Special Operations Wing in Europe, which includes the 67th, 21st and 7th Special Operations Squadrons; and



AFSOC crest

the 353rd Special Operations Wing in the Pacific, which includes the 1st, 31st and 17th Special Operations Squadrons.

### **Policy change limits foreign-tour extension**

Department of the Army personnel policy changes now limit Special Forces soldiers' foreign-service-tour extensions.

The change was approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on Nov. 12, 1990 and limits extensions to a maximum of 12 months, according to Col. Juan Chavez, deputy chief of staff for personnel,

U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

In-place consecutive tours, consecutive overseas tours and inter/intra-theater transfers will be denied under the new policy. The change applies equally to SF commissioned and warrant officers and enlisted soldiers in CMF 18.

The new policy will give more SF soldiers the opportunity to train and to improve language and regional orientation skills by serving with forward-deployed SF units in their respective theaters, Chavez said. SF soldiers returning from overseas will also be able to train CONUS-based parent groups through their experiences, skills, cultural and political perspectives.

For more information, contact Maj. Mariano or MSgt. Wiggins, USASOC DCSPER Plans, Programs and Policy Division, at AV 236-6029, commercial (919) 396-6029.

### **Writing for publication**

Besides Special Warfare, there are a number of publication outlets for writers who wish to write on special-operations topics.

Special Warfare is targeted toward a special-operations audience, but Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto, commander of the SWCS, stresses the need for special-ops writers to reach other audiences in the Army, as well. By publishing in other branch and Armywide publications, he said, SOF writers can help to inform other branches and specialties about the capabilities and missions of SOF.

Listed below are some of those other publications:

Parameters; U.S. Army War College; Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013.

Military Review; Funston Hall, Bldg. 314; Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.

Armor; U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox; Attn: ATSB-DOTD-MAG; Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

U.S. Army Aviation Digest; PO Box 699; Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5000.

Infantry; PO Box 2005; Fort Ben-

ning, GA 31905-0605.

Military Police Journal; U.S. Army Military Police School; Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030.

Military Intelligence; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School; Attn: ATSI-TD-DPB; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000.

Engineer; U.S. Army Engineer School; Attn: ATSE-TDM-P; Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6650.

Air Defense Artillery; U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School; Attn: ATSA-ADA; Fort Bliss, TX 79916-7001.

Army Communicator; Bldg. 25701, U.S. Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon; Fort Gordon, GA 30905.

Field Artillery Professional Bulletin; PO Box 33311; Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

Army Chemical Review; Room 2029, Sibert Hall; U.S. Army Chemical School; Fort McClellan, AL 36205.

Ordnance Bulletin; U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School; Attn: ATSL-O-B; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5201.

Quartermaster Professional Bulletin; U.S. Army Quartermaster School; Attn: ATSM-ACZ-PB; Fort Lee, VA 23801-5032.

Transportation Corps Professional Bulletin; Director, Office of the Chief of Transportation; Attn: ATZF-OCT-E; Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5407.

## **Rough-terrain suit offers jumpers protection**

A new suit developed for special-operations forces will allow them to jump more safely into areas of rough terrain.

The Parachutist Rough Terrain System has been developed by the Army's Natick Laboratories, which modified smoke-jumper suits currently being used by the U.S. Forest Service. Like the smoke jumpers, special-operations soldiers must often parachute into remote areas, using drop zones in mountainous, rocky or forested areas. Unlike smoke jumpers, however,

SOF soldiers who get injured during an actual mission may have no way of getting help or medical attention.

"Our soldiers can't afford to get injured," said Capt. Samuel Young, chief of the Infil/Exfil Branch of the SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments. "The PRTS will increase the probability that they will be able to overcome the hazards of airborne infiltration and carry on with their missions."

The PRTS will consist of a helmet with face mask and a two-piece padded suit weighing 12 pounds. The suit will be made of an 8-ounce



Prototype of the Parachutist Rough Terrain System

Kevlar fabric which is puncture-resistant and will be padded in vital areas — elbows, knees, hips, back, crotch, spine, neck, kidneys and underarms — which are subject to injury on landing. The foam padding is either sewn in place or held in specially designed pockets to keep it from shifting during airborne operations. A rigid spine-protector plate will protect the jumper's spine from injury. A special strap sewn between the legs of the pants near the crotch will further protect the jumper from limbs during tree landings.

Should the jumper get caught in a tree, the suit has large cargo

pockets on the legs which will hold lowering lines. These lines can be hooked to the suit and used by the jumper to lower himself from the tree. The length of the lowering line will be determined during mission planning and will vary, Young said, according to the height of the trees in the area of the drop zone. "If jumpers were going into an area with 50-foot trees," he said, "a 90-foot line would be plenty. If they were jumping into redwoods, the line would obviously have to be a lot longer."

The system will be a subdued color, olive drab for the suit and flat black for the helmet, Young said. The suit will be available in a limited range of sizes to fit various body sizes and builds. It is oversized to allow it to fit over all types of clothing; adjustable leg straps and suspenders allow the wearer to adjust the pants for a better fit. The two-piece design not only allows greater upper-body movement, but also allows cross-sizing to better accommodate the jumper. Having two pieces also makes it possible to replace one piece of the suit at a time, should it become worn or damaged, lowering the suit's life-cycle cost.

Prototypes of the PRTS have been tested and evaluated by members of the U.S. Forest Service, Young said. Developers estimate the cost of each system — pants, coat, helmet, mask and chin strap — will be \$627. The systems could be fielded by late FY 91 and are scheduled to be distributed at a rate of 144 per Ranger battalion or SF group.

## **SWCS working to produce new CA field manuals**

Work is under way at the Special Warfare Center and School to produce a revised Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

The new manual, written to replace one published in 1985, will include a new appendix on foreign-nation support and extensive rewriting of chapters dealing

with Civil Affairs in the operational continuum and civil-military operations, according to Maj. Mark Zamperini, commander of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Zamperini's company is responsible for revising the manual, in conjunction with the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Preparation of the new manual began when members of Civil Affairs units met at the SWCS in May and November 1989 to assist in planning the preliminary draft; the coordinating draft was distributed to field units for comment in January 1991. Following a review of unit comments and further revision, SWCS will distribute the final draft this summer. Publication of the finished manual is scheduled for 1992.

Involvement of field units in the revision process is critical, according to Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, Civil Affairs integrator at the SWCS, because the doctrine formulated in the new manual will form the basis for future Civil Affairs training and force structure.

Another manual in progress, FM 41-11, Civil Affairs Functions, will be a tactics, techniques and procedures manual, according to Maj. Povl Wise, project officer for the manual. The how-to manual will be comprehensive, covering all 20 Civil Affairs specialty areas, and will include a chapter on noncombatant-evacuation operations. FM 41-11 is scheduled for completion in late FY 1993.

### **Fort Campbell facility named for Colonel Rowe**

Soldiers of the 5th SF Group at Fort Campbell, Ky., now train in a facility named for a Special Forces officer known for his contributions to training.

The Colonel James N. Rowe Consolidated Training Facility is used by members of the 5th Group for a variety of training activities. The two-story facility contains

more than 60,000 square feet of space, according to Fort Campbell facility engineers. It was completed in March 1990 at a cost of approximately \$5 million.

Captured as a SF adviser in Vietnam in 1963, Rowe endured more than five years of captivity in South Vietnam. He later drew on his POW experience to organize and run the Army's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course, taught at the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. Rowe was killed in an ambush in Manila April 21, 1989, while serving as the ground forces




Photo by Jason Brady

Then-Maj. Nick Rowe while assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School

director for the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group — Philippines.

Despite a post policy that training facilities be named for Medal of Honor winners, the Fort Campbell memorialization board unanimously decided to make an exception in Rowe's case, according to Rex Boggs, curator of Fort Campbell's Pratt Museum and a member of the memorialization board. "Even though Colonel Rowe was not a Medal of Honor winner, it was recommended that the facility be named for him because of his strong commitment to training," Boggs said.

### **SWCS preparing SF how-to manuals**

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is preparing a series of how-to field manuals covering Special Forces tactics, techniques and procedures.

Prepared by the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, the manuals will be oriented toward operational personnel from team through battalion level and will cover all SF mission areas, according to Maj. William Council, project officer in the DOTD Doctrine Development Branch.

Production of the manuals will proceed through three draft stages: preliminary, coordinating and final. Average time for completion, from concept to distribution of the final DA-approved copy, will be 18 months to two years, Council said. Operational units will routinely review the manuals' coordinating drafts, and in some cases, may receive review copies of the preliminary drafts.

Listed below are the manuals, their status and point of contact:

- FM 31-20-1, Special Forces Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Contains tactics, techniques and procedures that are basic and common to all or most SF missions. Includes command and control, mission planning, deployment, infiltration and extraction, foot movement, mounted operations, basic communications and post-mission activities. Preliminary draft to be completed in May 1991. Contact Maj. William Council.

- FM 31-20-2, Unconventional Warfare Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces. Contains organizational concepts, pre-infiltration training, guerrilla operations, demobilization and exfiltration. Preliminary draft to be completed in late June 1991. Contact SFC Gary Wertz.

- FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques and

Procedures for Special Forces. Includes command and control, intelligence, training, adviser techniques, civil defense, pacification operations, hand-off procedures and other operational techniques. Preliminary draft to be completed in early May 1991.

Contact SFC Melchor L. Becena.

- FM 31-20-4, Direct Action Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces. Includes direct assault, raid, ambush, standoff attack, terminal guidance, mining/demolition, independent sabotage and incendiaryism. Preliminary draft to be completed by July 1991. Contact SFC James C. McGill.

- FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces. Covers personnel, training, Special Forces intelligence function, basic reconnaissance/surveillance, target acquisition, area assessment, hydrographic reconnaissance, post-strike reconnaissance, technical appreciation, NBC reconnaissance and post-mission activities. Coordinating draft to be completed in late April 1991. Contact Maj. William Council.

To reach points of contact, call

the DOTD Doctrine Development Branch, AV 239-6305/8689, commercial (919) 432-6305/8689.

### **Army needs feedback on M-24 sniper weapon**

The Army wants to hear from soldiers who have comments or suggestions about the M-24 Sniper Weapons System.

"The users are the only ones who can tell us what they don't like about the design or performance of



The M-24 Sniper Weapons System

their equipment," said SFC Walt Minton of the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Combat Developments, Materiel and Logistics Systems Division. Equipment specialists in DCD worked with instructors in the SWCS Special Operations Target Interdiction Course to develop the sniper weapons system, which was later adopted for use Armywide.

Army users can report their complaints on Standard Form 368, Quality Deficiency Report, called a QDR. Soldiers should mail the QDR to Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command; Attn: AMSMC-QAG; Rock Island, IL 61299-6000 and send a copy to the SWCS. Copies should be mailed to Commander, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-CD-ML; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, Minton said. The SWCS will follow up on the QDR and assist in providing an answer to the user.

For more information, contact SFC Walt Minton, AV 239-1816, commercial (919) 432-1816.



# Book Reviews

## Special Warfare

### THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS

THE U.S. MARINES' OTHER WAR  
IN VIETNAM

Michael E. Peterson

**The Combined Action Platoons: the U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam.** By Michael E. Peterson. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. ISBN 0-275-93258-3. 160 pages. \$39.95.

Many regard the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon program as one of our more innovative and successful initiatives in the Vietnam War.

A CAP combined a 14-man Marine rifle squad with a Vietnamese village militia platoon of Popular Forces, often the lowest-regarded element in Vietnam's military pecking order. The Marines ate, slept, trained and operated in the hamlets with their PF counterparts. The Marine squad leader commanded the combined force.

Conceived in 1965, the CAP mission sought to provide security for selected hamlet populations and to

deny the enemy (VC and NVA) access to local intelligence, manpower and logistical resources. Another CAP aim was to conduct civic action and community development at rice-roots level. By 1969 the program reached a maximum of 114 CAPs in the Marine tactical area of responsibility.

The author of this succinct account of the CAP program, Michael Peterson, himself a former CAP commander, presents valuable insights and some problematic issues that endure today. Extremely relevant for SOF, this brief readable book is based on oral interviews with former CAP members and senior Marine officers and on research into official documents and secondary sources.

As Peterson states, "The CAP Marines waged war in the hamlets; the mainforce Army and Marine units all too often waged war on the hamlets." Despite U.S. espousal of "winning hearts and minds," the CAPs represented one of the few instances (the Special Forces CIDG program was another) where U.S. troops got their hands dirty side-by-side with the Vietnamese villagers.

The CAP program encountered resistance from some Marine line commanders who denigrated it in favor of Army-style large-unit maneuver warfare. Nor was it fully embraced by the commander of the Military Assistance Command – Vietnam, who saw the program reflecting a USMC beachhead-security mentality. Yet the CAP concept was partially imitated in the Army's Mobile Advisory Team concept, designed to upgrade the proficiency of the provincial militia companies, the Regional Forces.

The Marine participants performed with high dedication and morale, shown in a 60-percent voluntary extension rate. Though CAPs produced combat results disproportionate to their relatively small numbers, the author raises some disturbing questions about their ultimate effectiveness.

All CAPs were not equally good. Though they were supposedly filled with screened volunteers who underwent specialized training at a two-week school, not all their Marine participants were suited for effective people-to-people interaction in a foreign environment. Vietnamese language deficiency was the most serious obstacle, and problems of cultural sensitivity persisted due to ignorance about local customs.

CAP civic-action initiatives achieved more in terms of physical projects (wells dug, buildings constructed, food distributed) than in lasting "empowerment" projects intended to give the hamlet control over its own affairs. Insufficient guidance, lack of interagency coordination, and time expiration (i.e., U.S. troop withdrawal) impeded Marines from accomplishing the latter.

We in SOF may overrate our ability to influence our allied counterparts. When the U.S. intervenes heavily in a foreign nation, the CAP experience points to possible limitations, inherent and external, that U.S. advisers and trainers intent on promoting military and social change at village level may encounter again.


Lt. Col. James K. Bruton  
4156th USARF School  
Tulsa, Okla.



**The Lessons of Modern War, Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989; Volume II: The Iran-Iraq Conflict; Volume III: The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts.** By Anthony S. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990. Vol. I: ISBN 0-8133-0954-9; 394 pages; \$47.50. Vol. II: ISBN 0-8133-0955-7; 647 pages, \$54.95. Vol. III: ISBN 0-8133-0956-5; 470 pages; \$49.95.

Authors Cordesman and Wagner have made a significant intellectual contribution to the analysis of modern conflict with this trilogy.

They analyze five major conflicts and assess lessons in a number of categories. The categories include: combatants; terrain; history of the conflict; casualties and losses; threat-assessment technologies; command, control and communications; combined arms; infantry; tanks and armored vehicles; precision-guided and specialized munitions; tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers; surface-to-surface missiles; mines and barriers; all-weather and night-target-acquisition systems; anti-aircraft



artillery and surface-to-air missiles; air combat; naval systems and combat; close air support; interdiction and long-range attack; air reconnaissance; helicopters; combined operations; logistics; and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.


The research is quite detailed, and the analysis is very good. The volumes are long, tedious and somewhat disjointed, however. Although this is partially due to the immense breadth of information covered, it is largely due to an unsatisfactory organization of subjects. It would have made more sense and been more readable, for instance, if the material had been organized according to battlefield operating system.

Another criticism is that the work focuses heavily on advanced technology, general-purpose forces and high-intensity violence. There is only minor mention and scant analysis of low-intensity conflict, special-operations forces, and mission areas such as unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism.

In the case of the volume devoted to the Iran-Iraq War, this is especially lacking, despite the fact that what is called the Iran-Iraq War is merely the overt phase of a struggle that the two nations have been waging at lower intensities and by less direct means for more than 30 years.

Their price is prohibitive for most personal bookshelves, yet these volumes have a place in academic libraries. They provide good starting points for detailed analyses of a wide variety of 20th-century conventional military issues. Their relevance to SOF and intelligence soldiers, however, is not very great, given their limited attention to such topics.

Maj. William H. Burgess III  
3rd SF Group  
Fort Bragg, N. C.



**The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944 (Leavenworth Papers Number 17).** By Maj. James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1989. 182 pages. Softcover.

This book should be required reading for every officer in the U.S. Army's 6th Infantry Division (Light), the Canadian Army, the armies of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and U.S. Marine Corps units with duties in the Far North.

Maj. James Gebhardt's account of the Soviet operation that swept the Germans from the approaches to Murmansk and ended with the liberation of northern Norway is by far the best, most lucid exposition ever prepared of the one operation from which all modern Soviet far-north warfighting doctrine flows. With the continued buildup of Soviet forces in the Kola Peninsula, glasnost notwithstanding, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation is relevant today and bears close reading.

Gebhardt, an Armor Branch officer formerly assigned to the Soviet Army Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, writes in a clear and crisp style. He also has something for everyone, with balanced accounts of

the roles of combat, combat-support, and combat-service-support arms. He has a particularly fascinating chapter on the role of Soviet spetsnaz and other special-purpose troops in the operation.

The book is concise, objective and accurate. Gebhardt has gone to great lengths on the latter score, including a visit to the Norwegian side of the battlefield and the correlation of German and Soviet sources for each major (and several minor) events.

What further makes this book stand out from the crowd is that Gebhardt has made extensive use of Soviet sources (he is fluent in Russian) where heretofore, accounts of World War II in the far north have relied almost exclusively on one-sided German records.

Petsamo-Kirkenes is also well-illustrated, with ample maps and photographs. It is well-edited, with none of the fluff or meandering that often characterizes works using foreign sources.


The book also has many insights into operational art as practiced by the Soviets and seldom understood by Westerners. Petsamo-Kirkenes is good reading for intelligence and special-operations soldiers, military buffs and anyone interested in the Soviet Union's history and capabilities in the far north.

Maj. William H. Burgess III  
3rd SF Group  
Fort Bragg, N.C.

### **The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World.**

By Hernando De Soto. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. ISBN 0-06-016020-9. 271 pp. \$22.95.

This is a must-read book for all professionals in the area of low-intensity conflict, nation-building, Civil Affairs, or related areas. De Soto is a Peruvian economist who has served as managing director of Peru's Central Reserve Bank, as director of the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (Institute for Liberty



and Democracy), as director of several private companies in Peru, and as a member of the United Nations Committee for Development Planning

The Other Path is an economic study of Peru's informal economy, what many would call the black market. But De Soto tells us much more — through his facts, figures and accompanying anecdotes, we see and feel what the people of Peru see and feel. We experience their frustration when they try to build a house, establish a market stall or license a business. We learn about the government and its bureaucracy in real terms — the bribes required, the overwhelming disinterest — how government really affects the people on a day-to-day basis.

De Soto takes us from the beginning of the influx of peasants from the countryside to present-day Lima, Peru's capital and largest city. Three economic areas are covered in detail: housing, trade and transport. Proof of the magnitude of the informal economy is amply given — an estimated 60 percent of Peru's national product is represented by the output of the informals, as the black market enterprises are known within the coun-

try. More importantly, De Soto provides evidence of the reasons for this phenomenon, mainly the mercantile nature of the economy and the government's reluctance or inability to change it.

De Soto sees mercantilism as the culprit in Peru's (and by his extension, most of the Third World countries') inability to make any economic progress during the last 50 years. De Soto's description of mercantilism — a highly regulated economy dependent on elite groups sustained by state-granted privileges — and its historical parallels with the European mercantile states of the 15th-19th centuries is filled with invaluable insights. The rise and fall of mercantilism in Europe is very clearly described, as are its inevitable by-products.

De Soto sees the consequences of mercantilism as economic inefficiency, impoverishment of the vast majority of the people, and the undermining of social structures. These conditions, not surprising to students of low-intensity conflict, can lead to conflict, violence and revolution. England, France and Russia — all mercantile countries in De Soto's view prior to the 20th century — addressed the consequences of mercantilism in different ways, one (England) peacefully and the others through revolution.

The Other Path is not just an analysis; it recommends solutions to the problems described. Basically, De Soto advocates a free-market economy, one that would grant economic and personal freedom to its citizens. De Soto urges that the transformation be made soon, in order to avoid the violent alternative offered by subversive groups, such as the Shining Path insurgents now active within Peru.

De Soto is hopeful and proposes concrete solutions. However, he warns us that "the poorest and most discontented members of the population are not prepared to accept a society in which opportunities, property, and power are distributed arbitrarily." With our eyes

focused on eastern Europe, The Other Path reminds us of the magnitude of the problems existing within Latin America, and the critical choices facing Latin governments and ours.

Col. Wayne D. Zajac  
Senior Intelligence Officer  
Army National Guard

**The Red-Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts.** By Fairfax Downey and Jacques Noel Jacobsen Jr. Fort Collins, Colo.: The Old Army Press, 1973.

Fairfax Downey, a well-known popular historian of the Old West and the American Civil War, has cooperated with Jacques Noel Jacobsen Jr. to produce a workmanlike account of the U.S. Army Indian Scouts. Though based on secondary sources and somewhat pedestrian in its writing, the book tells the story of the scouts who distinguished themselves through hard campaigning on the Great Plains between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War.

Gen. George Crook, perhaps the best friend the American Indian ever had, asserted that any white

trooper who attempted to track down a hostile Indian band "would be outwitted, exhausted, circumvented, possibly ambushed and destroyed." Obviously the U.S. Army needed something on the frontier beside its regular troopers.

The duties of the U.S. Army Indian Scouts were fourfold: to serve as guides and intelligence-gatherers, to keep order on the reservations, to reinforce military government — and to fight. All this was rewarded with the regular Army private's pay of \$13 per month.

The first to be enlisted were Pawnee tribesmen, but over the years Crow, Shoshones, Apache and Black-Seminole, even the implacably hostile Sioux and Cheyenne, added to their ranks of honor.

The Indian Scouts brought into the Army their traditions and skills in battle, tracking, fieldcraft and physical hardiness. In more than one account, it was noted by officers that Indian Scouts on foot could keep up with mounted white troopers.

The loyalty of the Indian Scouts, even when they had on occasion to attack members of their own tribes, was marred by only one case of defection throughout all the frontier wars. Sixteen of these faithful warriors earned Medals of Honor.

The Army for its part played fair with its Indian Scouts and with the Great Plains Indians as a whole. It was white civilians who sold the Indians firewater, who coveted and swindled them out of their lands, who cut up their hunting ranges with railroad track, and who shot their buffalo from speeding trains for "sport."

But it was the Army which, even when rounding up the Indians for exile to harsh reservations, was merely doing a distasteful job, and usually performed it with more than a modicum of humanity. No wonder that even old Apache chief Geronimo demanded and received permission to enlist as an Army Indian scout.

Yet no account of white-Indian

relations seems complete without its tale of bad faith. One of the darkest chapters in Western American history was the exiling of the Chiricahua and Warm Springs Apache tribes to Florida — along with more than 60 Indian Scouts who had rendered faithful service, and who were actually held as prisoners of war. (One remarked with touching restraint, "It seemed a bit unjust.")

Although the frontier was closed by the turn of the century, the Scouts soldiered on, keeping order on the reservations, until the last minuscule unit was finally disbanded in 1943. But the heritage lived on, and not only in fireside memories. The Indian Scouts' crossed-arrow insignia was taken up by the Canadian-American First Special Service Force in World War II and later incorporated into the Special Forces collar insignia and distinctive unit insignia. (The authors commit one howler when they claim that the crossed arrows "live on in the U.S. Army as the insignia of the Special Forces, adopted in 1942.")

Unfortunately, this work is now out of print, although a copy is on file at the Special Warfare Museum.

Stanley Sandler  
Command Historian  
USAJFKSWCS



Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special-operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably Autovon) and your mailing address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.



# **Special Warfare**

---

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

---

Department of the Army  
JFK Special Warfare Center and School  
ATTN: ATSU-PAO  
Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

