# MILITARY POLICE


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# USAMPS

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# Military Police

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

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# New USAMPS Commandant



**MG Charles A. Hines**

The new Commandant of the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and Commander of the Military Police Corps Regiment is Major General Charles A. Hines. General Hines will also serve as the Post Commanding General for Fort McClellan, Alabama.

General Hines was born in Washington, D.C. on 4 September 1935. Upon completion of the Reserve Officers Training Corps curriculum as a Distinguished Military Graduate and the educational course of study at Howard University in 1962, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant and awarded a Bachelor of Science Degree in Physical Education.

He also holds a Master of Science in Police Administration and Public Safety from Michigan State University, a Master of Military Arts and Science from the United States Army Command and General Staff College, and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the Johns Hopkins University. His military education includes completion of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Military Police Officer Advanced Course, the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.




He has held a wide variety of important command and staff positions; they include duty as Director of Manpower, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Director, Officer Personnel Management, United States Army Military Personnel Center; Strategic Research Analyst; Director of Evaluation and Organization Effectiveness as a member of the staff and faculty, United States Army War College; Chief, Force Management Issue Team; Director of the Women in the Army Policy Review Group, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in Washington, D.C.; and Commander, 14th Military Police Brigade and Provost Marshal, VII Corps, United States Army Europe. General Hines has completed Exective Development Courses at the University of Maryland, and at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Awards and decorations which General Hines has received include the Legion of Merit (with Two Oak Leaf Clusters), the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (with Five Oak Leaf Clusters), the Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), and the Parachutist Badge. General Hines was selected to appear in "Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities" and was selected to the Outstanding Young Men of America Foundation.

He and his wife Veronica have seven children: Tracy, Charles, Kelley, Christina, Michael, Nicholas and Timothy.

We wish the Hines's success at Fort McClellan and look forward to a long and fruitful relationship with our new Commandant.

# *Regimental Command Sergeant Major*

**CSM Joshua Perry**


I just finished reading a recent *Countermeasure* magazine published by the U.S. Army Safety Center. It saddens and angers me to read about young soldiers dying needlessly due to accidents that so easily could be prevented.

One particular article, about a soldier killed as he slept on the ground when a vehicle ran over him, places the blame squarely on an NCO. I quote from the article, "As the advance party NCO, the sergeant was responsible for all actions at the site, either directed or implied. Although not directed, it was his job to establish security and rest plans for his soldiers.

"Although the battalion must share the responsibility for this accident for not directing the establishment of security and rest plans and the use of ground guides, this does not shift the responsibility from the NCO. He had fourteen years of hands-on experience...He knew his job, but on this night he didn't do his job and a young soldier, who had been in the Army less than seven months, died."

Pay particular attention to the phrase *responsible for all actions at the site...directed or implied.* This is basic NCOship 101. Let's go back to the basics for a second: duties, responsibility and authority of NCOs. As NCOs we all know what they are, but please humor me while I focus on duties.

**Focus on Duties**

A duty is a legal or moral obligation. There are specified duties related to your job and position. These specified duties are found in ARs, general orders, ARTEP publications, UCMJ and MOS job descriptions. These items prescribe duties and standards.

We also have directed duties. These directed duties are given orally or in writing by a superior.

Then there are implied duties. In my humble opinion, these implied duties earned us the title "backbone of the Army." These implied duties are not written anywhere; implied duties may not even be related to your MOS. They depend on your own initiative.

Implied duties are the duties that make all the wonderful things that we do as NCOs happen. These are the duties that make you proactive instead of reactive. These are the duties that prevent training accidents and save young soldiers' lives.

**Give Safety Priority**

Let's make safety our first priority in everything we do. Analyze every situation within your area of operations. Inspect your soldiers' work area, observe their actions and imagine the worst possible scenario. Chances are that if you can imagine a situation that might result in an accident, it will eventually happen.

Then do something to correct the situation. Hammer safety consciousness into your soldiers every opportunity you get. Develop within them a sensitivity to safety hazards just as we as MPs have developed a sensitivity to physical security hazards.

Create a safety-conscious climate in which every one of your soldiers becomes a safety inspector. Be wary of complacency. Stay alert; safety demands your undivided and continuous attention. Routine dulls the sharpest senses and creates opportunities for accidents.

I bet that every one of you out there can relate an incident about a .45 discharging "accidentally" in the arms room. Yet it continues to happen. That is the sad thing about most accidents I read about. They happen over and over again because someone failed to follow established safety measures.

The accident highlighted in *Countermeasure* magazine I mentioned above is no exception. Using ground guides for moving military vehicles is not new. I have been in the Army almost twenty-eight years. I have known about ground guides for military vehicles since I was a private. During the past twenty-eight years many soldiers have lost their lives because ground guides were not used.

Let's all of us concentrate our energies into making this Year of the NCO the safest ever in our Army. Safety—NCOs can make it happen.




**TO:** *Readers*
**FROM:** *Editor*

### Variety of Missions

Military police duties cover a wide variety of missions—from preparing for combat in the AirLand Battle Future to dealing with today's child offenders in trouble with the law, from field training with host-nation soldiers in Korea to customs duty in Europe, from confining enemy-prisoner-of war operations to performance of staff duties. The list of MP missions goes on and on. This issue of *MILITARY POLICE* carries articles on these topics by MP authors in the field and on other topics of interest to our readers.

### Army Theme

The 1989 Army theme, Year of the NCO, is drawing to a close, Again in this issue *MILITARY POLICE* highlights articles by, and for MP noncommissioned officers. May we hastily add that such material is always welcome. We look forward to supporting the new 1990 theme the Army will be selecting.

### Saluting Authors

A major factor in the success of *MILITARY POLICE* in accomplishing its mission is the fine support we get from MP authors and its readership. We hope this sharing of valuable information from the field continues. And, if we can't use a manuscript, we are happy to assist the author in locating other appropriate publishing sources.

Manuscripts need to be typed, double-spaced on plain bond paper. Photos and artwork add greatly to an article's effectiveness. Our assistance to you is as close as your telephone, AUTOVON 865-5405 or commercial (205) 848-5405. Please enclose a self-addressed envelope if you would like to have your manuscript returned to you.

### Retiring Printer

This issue of *MILITARY POLICE* was slow in reaching you after its publication was delayed for several months. The printer unexpectedly retired from business, and there were difficulties in obtaining a new one in a hurry. We hope to get back on schedule as rapidly as possible.

# Letters

Editor:

In response to the letter to the editor from Sergeant Michael D. Balentine, Military Police Activity, Fort Benning, Georgia in the January 1989 issue, I would like to offer the following information.

At Fort Hood, Texas the provost marshal decides who within the provost marshal office (PMO) has the authority to approve civilian job descriptions and who is authorized to interview prospective candidates prior to hiring. All the civilian personnel office (CPO) does is screen applicants for the vacant civilian police positions to ensure that only qualified applicants, in accordance with the job description that the PMO supervisor previously approved, are referred to the PMO supervisor for consideration.

If the PMO is not receiving qualified applicants, in their opinion, they should consult with the classification specialists at the CPO to determine if the job description needs revision. The CPO does not hire civilian police at Fort Benning or anywhere else that I know of. The provost marshal has the final authority over who will work under his command.

If the PMO decides to get an off-duty MP out of the barracks to fill in for a civilian who does not report for work, it's because they have decided not to call in a civilian because of lack of other available civilians or not to pay for overtime.

What happens when a MP does not or cannot report for work as scheduled? I assume that the PMO gets another MP out of the barracks or calls in a civilian. Both options are acceptable, available, and required to accomplish the mission.

If civilians do not report for work because of unauthorized absences, they can be charged with being AWOL and are subject to disciplinary action just like their military police counterparts.

If the provost marshal has granted a civilian the authority in an approved job description to exercise authority over military police, then he definitely has authority over them in the same manner as if he were military. If the civilian police are allowed to carry credentials, that privilege has also been granted by the provost marshal. The provost marshal also directs what level of authority the civilian police have, and it is normally specified within the civilian's job description.

For civilian law enforcement positions classified under the Police Series (GS-083) and Guard Series (GS-085) AR 190-56, *The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program*, applies and specifies minimum physical and training requirements, qualification standards, standards of appearance, and other details regarding the employment of civilian police.

It's the PMO's responsibility to train the civilian police in accordance with these standards. Additionally, the supervisors (military or civilian) of the civilian police are required to develop performance standards that the civilian police are required to maintain or else face disciplinary or administrative action.

Civilian police greatly enhance the capabilities of garrison law enforcement operations because of their stability and continuity of enforcement. Here at Fort Hood there are civilian police who serve as supervisors and leaders over military police with a comradely working relationship.

Because of the civilian police officers' continued enforcement of local, state, and federal laws for several years at a time there is a high degree of technical expertise and efficiency seldom seen in solely military police manned activities.

Rather than foster a we-they attitude over civilian police officers versus military police, I hope that SGT Balentine can set the example by supporting the joint civilian-military police operation that his provost marshal is responsible for and to research more thoroughly what he perceives as systematic problems.

At Fort Hood the types of complaints made by SGT Balentine would be presented to a management-level representative at the provost marshal office for clarification before blaming the civilian police and the civilian personnel office.

*(Cont. on page 7)*




The cover of this issue places emphasis on real-world training displayed during a field training exercise in Korea, TEAM SPIRIT 89. Soldiers from the United States and the Republic of Korea, KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army), trained side by side. Also shown on the cover is an MP charging through smoke during MOUT training.

# AirLand Battle (Future)

## PART I

*Captain Gary Holt*
*and*
*Lieutenant Colonel Robert Baker*

The publication of FM 100-5, *Operations,* in July of 1976 and its revision in 1982 ushered in a new era of warfighting doctrine for the U.S. Army—AirLand Battle (ALB). ALB emphasized maneuver warfare on an often nonlinear battlefield.

A cornerstone of ALB doctrine was deep battle—the attack of follow-on enemy forces. Deep battle is executed by artillery and air systems to isolate, immobilize, and weaken uncommitted forces, slowing their closure rates and denying the threat of the ability to concentrate combat power at decisive points.

The 1982 revision of FM 100-5 addressed rear area protection (RAP) and the roles of forces, including MP, in the rear areas. In May, 1986 another revision of the field manual was published to incorporate lessons learned. One of the most significant changes was the development of the one-battle, three-operations concept synchronizing all three operations (close, deep, and rear):

- *Deep operations.* Shape the battlefield and create the conditions for future victory.
- *Close operations.* Prosecute the battle and bear the burden of victory.
- *Rear operations.* Ensure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations.

Soviet combat developers also employ innovative, forward-looking methods to develop their doctrine and forces for the future. ALB doctrine presents the Soviet Union with unique problems based on their doctrinal employment.

However, they have continued to change the doctrine, materiel and equipment that they believe will permit them to defeat our doctrine. This is evidenced by the following quote from Soviet Lieutenant General V.G. Reznichenko in the 1984 version of the book, *Taktika:*

> "According to the U.S. Army's air-land battle concept, the objectives of defensive operations will be achieved...by maneuvering widely on the ground...and by conducting determined counterattacks. When organizing a breakthrough into such a defense it is important to disrupt, or impede as much as possible, the enemy's maneuver. ...It is particularly important to organize thorough reconnaissance...to achieve quick and effective destruction of defensive nuclear weapons and precision weapons systems, and to disrupt enemy command and control."

In 1987 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) began to develop a concept that would carry the U.S. Army into the twenty-first century. The AirLand Battle Future concept (ALB-F) was initiated in 1987 to develop global warfighting requirements for the Army into the twenty-first century. This effort continues, and it will serve as an umbrella concept for all potential theaters and intensities of conflict.

Concurrent with the commissioning of the ALB-F concept, a subordinate study was initiated by headquarters TRADOC to develop a warfighting concept for the Army heavy force engaged in close operations in a European environment.

A special study group (ALB-F SSG) was created for this task. It was comprised of officers with broad backgrounds from all branches. The U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama combat developers participated from the outset their mission outlined by the Commandant, BG David Stem.

The final results of this study effort have not yet been approved as doctrine. Parts or all of this concept will be incorporated into the aforementioned ALB-F concept when it is possible.

The SSG has to postulate the future battlefield. Over the next fifteen years technological advancements will create an extremely complex and lethal battlefield. Smart and brilliant munitions will provide tactical commanders the ability to see and destroy opposing forces at increased ranges.

Mobility enhancements will create a more fluid, flexible battlefield. Some developments, recon and strike [illegible] complexes, decreased reliance on mass ing of forces, increases in their army aviation, and increased use of automated troop control systems dictate more complex solutions to our warfighting doctrine. Also, less definitive aspects of the future such as budgetary limitations and population demographics had to be considered.

After eighteen months of study analysis, research, coordination, and "gnashing of teeth" the AirLand

...tle—Future (Heavy) (ALB-F[H]) ...dy was completed. ALB-F(H) ...blishes the requirements for tactical ...ess on the future battlefield through ...e simultaneous application of combat ...er throughout the depth of Soviet ...ical formations. Deep operations ...ll be conducted at greater depths, and ...e close operations area of responsibil-...y will be expanded.

Close operations will include the at-...ck of committed and uncommitted ...st-echelon threat forces by any forces ...ailable to the U.S. tactical com-...nder. The close operations area will ...pand from the U.S. division rear ...undaries to the threat division rear ...undaries. By expanding the close ...erations area (figure 1), the U.S. can ...eate uncertainty for the enemy by ...esenting more systems in a larger area ...er a shorter time frame (figure 2).

Four imperatives are prevalent in the ...w U.S. study. Incorporating these ...peratives into our planning and ...erations, U.S. commanders will ...eate an environment that will force the ...reat commander off-plan, allowing ...e U.S. commander the opportunity to ...ize the initiative. These imperatives ...e as follows:

- *Simultaneity.* The attack, in near-simultaneous time frames, of committed and uncommitted elements of first-echelon Soviet divisions.
- *Counterfire.* The attack of the enemy's entire fire control system (weapons, munitions, acquisition means, $C^3$ nodes).
- *Force Agility.* The ability of tactical commanders, through improved $C^2$ (command and control) and enhanced mobility, to reposition forces at decisive points faster than the threat can anticipate or react.




FIGURE 1. BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE.




FIGURE 2. BATTLEFIELD ASYMMETRY.

The study poses that future operations will be characterized by the five tenets: agility, initiative, depth and synchronization (the original four in FM 100-5) and endurance—the ability of a force to maintain high levels of combat power relative to the enemy over the time of an operation. Simply stated: endurance is the staying power of a force.

The battlefield in the year 2004 will be an extremely lethal and highly complex environment. The ALB-F(H) operations attempts to create an environment in which the U.S. can successfully counter the Soviet forces. The human dimension will play a critical role; it will be the dedication of the few who are willing to stand in harm's way on the most lethal battlefield in the history of mankind that will spell the difference between victory or defeat.

In the next edition of *MILITARY POLICE* we will outline the MP perspective of the ALB-F(H) study and the initiatives we are taking to prepare the Military Police Corps to fight on the future heavy battlefield. *(To be continued).*

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## FORT HOOD CIVILIAN POLICE *(Cont. from page 5)*

The above information has been ...erified with the Fort Benning CPO and PMO prior to its dispatch to *MILITARY POLICE.* To further qualify my views I currently have over nineteen years experience (civilian and military) in garrison law enforcement operations in virtually all military police roles to include my current employment as the administrative officer for the Fort Hood Provost Marshal Office.

Let's work and train together as a team in the all-important role of law enforcement. The Military Police Corps Regiment does most definitely have a proud tradition of service to the U.S. Army, and the civilian police officers and related positions play an integral role in accomplishing the law enforcement mission.

Timothy J. Leverenze
Administrative Officer
Provost Marshall Office
Fort Hood, TX

# Juvenile Offenders

*Captain Charles Dietrick*

Offenses committed by juveniles on a military installation can create problems and frustrations for the military community, particularly in terms of dealing with the offenders after they are identified. Left unchecked, even minor, sporadic juvenile offenses can mushroom into recurring incidents that significantly disrupt community routine and require an extensive outlay of resources to prevent and control.

The investigation of offenses committed by juveniles on a military installation, which normally falls within the purview of the military police, often results in the eventual identification of the offender. But once a juvenile offender is identified, an often bureaucratic and frustrating process of effectively dealing with the offender begins.

Adjudication options on a military installation are limited: (1) administrative sanctions imposed on the juveniles or sponsors, or both, by the installation commander (curfew, restrictions, termination of government quarters) or (2) referral to federal, state or host-nation courts (often limited by existing statutes, jurisdictional issues or host-nation laws). However, very few efforts are aimed directly at procedurally adjudicating juvenile cases or rehabilitating offenders.

This was the situation confronting the Fort McClellan, Alabama community in the late summer of 1988. Sporadic and seemingly unrelated incidents of juvenile shoplifting and destruction of private property grew to more serious and recurring incidents of larceny, assault, intimidation, housebreaking and recieving stolen property—all committed by a small group of juveniles, several of whom had been apprehended more than three times.

The problem seemed to be encouraged by a lack of timely and effective follow-up action after apprehension and by several apathetic sponsors who refused to believe their children were involved in acts of misconduct. No procedure was employed to deal with the juveniles after they had been apprehended, and the juveniles eventually realized that getting caught would not result in any significant consequences.

Recognizing this void, the staff judge advocate and provost marshal offices, together with other key leaders on post, developed a program aimed at closing the loop on juvenile offenders.

The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention, Enforcement and Control Program was established to meet two primary objectives: direct efforts toward sponsors to ensure they realize their responsibilities toward their families and direct efforts toward the juvenile offender that would result in rehabilitation of the individual and the development of a more cohesive family and community environment.

Key to the success of this juvenile program was the creation of a Juvenile Review Board (JRB).

### The Juvenile Review Board

The JRB mission is to review specific juvenile cases referred to it and recommend to the commanding general or his designated representative (normally the chief of staff) appropriate adjudication or rehabilitative options, or both, for approval. Once the recommendations are approved, the JRB ensures that recommendations would result in administrative sanctions being taken against the sponsor.

The JRB is comprised of key community leaders and professionals, both military and civilian, who are charged with making impartial recommendations concerning errant juvenile behavior.

The Fort McClellan JRB is comprised of the post command sergeant major who is the chairperson; the directors of personnel and community activities and housing; the staff judge advocate; post chaplain; and two randomly selected representatives from other major post activities. Each board member has an equal vote in the proceedings, with recommendations arrived at based on majority vote.

Professionals (psychologists, sociologists from MEDDAC) provide guidance to the board in formulating recommendations. The provost marshal is conspicuously absent from the board to preclude perceptions of undue influence on the proceedings; but the military police juvenile investigator is available to the board to clarify specific points pertaining to the scope, conduct or methodology of each investigation.

**Juvenile Review Board Proceedings**

The JRB proceedings commence whenever a juvenile is identified as a subject of an offense. The military police normally exercise investigative authority over juvenile offenses committed on a military installation. A military police investigator serves as the installation juvenile investigator and personally investigates every offense involving a juvenile.

Those cases involving repeat offenders or particularly aggravating circumstances are forwarded through the provost marshal to the JRB chairperson for consideration. At its first session the Fort McClellan JRB agreed to hear eight separate cases involving eighteen incidents and and nine juveniles.

The chairman is responsible for notifying other board members, juveniles, sponsors and potential witnesses of the date, time and location of the JRB's meeting. Sponsors are required to appear before the board; attendance by the juveniles is optional. Of the nine juveniles invited to appear at the first board, eight elected to appear and all responsible sponsors were present.

The JRB chairman ensures that the proceedings are conducted in a confidential, dignified manner. Proceedings are relatively informal with normal judicial rules of evidence relaxed. The juveniles and sponsors have the right to be present at the hearing, to be confronted with the investigative findings, to present witnesses on their behalf and to be represented by legal counsel at no expense to the government.

A representative from the staff judge advocate's office presents each case to the JRB in a nonadversative format, essentially reviewing the case findings. All parties are free to ask questions and challenge evidence and the juveniles are offered the opportunity to present their position and make statements.

After all cases have been reviewed, the board deliberates in private on the merits of each case and, through a majority vote, develops recommendations to be forwarded to the commanding general for approval.

The board has no punitive authority; it exists solely to review cases and make recommendations concerning rehabilitative and adjudication options. The board may find in favor of the juvenile and recommend no action be taken.

Upon the recommendation of the JRB and approval by the commanding general, a juvenile may be placed on supervised probation for a specified period of time. Entry into the probation program must be agreed upon by both the juvenile and sponsor. Supervised probation may include any one, or combination, of these provisions:

- Counseling of the juvenile (and sponsor if appropriate) by Army sociology or psychology professionals;
- Suspension of privileges (PX, youth center, bowling alley, etc.) except medical;
- Curfew;
- Handwritten work;
- Restitution to victim(s); or
- Juvenile work program.

The work program is reserved for the more serious offenders and requires the youth to perform some type of community service on post under the sponsor's supervision. Community service projects are coordinated with a sponsoring agency prior to placement of the youth. All projects are screened to ensure the safety, well-being and dignity of the youth and the family are protected.

For example, youths who vandalize a playground may find themselves picking up trash, trimming bushes or doing touch-up painting on post playgrounds for four hours every Saturday for a month. This program allows the offenders to pay back the community for their transgressions while providing the benefit of supervised probation.

After the commanding general acts upon the board's recommendation, a letter is sent to the juvenile and sponsor informing them of the decision. It is then incumbent upon the juvenile, sponsor, and juvenile investigator (who acts as the probation coordinator) to abide by all prescribed elements of probation.

The juvenile investigator merely verifies that the juvenile completes the requirements of probation. In instances where a juvenile reneges on any element and the sponsor is uncooperative in assisting the youth in meeting the elements of probation, a report is forwarded through the JRB chairman to the commanding general for further action.

At this point administrative action against the sponsor may be appropriate. Of all nine juveniles entered into the supervised probation program at Fort McClellan, all met the elements of their probation; and none have been involved in any further acts of misconduct on the installation. Furthermore, acts of misconduct attributable to juveniles postwide have shown a significant decrease since the first JRB meeting.

**Results Encouraging**

The preliminary results of the juvenile program at Fort McClellan are encouraging and show potential for application to other military installations both in the United States and overseas. The program provides for a systematic approach to dealing with repetitive and serious juvenile offenders in a timely, uniform manner. It provides for the involvement of installation leaders, sponsors, and the juveniles themselves in resolving situations before they escalate to more serious levels.

The methodology is workable in almost every jurisdictional setting. It even provides a pretrial diversion alternative on those installations where a formal civilian court could head and decide juvenile cases.

Most importantly, this program forces youthful offenders to come to terms with their misconduct and to accept responsibility for their actions in an adult manner before their juvenile misconduct carries over to adulthood, where the consequences for transgression are much more severe.

**Captain Charles Dietrick was the Provost Marshal, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written.**

# TEAM SPIRIT 89

*Captain Brice A. Gyurisko*




"Whiskey four six this is hotel one five, adjust fire, over." "Hotel one five this is whickey four six, adjust fire, out." "Grid, 765815, 25 tanks, preparing defensive positions, over."

Hotel one five, a traffic control post (TCP) on the far shore of the Namhan River in the Republic of South Korea, supported the 25th Infantry Division (Light) during a deliberate river-crossing operation during TEAM SPIRIT 89.

During this operation the 25th Military Police Company (Light) acted as eyes and ears for the division. In addition to controlling traffic movement military police found, fixed, and engaged enemy forces.

During TEAM SPIRIT 89 the company performed a myriad of tasks encompassed within the four battlefield missions: battlefield circulation control, area security, enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and law enforcement operations.

As a light MP company, the 25th had to be augmented to perform all missions required of it. The 58th Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii provided personnel to make up for shortages within the company.

The 728th Military Police Battalion, Camp Henry, Korea provided a heavy platoon—the 3d Platoon, 557th Military Police Company, Camp Humphries, Korea. The 49th Military Police Brigade, Alameda, California provided a team for EPW operations and also a platoon from 270th Military Police.

The 81st Infantry Brigade had a squad of military police that provided teams throughout the exercise. Additionally, a Republic of Korea officer (a first lieutenant), an NCO, and eleven KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army) came with the 557th Military Police Platoon to bridge the culture and language gap in addition to performing its MP duties.

The 7th Region United States Army Criminal Investigation Division Command, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii supported TEAM SPIRIT 89 with an investigative team. Five KATUSA attached directly to 25th MP Company served as interpreters.

Within the 25th Infantry Division (Light) the commanding general has made rear operations the primary mission of the military police. A rear tactical operations center (RTOC) was developed and placed within the division rear command post under the command of the assistant division commander (support).

The officer in charge (OIC) of the RTOC was the division provost marshal (PM). The RTOC managed and controlled security operations, terrain management, and movement control operations for the division rear area. The PM and the rear battle NCO (augmentation from the 58th Military Police Company) worked at the RTOC along with a 21-man staff taken from within the division. The majority of the staff consisted of the following:

- Chief, operations (PM);
- Operations officer and assistant (04/03) from force integration, G3);




- Engineer and fire support NCOs;
- Chemical officer (03);
- Intelligence officer (03);
- Counterintelligence officer (03); and
- Senior operations sergeant (E7).

With the PM as OIC of the RTOC, the deputy provost marshal (DPM) and 25th Military Police Company commander were collocated to facilitate command and control of military police operations. This proved effective when additional unit assets serving as reaction patrols were available twenty-four hours a day to maintain radio and telephone watch.

During all phases of the joint training exercise military police were in constant demand. To accomplish the mission of terrain management and area security, military police platoons patrolled assigned sectors.

They located, identified, and coordinated with the facilities such as POL (petroleums, oils and lubricants) points, bases, and base clusters within their areas. This coordination ensured that friendly units were in the right place providing sector sketches for the RTOC and knew where to provide response force support. The MP platoons collocated at bases within their sectors for rapid response, messing, and billeting.

Provost marshal operations and company headquarters were located with the division support command headquarters/RTOC. Throughout the exercise military police provided continuous patrolling in the division rear area.

The PM was also responsible for ensuring the division movement plan was planned and executed properly during each phase.Particular emphasis was placed on the redeployment from the field site to the base camps.

In a recent newspaper article the 25th Infantry Division commanding general stated, "The 25th military police maintained the rear area security and performed outstandingly in controlling the lengthy lateral movement of the division between phases."

During the deliberate river crossing military police occupied eighteen TCPs and operated a radio relay station. The DPM was located with the assistant division commander (support) directing operations. A platoon leader acting as a liaison officer was located with the crossing force engineers and the crossing force commander relaying requirements while the company commander continued military police operations.

This arrangement proved to be excellent for controlling and monitoring movement of friendly and enemy forces respectively.

Military police escorted convoys to and from the forward edge of the battlefield and provided a personal security team for the commanding general. The assistant division commander (support) made a helicopter available for aerial reconnaissance and reaction force purposes.

The MPs also provided a team to the division main (DMAIN) command post in order to provide the division band with technical expertise and supervisory responsibility as the division band conducted security of DMAIN and operated the dismount point.

An MP team was also provided to the division tactical command post to assist the division band with security and movement control. An NCO was designated to provide supervisory responsibility of the division EPW collection point, the operation of which was also the responsibility of the division band. Because of a shortage of band soldiers, however, the 49th Military Police Brigade provided a team for this mission.

Before and after the exercise the military police soldiers augmented the local military police at Camp Long, R605 base camp, and OSAN Air Base. Military police reports were forwarded from Camp Long and Camp Humphries to the division provost marshal.

Support from all augmenting units such as the 8th Military Police Brigade (Provisional) Seoul, Korea and 49th Military Police Brigade was excellent. Predeployment training and the compatability to work together ensured that all military police could excel in this training environment.

**Captain Brice A. Gyurisko was the Commander, 25th MP Company (Light), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI, at the time this article was written.**

**(Although this article does not represent existing doctrine, it graphically describes how one unit successfully handled a deliberate river-crossing operation during TEAM SPIRIT 89.—editor)**

# 40 Years of Challenge

*Robert Szostek*

Born forty years ago in the ruins of postwar Germany, the 42d Military Police Group is tasked with a mission that spans the European continent.

Immediately after World War II the 42d began its fight against widespread black market activity. Even after Germany regained sovereignty black market investigations continued to protect the reemergent Germany economy.

During these critical years the group manned major German border crossings, the Bremerhaven seaport, and international airports to control the flow of tax- and duty-free goods into and out of Germany, as well as assist soldiers during border crossings.

Although the group relinquished these border posts in 1980, its military police stayed on at Frankfurt International Airport and Rhein Main Air Base (where most military members and their families still enter Europe).

The 42d's primary mission remains law enforcement under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, particularly regarding drug and black market suppression. However, helping new arrivals to import pets and other restricted items is also important.




**The 42d MP Group was assisted by German customs when U.S. forces members entered Germany. (U.S. Army photo courtesy of HQ, 42d MP Group)**

In 1968 the 42d MP Group also assumed the military customs inspection (MCI) mission for USAREUR (United States Army, Europe). Qualified customs inspectors inspect everything from household goods to tanks moved through military channels to the United States.


**Customs MPs also inspected the mail. (U.S. Army photo courtesy of HQ, 42d MP Group)**

Each year 42d's inspectors clear approximately one hundred thousand household goods shipments, twenty thousand privately-owned vehicles (POVs), five thousand military aircraft and eighty thousand passengers. This saves the government and the individual soldier, DOD civilian, and their families time and money. Because shipments, passengers, and vehicles cleared by the 42d are not normally inspected when they enter the United States, they reach their destination sooner.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture requirements are of central importance to the MCI mission. They safeguard the American farming industry from foreign pests such as the Mediterranean fruit fly. It may be unusual to see an MP crawling under a wet tank looking for dirt; but that dirt could harbor nematodes and other voracious insects that could wipe out the American potato industry if they reached CONUS. When considered in that context, the mission is an awesome responsibility for young soldiers.

Customs information is also a vital service that can save a soldier from unintentionally breaking the law. So USAREUR's public affairs office uses all available media to tell the U.S. forces audience in Europe about customs and agriculture laws and about their host-nation tax- and duty-free benefits. This mission is challenging because many soldiers and their families have never dealt with customs before.

As a result of the group's expertise in the military customs inspection arena, it was assigned duties as the executive agent for all customs matters in the European command. The Group USEUCOM (United Stated European Command) Executive Agency for Customs supervises approximately 180 MWR programs run by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in nine European countries. Advisors from the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture assist in program accreditation, coordination with U.S.federal agencies, and training.

**All equipment bound for CONUS must meet U.S. Department of Agriculture standards. (U.S. Army photo by Robert Szostek)**

### Training Is Unique

The core of this training is a unique week-long qualification course organized and conducted by the executive agency. It introduces MPs to the complex world of customs and agriculture regulations. Which U.S. Department of Transportation safety rules apply to POVs built in 1971? What paperwork does the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms need for a 9mm handgun made in Lithuania after 1945?

Other subjects covered in the training range from currency, wildlife, and environmental protection laws to Public Health Service regulations. Military police are taught to inspect household goods, POVs, aircraft, passengers and cargo. They learn the latest smuggling methods and are given reinforcement training in drug recognition.

Later in the week the MPs learn the tax and customs laws that apply to the U.S. forces in Germany under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Who exactly is allowed to have tax-free privileges in Germany? What privileges do they have and what are the limitations?

In addition, classes are given on black-market investigations and surveillance. A military working dog team comes to demonstrate the effectiveness of its drug-detection capabilities. The interaction between the group's military customs inspectors, dog handlers, and investigators is heavily stressed.


**Inspecting a soldier's household goods. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Kurt Retka)**


**A military working dog team performs drug-detection operations. (U.S. Army photo by Robert Szostek)**

**Customs MPs help a REFORGER soldier with his customs declaration. (U.S. Army photo by Robert Szostek)**

One spin-off from the MCI mission is the 42d's role in the annual REFORGER exercise. When REFORGER troops land in Europe, the 42d's customs inspectors are there to speed them through customs. Then, when the exercise is over, the troops and their baggage move to special customs clearance areas where they are inspected before flying back home.

Their equipment goes to wash sites where it is cleaned by the unit, inspected by the 42d, and then loaded onto flatcars for the journey to the port and the voyage to CONUS. All this saves the taxpayer millions of dollars each year because such precleared flights don't have to land at U.S. ports of entry, download, and go through customs before flying on to their destinations—thereby saving time, fuel, airport landing fees, and customs user fees.

To give the MCI program real teeth, the 42d was the first Army unit in Europe to acquire drug-detector dog teams. Today the 42d still has the largest drug-detector dog force in USAREUR for its own customs operations and to support USAREUR drug-suppression missions, with seventeen kennels strategically placed throughout Germany and Italy. Today the majority of 42d's dogs not only detect drugs, they also perform patrol functions for wartime.

This bewildering array of peacetime customs-related tasks would seem enough to keep any unit busy, but the 42d also performs extensive combat planning and training. In wartime the headquarters of the 42d assumes command and control of MP assets in the RCZ. The (peacetime) subordinate companies become enemy-prisoner-of-war (EPW) guard and escort guard units collecting EPW from forward units and escorting them to camps set up by the guard companies. Here the prisoners are processed for shipment out to permanent EPW camps.

To meet its missions the 42d is dispersed over a wide geographic area with forty-three field offices ranging from Bremerhaven in the far north of Germany, to West Berlin, and to Livorno, Italy, in the south.

The five subordinate companies fall under the group headquarters in Mannheim, Germany: their headquarters are located in Fuerth (193d MP Company), Frankfurt (256th MP Company), Karlsruhe (285th MP Company), Kaiserslautern (294th MP Company), and Bremerhaven (560th MP Company).

### NCOs Play Key Role

Communication and individual responsibility are the vital keys to the success of this widely dispersed organization. Soldiers on the ground must make good independent decisions their company headquarters is sometimes hundreds of miles away. For this reason NCOs in the 42d are assigned more responsibility than NCOs in many other MP units. A noncommissioned officer is appointed as the NCOIC of a field office supplying many customs services to whole military communities serving thousands of soldiers, civilians, and families.

**The 256th and 294th MP Companies conduct joint EPW training. (U.S. Army photo by MAJ Scott Kindred)**

These NCOs must also independently apply the local laws pertinent to their particular area. Laws that apply in Frankfurt may not always apply in Berlin, and may be different again from Italy. The local field office serves as a focal point of law enforcement liaison between the German customs authorities, provost marshal, and CID (Criminal Investigation Division).

Exercise missions require the NCOs to organize travel to foreign countries from Norway to Zaire, provide troop support for their soldiers while abroad, and complete the customs mission with minimum delay. Such unique challenges are the reasons why so many soldiers choose to stay in the 42d.

Although the demands placed upon the 42d have changed during its forty-year history, its basic missions have remained the same: provide peacetime customs support to members of the U.S. forces and to be prepared to fight, survive, and win in war. In this the 42d has succeeded. Throughout the last forty years the road has been paved with challenges for the 42d Military Police Group and it has met them all.

In the future continued emphasis must be placed upon balancing the sensitive nature of peacetime support with the critical training for wartime support. The 42d Group has accepted this challenge.

**Mr. Robert Szostek was the Public Affairs Officer, 42d MP Group Public Affairs Office, Mannheim, FRG, at the time this article was written.**

# Lineage and Battle Honors: 324th Military Police Battalion

*Master Sergeant Crosby E. Berry*

The 324th Military Police Battalion was originally constituted on May 31, 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 801st Military Police Battalion. On June 4, 1942 the unit was activated at Fort Ord, California. The 801st MP Battalion received extensive training in tactical operations, performed military police law enforcement duties and participated as guards of honor for visiting dignitaries to Melbourne, Australia.

During World War II, the 801st Military Police Battalion saw action in Luzon and New Guinea, receiving campaign streamers for both. The battalion was also awarded the Presidential Unit Citation of the Philippines for the period from October 17, 1944 to July 4, 1945.

The 801st MP Battalion was deactivated on May 31, 1946 in the Philippine Islands. The battalion was redesignated as the 324th Military Police Battalion on June 11, 1947. It was allotted to the organized Reserves and assigned to the Sixth United States Army. The 324th MP Battalion was activated at Fort Lawton, Washington on July 4, 1947.

At present the 324th MP Battalion is a command and control headquarters organized under a 19-500H Modified Table of Organization and Equipment. The unit's present capstone headquarters is the 49th Military Police Brigade of the California National Guard. The battalion headquarters is presently located at Fort Lawton, Washington.

During peacetime subordinate units assigned to the battalion are Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment; 324th MP Battalion; 300th Transportation Detachment; and the 737th Transportation Company. The mission of the 324th MP Battalion is to provide responsive and flexible command and control of assigned subordinate units within the corps area for transport, segregation and temporary holding of enemy prisoners of war. The battalion also provides care, safety and a secure area for enemy prisoners of war while in custody, ensuring strict adherence to the Geneva Conventions. The 324th MP Battalion also has the capability to provide flexible command and control for missions in physical security and rear battle operations.


The Coat of Arms and Crest uses the green and gold colors of the Military Police Corps. The shield has, from the base, an upraised arm with hand holding two serpents, the heads facing contrariwise and the tails entwining around the arm. The control functions are symbolically illustrated by the hand of the organization grasping and subduing the serpents of evil. The motto is "Durability."

**Master Sergeant Crosby E. Berry was the Operations Sergeant, 324th MP Battalion, Fort Lawton, WA, at the time this article was written.**

# Victims' Rights in the Military Criminal Justice System

## PART II

*Lieutenant Colonel John P. Bordenet*

(This is the final installment of a two-part article that began in the last issue—editor)

The following hypothetical case illustrates some of the differences between responses of military and civilian communities to victims' needs and the progress that has been made to provide more understanding and support to victims.

A soldier (civilian) leaves the service club (restaurant) and on the way to his car is beaten and robbed. The MPs (police) are notified, obtain descriptions from the victim and a witness, and later apprehend (arrest) a suspect.

### Physical Injuries

The most immediate consideration is to attend to any injuries suffered by the victim. In the military service complete hospital care is available at no cost to the soldier and at no loss of salary.

This may not be the case for a civilian victim who may even have difficulty in simply getting to a hospital, let alone paying the costs involved and affording a possible loss of pay if unable to work.

### Information

In addition to physical injuries and economic losses from crimes, victims may become confused and frightened. Many may not even know how to report the crime, and most are not familiar enough with the criminal justice system to anticipate their role in subsequent legal processes.

In the military a soldier who has been victimized can first return to his or her immediate supervisor and look to the chain of command for answers.

When necessary, staff judge advocate personnel will explain legal procedures and terminology. Soldiers will also be given time off from duty to prepare statements and attend hearings and courts-martial.

Contrary to the civilian environment, soldiers receive full pay during legal proceedings because they are considered to be on duty, and their training and work schedules are adjusted as necessary.

### Victim Assistance and Services

Civilians face potential difficulties at every step in this process.

Their employers may be under no obligation to allow them time off with no loss of pay to testify, and victims are usually responsible for arranging transportation to and from the courthouse.

Some prosecutors are too busy to explain any details of the process of testimony and cross-examination. These problems become worse if cases are continued and victims must come to court several times; again, they may find little or no help offered to arrange work schedules, transportation, and compensation for any loss of pay.

In recognition of these problems most states have now funded victims' assistance programs that receive federal support through the 1984 Victims of Crime Act. These programs often include volunteers on their staffs who provide victims with explanations of court processes, terms used, and what will be expected of them during their appearance in court.

In thirty-five states there are also various provisions for intercession with the victim's employers (urging but not requiring that victims be given time off without loss of pay to testify). In ten states the laws urge or require that creditors be contacted on behalf of victims.

### Victim Protection

Prior to their appearance in court some victims may be subjected to threats and intimidation from defendants attempting to prevent or alter their testimony. While this may occur in the military, the relatively controlled environment and the dictates of command responsibility discourage such attempts and facilitate reporting and response should threats occur.

Military police and investigators must be aware of this possibility, however, and be prepared to respond aggressively in cooperation with the appropriate commanders.

The problem of intimidation of victims and witnesses in the civilian sector has been reported by the American Bar Association to be widespread and pervasive. The Victim Service Agency in New York City has reported that intimidation occurs in at least 10 percent of criminal cases.

In 1982 the Victim and Witness Protection Act was enacted in response to this problem in the federal judicial system. The law broadened the definition of intimidation, provided for the issuance of temporary restraining and protective orders, and stipulated that under certain conditions punishment for violations was to be served consecutively, not concurrently, with other sentences.

This legislation was intended to serve also as a model for the states, and by 1987 forty-six states had enacted some form of legislation to protect victims from intimidation. In addition, the opportunity for intimidation can be reduced by providing separate waiting rooms in the courthouse for victims (implemented by law or resolution in thirty-one states) and withholding the addresses of victims from defense attorneys (implemented by law or resolution in twenty-two states).

### Victim Participation and Input

Our hypothetical case has now progressed to the point where charging decisions must be made. In the service, commanders make these decisions and from my experience are well aware of the crime's impact on the victim.

In the civilian sector prosecutors are responsible for charging decisions and until recently often considered victims in a light that differed little from that of a witness. In many cases victims were given virtually no opportunity to participate in prerelease (bail bond) hearings or probation and parole hearings.

We can be thankful that there recently has been positive movement to involve some victims in these processes by court acceptance of impact statements from them, consideration of their opinions prior to or during sentencing hearings, and allowance of victims to testimony in court and appearance at parole hearings.

In 1982 federal Victim and Witness Protection Act mandated that victim impact statements be considered before sentencing in federal courts. Presentence reports were to include verified information assessing the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon the victim of the crime and assessing the victim's need for restitution.

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee prior to enactment of the 1982 act, the chief U.S. probation officer for the District of Maryland provided the committee a perceptive and unique rationale in support of courts receiving this victim-based information: "We never want to be guilty of waving the bloody shirt, neither are we to bury the bloody shirt with the victim still in it."

This and other testimony before the Senate committee made it clear that victims as well as defendants would now have their day in court.

Legislation to permit impact statements from victims seeks only to balance the system. It takes nothing away from a defendant's right to proper and even spirited defense. However, in fairness one must accept the fact that prosecutors cannot, by themselves, fully present the side of the victims.

Only victims can relate the true impact of the crime upon them from direct and personal experience. Certainly the defendant may appear remorseful during the trial. However, only the victim can tell of the defendant's actions and attitude during commission of a confrontational crime when the victim may have asked for mercy or simply to be left alone.

PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
SPEEDY TRIAL
BAIL HEARING WITH FREE ROOM & BOARD IF CONFINED
FREE LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF INDIGENT
RIGHT TO CONFRONT & CROSS-EXAMINE ACCUSER
DELAYS & CONTINUANCES IF "REQUIRED" FOR THE DEFENSE
PLEA BARGAIN POSSIBILITIES
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION
RIGHT TO "FAIR" TRIAL WITH APPEAL IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES
PROBATION
PAROLE
CONCURRENT SENTENCING
REHABILITATION & TRAINING PROGRAMS

PROTECTION FROM INTIMIDATION
COMPENSATION
RESTITUTION
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
CONSULTATION WITH PROSECUTOR
PARTICIPATION IN PLEA-BARGAIN DECISIONS
EMPLOYER AND CREDITOR INTERCESSION
INFORMATION OF DEFENDANT'S STATUS
WAITING AREA SEPARATE FROM THAT PROVIDED DEFENDANT
EXPEDITIOUS RETURN OF PROPERTY NO LONGER NEEDED AS EVIDENCE
PARTICIPATION IN PAROLE HEARINGS



By 1987 forty-seven states permitted victim impact statements in their court proceedings. Twenty-five states also permitted victims to provide courts their opinions as to appropriate sentences, and twenty-three permitted victims to participate in the plea-bargaining process.

Some victims have also recently been granted certain rights to participate in parole board hearings. As of 1987, thirty-four states permitted victims to present impact statements to parole boards, and thirty-one allowed victims personally to appear before parole boards to describe the impact of the crimes upon them and their families.

The parole issue was directly addressed by the 1984 federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which eliminated parole from the federal system. By 1987 eight states had also removed parole from their systems.

### Restitution and Compensation

Whether or not an offender is identified or convicted, many victims must replace stolen and destroyed property and pay for continuing medical treatment. In addition, some may be unable to work because of injuries resulting from the crimes against them.

Victims who are military servicemembers will receive all needed medical care, and items stolen from them or damaged as a result of the crime can be replaced through the claims process.

Victims in the civilian sector face a host of problems that are not as readily resolved. In addition to property losses, those who suffer physical injuries during the crime may face considerable medical expenses and be unable to work because of the physical and pyschological impacts of the crime.

In researching this problem the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime found numerous situations in which victims were left destitute for the rest of their lives while the perpetrator, if caught and convicted, completed the sentence and was then released to live in relative comfort. This issue has been addressed in both federal and state legislation through enactment of victim restitution and compensation programs.

Restitution is essentially a court-ordered transfer of funds from the person convicted of a crime to the victim(s). This does not provide a complete solution, however, because only a small percentage of crimes are cleared through identification of a subject; and even fewer result in a conviction. In the more common situations, in which there are no subjects to be tried, victims may be assisted by compensation programs.

Funds from compensation programs are provided by both the federal and state governments. States began to develop compensation programs in the late 1970s, and in 1984 the federal Victims of Crime Act encouraged all states to develop such programs.

Under this act funds collected from fines and forfeitures assessed on those convicted in federal courts were transferred to states with victim compensation and assistance programs. In fiscal year 1988 total federal funding under this act amounted to approximately $90 billion.

States add to this amount through a combination of fines and forfeitures assessed against those convicted in state courts. Forty-five now have such programs.

Victims are usually compensated for medical care, counseling, funeral expenses (paid to victims' families), rehabilitation, occupational training, and loss of wages. Unlike restitution, compensation funds do not normally cover property losses and pain and suffering.

### Summary and Conclusion

Even in the best of circumstances victims cannot recover from all the effects of crimes committed against them. If nothing else, the memory of the event and realization that no law enforcement system can fully protect them will be reminders of their potential vulnerability.

This article covered recent developments at both federal and state levels that will assist victims in their recovery process. Gaps remain between victim assistance in the military and civilian sectors of our society, but there has been meaningful progress.

The impacts of federal leadership, progressive state and federal legislation, and the dedication of victim and witness advocates have resulted in a variety of programs that demonstrate both a sensitivity to victims' concerns and commitment to corrective actions.

Although victim advocacy has occurred as a result of inequities in the civilian sector of the criminal justice system, some of the lessons learned could apply to the response to victims of crime in the Army and throughout the military.

In any event victims' rights issues now constitute an irremovable and vital segment of the criminal justice system that deserves recognition and support.

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(Chapter 18, AR 27-10, *Military Justice*, implements the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 within the Department of the Army. The author draws a distinction between military victims (who are entitled to the on-post services that he discusses) and civilian victims (who are not). Frequently, however, the victim of a soldier's misconduct is an off-post civilian with no ties to the military. These civilian victims are not omitted from the Army's victim and witness assistance program, which covers both military and civilian victims [AR 27-10, para 18-4 and 18-9].—editor)

**Lieutenant Colonal (Ret.) John P. Bordenet was a criminal justice services specialist for the American Association of Retired Persons when this article was written. His military police career began in 1966 and included a second tour in Vietnam. He holds a master's degree in criminology and corrections from Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX.**

# Fit to Fight 88 (Squad competition)

*Sergeant Major Ronald R. Lacasse*

Military police doctrine is changing rapidly. The focus for MP combat support operations recently shifted from long-standing concerns such as law enforcement, EPW (enemy prisoner of war) evacuation, and route reconnaissance to tactical operations—conducting denial operations, movement to contact, screening operations, etc.

We have not, however, lost our unique identity as military police. We have assumed additional responsibilities based on a careful analysis of enemy intentions and capabilities.

If we go to war we are likely to see Soviet airborne, air assault and unconventional warfare forces. They will operate often in rear areas. In the corps rear area and division rear area the MP squad or team may be the principal line of defense against these forces. The MP squad or team must be capable of performing critical combat missions in order to ensure that the forward-deployed forces are capable of sustaining combat operations.

The 18th Military Police Brigade commander believes in the concept of "power down." The commander establishes intent, provides the guidance and ensures that the necessary resources are available. The role of that office is to command, lead, and support while NCOs train subordinates in their individual and team tasks and care for the soldiers and their equipment.

The question the commander asks is what about that squad or team that is employed independently on the battlefield and how do we ensure mission accomplishment? Airing this question to senior noncommissioned officers, the Fit to Fight 88 squad competition came to life.

The brigade Fit to Fight 88 was planned and executed by NCOs. The objectives were:

- Recognize outstanding military police squads;
- Promote *esprit de corps* and foster a spirit of partnership;
- Highlight squad strength and identify training weaknesses;
- Evaluate level of unit training readiness;
- Evaluate effectiveness of Integrated Test/Evaluation Programs (ITEPs); and
- Evaluate the effectiveness of squad leadership.

The brigade command sergeant major, along with the two battalion command sergeants major, the brigade S3 sergeant major and several key senior NCOs, commenced backward planning. Backward planning assisted in organizing the available time and identifying support documents.

In-process reviews (IPRs) were scheduled to update any guidance received from the brigade commander and to discuss the implementation of the Fit to Fight 88 squad competition. It was decided that each battalion would select a squad to represent each company for the competition—ten squads including both headquarters and headquarters detachments (HHDs). The following events were chosen to be evaluated:

- EPW (fixed station)
- Secure and defend unit positions (night opns 101)
  - Provide security:
    - Vital points
    - OP/LPs
    - Range card
    - Intel reporting (night 101)
    - React to flares
    - OPFOR
- Call for fire (fixed station)
- PMCS (fixed station)
  - Vehicles
  - Commo
  - Weapons
  - NBC equipment
- Communications
  - Enter net, send message
  - Use LOI (encode/decode NSG)
  - Use of prowords
- First Aid (fixed station)
  - 5-10 tasks, CTT
- NBC (fixed stations)
- Orienteering
- PT test
- Battlefield circulation control
  - Route recon
    - Gather info
    - Prepare report
  - Set TCP
  - Set roadblock
  - Patrol MSR
    - Intel reporting (SALUTE)
    - Call for fire
- Areas security OPS
  - Conduct area recon
  - Collect and report intel
  - React to ambush
  - NBC reporting
- Convoy escort
  - Route recon
  - Escort convoy
    - Organize
    - Secure
    - OPFOR
    - Use checkpoints
    - Use alternate route
  - Release convoy
- Hasty and deliberate attack
  - Mounted to dismounted
  - React to indirect fire
    - Call for fire
  - Movement techniques
  - Secure objectives
  - Consolidate
  - Reorganize.

Along with the selection of events, a point system totalling 1000 points and time standards were developed. The squad accumulating the highest number of points would be recognized as the outstanding squad of the competition. This competition also served as an evaluation tool, for these were the best squads of each company. Composite squads were not permitted.

Our next task was the selection of the course controllers and evaluators. The evaluators were given their tasks to be evaluated along with point values and time constraints, and were then instructed to put a scenario together. After the evaluators completed formulating their packaged event, it was reviewed by the brigade command sergeant major.

April 6-12, 1988 was selected as the competition period; and the location for the event was the Friedberg training area, just outside of Frankfurt, FRG. The brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) first sergeant, supported by both battalions and the brigade S4, was responsible for the logistics aspect of the squad competition. This was no simple task, yet was accomplished with minimum problems.

The squad leaders received their briefing of the course, safety and other pertinent facts. Each evaluator gave a brief introduction of their event and informed the squad leaders that upon completion of each event they would receive a brief critique as to the squad's performance and the points they received.

Prior to being on site each squad leader knew the thirteen events and was able to prep their squad before the actual competition. The squads consisted of one squad leader, two team leaders and six military police. Again composite squads were not permitted.

The squad uniform was full field gear, basic issue weapon, three M151 vehicles and crew weapons. Weapons and COMSEC (communications security) were a squad responsibility. The squads were to ensure that adequate security measures were taken throughout the exercise.

Upon arriving at the training area for in-processing, the squad leader drew a number. This number determined the track the squad followed for Fit to Fight 88. With the information received, the squad leader had to ensure compliance with the scheduled time events, feeding the troops and using downtime wisely.

The soldiers received little time for sleep. The entire competition was geared for action from 0500 to 2400 hours. Two hot meals were provided

ing with the issuance of MREs. The squad had to manage its time properly, prepare for the next mission, PMCS weapons and vehicles, eat and rest.

Although the competition was designed to result in one squad being acknowledged and recognized as the outstanding MP squad of the brigade, in the final analysis the entire brigade was the winner.

Reponsibility for the overall success of this squad competition was placed on the NCOs' shoulders, as it should be—during an actual conflict the soldiers and NCOs will be the ones who will do the fighting. The brigade commander, through this tasking, helped create a tighter bond among the NCOs. They had to get together and plan this event completely. With guidance and supervision from the senior NCOs this was successfully accomplished. What happened? The brigade NCOs successfully planned the event.

Knowing what, where, when and how to accomplish the Fit to Fight 88 involved the matter of resources. This was far from being a simple task; the logistical questions dealt with tents, vehicles, fuel, ammunition, recovery operations, administrative support, etc.

Several months prior to the event the brigade command sergeant major assembled all participants for an information briefing. This allowed the selected squads to begin their training phase for the event. The squad leaders were aware of the established matrix, and it was up to them on how they were to prep or train their squad for the competition.

The selected squads were not "Ed" from normal mission or unit scheduled training. It proved later that the squads were really into the forthcoming challenge; and as the end results demonstrated, the degree of effort was an eye-opener.

All NCOs and soldiers who participated were part of the evaluation. The planning, resources, setting up the training and the actual event indicated that brigade noncommissioned officers were among the best that could be assembled in any unit.

For the troops, the soldiers who participated, the overall evaluation of the results of the event indicated that troops can indeed perform their mission.

Did it demonstrate a 100-percent proficiency? The answer is no. And the key NCOs, the trainers, were there to see this and be aware of what needs to be done. Even though some soldiers got "killed" during Fit to Fight 88, this time they were able to get back up and try again. Next time could be another story.

Getting a good handle on it was accomplished through the cooperation of every NCO and their battalion commanders.

**Sergeant Major Ronald R. Lacasse was the Staff Sergeant Major and the S3 Sergeant Major, 18th MP Brigade, Frankfurt, FGR, when this article was written. Previously he attended the Sergeant Majors Academy at Fort Bliss, TX.**



# Enemy Prisoner of War Operations

*Major William A. Doyle*

Conventional mobile warfare over the last fifty years has usually resulted in the capture of large numbers of prisoners of war by both sides. The law of land warfare and international agreements stipulate the capturing power's responsibilities and codify the great demands prisoners of war place on the support system of any army in the field.

Within the Department of Defense the U.S. Army is responsible for handling prisoners of war for all U.S. forces. Despite extensive U.S. Army historical experience, present Army doctrine is not sufficient to properly perform the prisoner-of-war handling mission in a theater of war.

As history has shown us, the major combatant powers in World War II and Korea were ill-equipped to properly handle enemy prisoners of war (EPW). One analysis of the situation sums up the American experience: In almost every war in which the United States has been involved, EPW operations have assumed the dimension of an afterthought.

The handling of EPW in future warfare could quickly take on an ethical dimension as men and women in captivity starve to death, die of exposure or die of simple, otherwise curable, medical problems due to a lack of medical treatment. These things have happened to prisoners of war held by Germans, Soviet Russians, Japanese, North Koreans, Chinese communists, North Vietnamese; and it has happened to prisoners of war in U.S. custody as late as 1945.

Towards the end of World War II the U.S. Army established a prisoner-of-war camp at Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Here perhaps one hundred thousand German prisoners lived for one year in the open with no fixed shelter, no proper food and only limited medical treatment. Sometimes one hundred prisoners died every day. Much of this occurred after hostilities had ended.

Several problems surfaced from the U.S. World War II prisoners-of-war handling experience. First, the Army found that responsibility for prisoners-of-war planning had been divided between the provost marshal general in the European theater and the commanding general of the theater's services of supply. This division of responsibility resulted in coordination problems that were eventually solved by the transfer of all staff and actions to the commanding general of services of supply.

Second, the Army had to divert significant numbers of tactical units to guard prisoners of war. At one time the 106th Infantry Division had about forty thousand soldiers assigned to prisoners-of-war guard duties.

Third, although the European theater of operations U.S. Army communications zone had performed detailed planning for prisoners-of-war operations, it used World War I historical experience as a basis. Because there were fewer prisoners of war taken by the United States inWorld War I, the detailed planning was flawed. The 106th found problems in transportation, logistic support, medical support, compound construction and communications.

During the Korean War the Army apparently did not make the best use of its recent World War II experience. Some 135,000 North Korean and Communist Chinese prisoners of war threatened the United Nations Command militarily (by violence and revolt within camps) and politically (by diverting international attention to the problem). The cost to the United States to correct the situation included the equivalent of two combat divisions, more than $35 million and a loss of U.S. credibility during peace talks.

Ethical, military and political reasons thus exist for the proper handling of prisoners of war. A review of our present doctrine shows that we have neither understood nor heeded our historical experience in this area.

Army Regulation 190-8, *Enemy Prisoner of War Administration, Employment and Compensation,* fixes responsibility within the Army for prisoner-of-war handling. The theater Army commander is responsible for security matters connected with custody of EPW overseas. The military police EPW brigade commander is responsible for all matters and operations concerning prisoners of war.

The military police EPW brigade is subordinate to the theater Army personnel command (PERSCOM), one of the major subordinate commands reporting to the theater Army commander. The regulation does not fix any responsibilities for prisoners-of-war handling at the PERSCOM. The result is responsibilities fixed both at theater Army command level and at a level two echelons below the theater Army comman level.

Field Manual 12-3-4, *Echelons Above Corps Personnel and Administrative Doctrine,* notes that the PERSCOM has responsibility for prisoners of war. The manual then states that the military police EPW brigade commander, as Deputy Commander, PERSCOM, has responsibility for all matters concerning prisoners of war. There are staff directorates in PERSCOM that would likely concern themselves with prisoners-of-war staff matters.

However, other than the doctrinal requirement for the operations directorate to monitor the military police EPW brigade deployment to the theater, there is no mention of PERSCOM staff directorate responsibilities for prisoner-of-war handling.

The EPW brigade, unfortunately, is not overseas. In the force structure, the brigade is in the Reserve Component. There are some EPW units available presently in the European theater to fill the gap until the brigade arrives; however, these are only company-sized units; the brigade may arrive after hostilities begin. At the very least the brigade will require some prehostilities planning in order to accomplish its mission. Doctrinally the PERSCOM is not responsible for such planning within its staff directorates.

The delegation of the prisoners-of-war problem in overseas theaters to a Reserve Component MP brigade is a dangerous solution to an important problem. The theater-based PERSCOM focuses on personnel and administration matters. Prisoners-of-war matters receive an easy transfer into the hands of a subordinate unit.

Concern with the level of command assigned responsibilty for prisoner-of-war planning is a valid concern. Planning for prisoners of war is difficult as the Army's World War II European Theater communications zone and the 106th Infantry Division experience has shown.

The level of command planning is not the only concern. Another is the lack of attention that staff officers pay to the prisoner-of-war issue. My experience in staff college exercises shows that student officers mostly assume prisoners-of-war problems away. This experience supports the idea that the present doctrine does not inculate in staff officers—even the ones whose organizations have the mission—a proper approach to the prisoners-of-war problem. As a result, we will again have to divert troops and other resources due to faulty preparation in peacetime.

The benign neglect of the prisoners-of-war problem will be costly, however. Historically these costs have been military, economic and political. There is a moral cost also that may have to be paid by U.S. soldiers captured by the enemy and treated with equal neglect. This is a cost that all serving military may have to share in wartime; it is a sobering thought and not easily dismissed.

Another solution (frequently employed in staff college exercises) is to turn prisoners of war over to the host nation. This is an easy solution to our lack of preparedness because it gives the problem to another nation. Because Europe is a mature theater in terms of host-nation support agreements, an examination of this solution is a best-case scenario may prove useful.

In Europe existing host-nation agreements do not address prisoners-of-war custody. This is probably for several reasons. First, German (and

other nation) support may be consumed in handling civilian refugees. Even if we did turn over prisoners of war to a host nation, the law of war and international agreements stipulate that the capturing power still retains responsibility for prisoners of war. This means that we still may have a job to do ethically and logistically and that we may not be in a position to dictate the rules to another nation. This turnover presumes that the U.S. Secretary of Defense would approve such a thing—which he must do pursuant to DOD directive.

Another facile solution is the evacuation of prisoners of war to CONUS. This very possible solution still requires attention to the prisoner-of-war issue at theater level for several reasons. First, enormous resources will be required to move large numbers of prisoners of war to the United States.

Second, this evacuation probably could not start until U.S. noncombatant evacuation was complete—perhaps two weeks or more—for political as well as morale reasons. Should the war start without warning time, prisoners of war could start mounting up in great numbers before we could successfully move them away. These two or more weeks could present tremendous problems if we were not prepared.

In essence, we have seen that the U.S. Army continues to consider prisoner-of-war operations as doctrinal afterthought. The problems of the Bad Kreuznach camp in 1945 could repeat themselves. The needless suffering and death of prisoners of war in U.S. custody is a specter that both the American sense of justice and the law of land warfare will not tolerate.

The military threat of ill-handled prisoners of war in our communications zone, the diversion of troops for prisoner-of-war duty or the political disapproval of an international audience are also equally distasteful outcomes. Clearly we should pay more attention to the issue of handling prisoners of war in our doctrine and then in our training and preparation for war.

**Major William A. Doyle is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Department of the Army. His experience as S3 of an interrogation and exploitation battalion generated his interest in prisoners-of-war operations. His article was also published in the January-March 1989 issue of *Military Intelligence,* PB 34-89-1.**

# Basic Principles of Staff Work

***Colonel Arnold L. Seligman***

So now you're out of the Military Police Advanced Course; and if you haven't commanded a company, you're now more than ready to take one. After all, what's the advanced course for?

But, wait a minute—the same folks who told you that a company command is a must, now can't guarantee you one. In fact, you will probably go directly to a staff job, and then to a company. Now nobody wants to be a "staff weiner;" but it's a tough job, and somebody's got to do it.

Here are some pointers that ought to help you in your job as a staffer. These ideas are not original. In fact, I picked them up from a friend when teaching at the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS$^3$). I don't know where he got them. Bottom line: they work when applied. So here it goes—some general principles and techniques of staff survival.

## Establish a Reputation

Establish a reputation for excellence and competence at the earliest possible time using the following techniques:

*Your first written action or briefing.* These should be as good as it is possible to make them. Long hours invested early-on will pay dividends later by making it easier to get your work through.

*You can't overcoordinate.* Do this at all stages. It's one of the best ways to get the information and support you need to complete an action and to avoid unnecessary nonconcurrences. If you have the responsibility for an action, you also have the responsibility for initiating coordination with other staff officers, units and agencies.

Don't assume that no one else is affected—you will probably be wrong. If you are not sure whether something you are working on affects other staff officers, check with them and act accordingly!

*Cooperate with other staff officers.* Give their requests a high priority; don't hold their papers. You get paid back in kind.

*Keep your facts straight.* Write things down. Ask questions even if they seem dumb. Refer to your notes if you are not sure. This will keep you from being perceived as being "flaky" (unsure or fre-

quently incorrect about things), which would limit your productivity and success.

*Help subordinate units.* Call on subordinate unit commanders at the earliest possible time. Gain their trust by helping their staffs solve a tough problem. If it's not necesary to tell your boss about a problem that you helped a subordinate solve, don't. (Use judgement.) Do things for subordinate units; present their case fairly to your bosses, and you will gain their trust.

*Give freely of your time* to subordinate commanders and their staff officers. Even though you may be pressed for time, never give them a rush job.

*Before you say no* to a subordinate commander ask yourself: (1) has the boss (your commander) expressly forbidden it, or (2) is it prohibited by regulation)? If your answer to these two questions is no, you'd better have a very good reason for saying no.

*Follow up.* Your success as a staff officer will largely depend on how well you follow up on actions. Your follow-up may keep something from turning sour.

*Be dependable.* When you offer to do something for someone, do it and provide feedback.

## Learn the Players

Establish good relationships by employing the following techniques:

Call on subordinate commanders on *their* ground.

Get to know other staff sections, officers and agencies.

Get to know secretaries. They can get you or your paper in where it needs to be fast—if they want to.

Make friends with the SGS (Secretary of the General Staff). He or she influences the assignment of actions and keeps suspenses.

Make contact with support agencies—headquarters commandant, printing, the motor pool, graphics, protocol, etc. They find it harder to refuse someone they know.

Get to know your counterparts in higher headquarters, lower, and adjacent units and activities.

## Learn Job Fast

Quickly acquire the important knowledge pertaining to your job, using these techniques:

Read the plans (continengency, war, etc.). Many staff officers have only a vague knowledge of plans. If you have a sound basic knowledge, you can become an "instant expert."

Learn and use the admin office SOP (standing operating procedures).

Learn all you can about the funds your section controls, budgets or is responsible for. This is real power.

Read the policy files.

Learn the pertinent regulations.

Read the files to find major problem areas.

Find out what your subordinates really do by taking time to talk to them individually—they are important to your success in accomplishing your job.

## Define Your Duties

It is important to have a clear idea of your duties; use the following techniques:

Find and read your job description.

Ensure that you follow the procedure required by AR 623-105, *Officer Evaluation Reporting System,* with regard to completing DA Form 67-8-1 (OER Support Form).

Find out what the boss's real priorities are. They may not be in writing.

## Know Your Chief

In dealing with the chief or the head of your staff section employ these methods:

Understand that they are looking for people to solve problems, not to create them.

Ask for guidance at appropriate steps in the problem-solving process.

Learn their idiosyncrasies. What gets them fired up?

Don't waste their time. You'll find that you'll be able to see them more easily if you don't.

Keep them informed, especially if the commander tells you something directly.

Don't waste time trying to guess what the problem is or what the brass wants. If it isn't clearly defined, ask the boss.

## Good General Principles

Don't surprise anyone but the enemy.

Be fair, especially when you can influence taskings or rewards going to subordinate units. They have a long memory and are sensitive to injustices.

Be open and aboveboard.

Set priorities. Do your boss's work first.

Bad news doesn't get better with time.

Support the headquarters company commander. Keep your troops, their billets, and your equipment sharp.

Clear your suspense files with the SGS periodically. If you think you will need an extension, ask early.

When you don't have anything to say, don't say anything—particularly at meetings. Nothing disturbs people more than an individual who wastes everyone's time at a meeting by talking just to hear themselves talk.

Keep files on all actions.

Rehearse briefings.

### Things to Look Out For

Be wary of assuming new areas of responsibilities early on. Some staff officers and sections will try to dump things on the new guy.

Watch out for staff favorites; keep your distance from them. Don't align yourself with anyone, especially when you are new. Treat all other staff officers equally and fairly.

Make MFRs (memoranda for record). Some people have been known to deny things.

Get a clear direction from the boss before jumping in with both feet. Do this by asking clarifying questions at the time of tasking, then return to your desk and dash out a messy but pertinent view of the problem, the constraints, the method to be used to solve the problem, and a description of the final product. Take this butcher paper analysis and plan back to the boss the same day and brief him or her on how you intend to produce the product.

Hope this helps you in your new job. Remember: they also serve who do good and faithful staff work—which most of us will spend our career doing.

**Colonel Arnold L. Seligman was the Provost Marshal, 21st Theater Army Area Command, United States Army Europe at the time this article was written. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions.**

# How DARE You!

*Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Cook*

In response to mounting concern about drug and alcohol abuse by youth, Army military police in Europe have the unique opportunity to DARE students to resist peer pressure to abuse drugs.

DARE, an acronym for Drug Abuse Resistance Education, is a substance abuse prevention program designed to equip elementary school children with the skills necessary to recognize and resist peer pressure to use tobacco, alcohol or drugs.

DARE was developed in 1983 as a joint Los Angeles Unified School District and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) project. Uniformed law enforcement officers teach a 17-week formal curriculum to students in the classroom setting. The terminal elementary school grade audience is targeted to prepare students for entry into middle schools where they will encounter the most pressure to use drugs.

DARE lessons focus on four major areas:

- Factual and accurate drug information,
- Decision-making skills,
- How to recognize and resist peer pressure, and
- Drug-free alternatives.

DARE military police instructor volunteers pass selection criteria to include the following: have experience but still be relatively young, have good speaking and communications skills, have a desire to work with children as classroom instructors, have a commitment to drug abuse prevention education, preferably have experience in youth activities, have had no disciplinary actions or investigations, and have an understanding of the drug subculture.

The volunteers attend a two-week training course conducted by the LAPD. The DARE instructor curriculum includes the following:

- An overview of the drug problem and current drug prevention activities,
- Communication skills and public speaking techniques,
- Teaching techniques,
- Clasroom behaviorial management,
- Police-school relations,
- Peer pressure,
- Audiovisual techniques,
- Child abuse recognition, and
- Problem-solving techniques.

Uniformed military police teaching in the elementary school serve as role models and provide subject matter credibility. Additional program benefits are the development of positive attitudes toward the MPs and greater respect for the law.

DARE lessons focus on information about personal safety, drug use and misuse, consequences of drug abuse, resisting peer pressure, building self-esteem, assertiveness, managing stress without taking drugs, media influences on drug use, decision making and risk taking, alternatives to drug use, role modeling, forming a support system, and resisting gang pressure.

Currently thirty-one DARE instructors are teaching in forty-one schools in sixteen military communities. The DARE program will be expanded to forty-five instructors and eighty-five schools in thirty-three communities. DARE has support from all levels, from the Commander in Chief to the students.

In addition to the LAPD training center there are six DARE training centers in six states (Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia and Washington) training an estimated 720 instructors annually.

**Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Cook, Jr. was the Operations Officer, Drug Suppression Operations Center, HQ, USAREUR & 7th Army, Office of the Provost Mashal, FRG, at the time this article was written.**

The handler accompanies Ringo as the dog practices on the "catwalk" to get used to walking on a narrow surface. (U.S. Army photo by Mickie Eichmeier)

# K-9 Section Shepherds Depot Security

*Ms. Mickie Eichmeier*

Not every dog leads the proverbial dog's life—especially the military police working dogs assigned to the K-9 section at Miesau Army Depot in West Germany.

On a large ammunition facility like the Miesau Army Depot—a 21st TAACOM community with twenty-seven miles of perimeter fence and numerous buildings containing ammunition—security is vitally important. And one of the best deterrents to ammunition thefts is the military police dog handler and the dog.

The use of dogs in auxiliary combat elements is as old as war itself. Primitive man used dogs to guard his family, his personal belongings, and himself. Throughout the history of warfare, from the days of the Persians and the conquest of the Roman empire to the Vietnam War, dogs have gone into combat. Initially entire formations of attack dogs, frequently equipped with armor and spiked collars, were sent into battle against the enemy as recognized and effective instruments of warfare.

The city of Ghent, Belgium is generally credited with establishing the first modern and successful police working dog program in 1899, and the success of this program stimulated interest throughout Europe. The use of dogs was first adopted in the United States in New York City in 1907. The U.S. Army military working dog program, as we know it today, began during World War II.

Miesau's military working dogs are, as you would expect, in the K-9 section of the Directorate of Security. There are several dogs housed in these kennels in Europe. German shepherds, Belgian shepherds or Malanoix, and the Bouvier des Flanders are the three breeds of dogs that have proved to be the most successful in security work.

The dogs at Miesau provide security for the depot during hours of darkness because of their ability to detect the presence of anyone in the vicinity of their guard post at night. These dogs undergo a very rigorous training schedule on a daily basis. They are trained to pursue, attack, and hold an intruder until the handler reaches the scene to take charge of the situation.

The Miesau military working dogs are shipped to Europe from Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, where the dog handers and the dogs are trained. After the dogs' arrival at Miesau they are assigned to a specific dog handler. Both are evaluted to determine whether their personalities and traits are complementary. The handler is entirely responsible for the care of the dog assigned to him for bathing, grooming, maintaining the dog's weight within certain set standards, and exercising.

The dogs vary in age from two to six years. When they become too old to perform their mission, they are put on a lighter schedule and used for shorter periods of time. A veterinary technician assigned to the K-9 section takes care of routine examinations and emergencies.

The dog handlers and their dogs are divided into three teams, and training usually takes place while the team is on duty to enable the dogs to learn in the same environment in which they work. One of the most important aspects of the training is teaching the dog to obey his handler. On the other hand, the handler learns to interpret what the dog is telling him by the position of the animal's ears and nose.

There is nothing sophisticated in the equipment used in training a military working dog. For instance, a simple burlap wrap is used to encircle the arm of a "decoy" (a dog handler in disguise) to teach the dog to attack and hold an intruder.

The soldiers assigned to the Miesau K-9 section make good use of their talent in other ways besides security. A patrol dog handler, and his dog, Alex, recently took part in the three-day International Canine Biathlon at Sennelager, West Germany. Teams from thirteen nations competed in this event sponsored by the British Army Veterinary Corps.

The competition was grueling for both Alex and his handler. It included a 5.8-kilometer obstacle course, a river crossing and firing the British Sterling 9mm submachine gun. Miesau took first place among the twenty American teams who competed.

**A handler trains his dog, Ringo, to jump through a window on the Miesau Army Depot K-9 obedience course. (U.S. Army photo by Mickie Eichmeier)**

It takes a great deal of concentration and preparation for the competition. Miesau has a 3.5-mile course similar to the course at Sennelager. Every day the training included 150 to 200 pushups, running, sit-ups and stomach exercises.

The Miesau K-9 section handlers maintain a close, friendly relationship with dog handlers of the the German *polizei*. Children from nearby communities visit the Miesau Army Depot for their summer vacation programs, and the Miesau K-9 section puts on an excellent show.

**Ms. Mickie Eichmeier was the Public Information Officer, 21st Theater Army Area Command, Kaiserslautern, FRG, at the time this article was written. She holds a Master of Science degree in Human Resource Management and has attended the Advanced Public Affairs Course at the University of South Carolina.**

# Rear Tactical Command Post To V Corps Command Post Concept

*Sergeant Major Ronald R. Lacasse*



**Example of a RTAC van.**

The command post (CP) operation of a corps is designed to support the commander's command and control and responsibilities effectively and consistently. The concept considers the environment in which a corps plans to fight.

For example, for V Corps, the environment includes the Warsaw Pact threat, with its potential superiority in firepower, equipment and force size; the terrain and infrastructure of Europe's central region; and the equipment, material and personnel organic to and in support of a forward-deployed U.S. corps. The concept as described here is designed specifically for V Corps, and as such all aspects may not be applicable to other corps.

The corps CP serves three indespensable functions: planning the battle, conducting the battle, and sustaining the battle. U.S. Army doctrine proposes the establishment of three CPs at corps level—the main CP, the tactical CP and the rear CP.

The main CP primarily synchronizes the entire battle, directs deep operations and plans future battles. Secondarily it coordinates combat service support over the entire depth of the battlefield.

The tactical CP primarily monitors close operations and prepares to function as the corps main. Secondarily it monitors deep and rear operations and prepares to plan future close operations as it assumes main CP functions.

The rear CP focuses on sustaining the battle and conducting rear area operations. As secondary functions the rear CP serves as a backup for the main CP and plans future rear area combat operations.

### V Corps Concept

The V Corps concept parallels that of the doctrinal concept described above. The main and tactical CPs remain as described.

The primary functions of the rear CP, sustaining the battle and conducting rear area operations, are disparate in character. When considering the service support functions over a large area that must be planned and coordinated by the rear staff, the requirement for the same staff to plan and execute rear operations is difficult.

Consequently, V Corps executes its rear functions with two closely located but differently focused subelements of the rear CP. One of those elements, the rear CP(-) is collocated with the support command post. The rear CP(-) includes a provisional rear area operations center (RAOC) staffed by selected members of the corps staff.

The second element of the rear CP is the rear tacical CP (RTAC CP), which plans and executes major rear area operations within the context of the larger corps plan under the direction of the deputy corps commander and the operational control of the 18th Military Police Brigade commander, who was the rear battle officer.

### RTAC CP Concept

The RTAC CP is the focal point for the command and control of rear operations in the corps rear area. The primary mission of the RTAC CP is the planning and execution of significant rear area combat operations.

Additionally it monitors deep and close operations and conducts contingency planning for future rear operations. The RTAC CP is a small, mobile CP that brings together the key rear operations forces necessary for the successful execution and command and control of this vital corps battle.

### Organization

The RTAC CP is organized into four vans, each located in a 5-ton expansible

van: an operations van, a plans van, a liaison operations (LNO) van, and later a RAOC van. Each van except the LNO van is organized along command lines and retains some flexibility in staffing depending upon the situtaion.




*The Operations Van.* This is the command and control HQ (headquarters) for the tactical combat force designated to respond up to level III incidents in the corps rear area. From this van the rear battle officer responds to any significiant enemy threats in the rear area and is prepared to execute other contingency plans for the corps. This van is staffed by 18th Military Police Brigade S2 and S3 operations personnel. They keep the rear battle officer and the RAOC informed about activity in the corps rear area and forward calls for artillery fire from MP patrols on the ground to the fire-support element.




*The Plans Van.* This van reviews summaries of deep and close combat operations from the command battle module, and summaries of rear operations from RAOC. Contingency planning for future rear area operations is accomplished by representatives from the corps G2, G3 and 18th Military Police Brigade plans cell.




*The LNO Van.* This van provides the interface for the liaison officers from the infantry, artillery, aviation, and fire-support element into rear area planning and exeuction of current and future operations. Additionally, the 18th Military Police Brigade S1 and S4 cell is located in this van.




*RAOC Van.* Upon arrival of the CAPSTONE RAOC this van will join the other three vans. It will include the plans section from the RAOC as well as other personnel designated by the rear battle officer. Their principal mission is to conduct contingency planning for future rear operations.

The RAOC van receives planning guidance from the rear battle officer and translates that guidance into contingency plans. After development of plans the RAOC van hands off the plan to the plans van for modification as the situation dictates and then in turn the plan is passed over to the operations van for ultimate execution.

**Responsibilities**

The RTAC CP is responsible for the following:

- Update commander's priorities;
- Establish rear area priorities based on guidance from the commanding general;
- Conduct rear area combat operations using the 18th MP brigade and its allocated combat and combat support forces;
- Provide missions to other rear area units as directed by the commanding general;
- Coordinate fire support in the corps rear area;
- Keep the commanding general and the support command and the corps support command commanders aware of rear area operations and their impact on rear area activities;
- Maintain status of current operations and future plans (close, deep, and rear); and
- Conduct contingency planning.

Although the RTAC (CP) is mobile and austere, creating it did not increase the requirement for communications nodes. Communications assets are available in the vans.

Life support for the RTAC CP is provided by HHC (headquarters and headquarters company), 18th Military Police Brigade. Life supprt includes messing, billeting, maintenance, fuel, supply, administration, morale, health, and welfare. Life support makes maximum use of host-nation facilities and infrastructure to conceal the location of the RTAC CP. Limited-access security and overall security for the RTAC CP is dependent on available MP support. For short periods of time the RTAC CP can provide its own security.

The RTAC CP may be positioned anywhere in the rear area. It is not fixed into a specific area; geographically it may be forward of the main or behind the rear CP. Normally it will be positioned inside a building such as a warehouse or factory to provide OPSEC, mask its communications signals, and provide easy access to life support facilities.

**Command Post Advantages**

Each factor of the V Corps concept—CP organization, CP communications, CP mobility and use of civilian structure, e.g., warehouses, factories, garages, etc.—are linked by procedures that optimize effectiveness and survivability of the CP. These factors all contribute to concealing the location of the CP.

A RTAC CP is battle-oriented, mobile and flexible, and survivable. Having a RTAC CP reduces communications requirements and provides sustainability.

**Sergeant Major Ronald R. Lacasse was the Staff Sergeant Major and the S3 Sergeant Major, 18th MP Brigade, Frankfurt, FRG, when this article was written. He is a graduate of the Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, TX.**

# REAR TACTICAL COMMAND POST

## STAFFING (36 OFFICERS, 93 ENLISTED)

MULTI— CHANNEL 2.5 TON

MULTI— CHANNEL 2.5 TON

FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT

**PLANS VAN**

G3 CELL
G2 CELL
BRIGADE PLANS CELL

**LIAISON VAN**

S1,S4 CELL
INFANTRY
ARTILLERY
AVIATION
FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT

**OPERATIONS VAN**

TASK FORCE COMMANDER
S3
S2

REAR AREA OPERATIONS VAN *
RAOC PLANS SECTION
PERSONNEL DESIGNATED
BY REAR BATTLE
OFFICER

* AFTER ARRIVAL OF CAPSTONE REAR AREA OPERATIONS CENTER (RAOC)

BRIGADE RADIO TELEPHONE




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### *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878*

This is the first of a series of projected volumes on the use of federal military forces in domestic disorders within the United States.

Although the scale and frequency of such use in this country have been less than in most others, particularly countries of the third world, instances have ranged from the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 to the urban riots of the 1960s. Many occurred at the very center of our development as a nation, arising out of great and controversial issues of their times.

The purpose of this and succeeding volumes is not, however, to deal with these issues beyond the extent necessary to make clear why and under what circumstances troops were called upon to quell disturbances or to enforce the law against dissidents. SN: 008-029-00167-5; 392 pp; $22.00.

### *Rear Area Security in Russia*

This study on the problems of rear area security is based on German experiences during the Russian campaign. Particularly striking examples have been selected which show most clearly the type of disturbances created by the Russians, the German countermeasures taken against them, and the lessons learned from experience.

The same, similar, or different circumstances were encountered in other theaters of war. Accordingly, a variety of security measures became necessary, and many new experiences were gathered. Yet the fundamental questions remain the same everywhere. SN: 008-029-00185-3; 60 pp; $2.00.

### *U.S. Army in the World War*

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I.

Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation...(and) the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance."

The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms. SN: 008-029-00180-2; 664 pp; $46.00.

### *The Noncommissioned Officer— Images of an Army in Action*

Although widely recognized, the contribution of the noncommissioned officer to the Army has been largely neglected in the study of America's military past.

The popular figure of the tough and knowing sergeant, the stuff of stories and films, actually masks the deeds and accomplishments of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, the true story of sergeants doing sergeants' business.

The history needs to be recorded, for it demonstrates how the Noncommissioned Officer Corps has contributed to the Army and the nation in three fundamental areas: troop leadership, practical initiative, and dedication to duty. SN: 008-029-00178-1; 44 pp; $15.00.

## *U.S. Government Structure*

The government text describes the basis of the government of the United States—the Constitution. It discusses the three branches of the United States government and the importance, duties, and authority of each. The types of government—federal, state and local—are explained and compared. SN: 027-002-00370-5; 120 pp; $3.25.

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## *National Defense Profiles in Terrorism*

That which is shrouded in secrecy or mystery develops a certain mystique. This is true for everything from reclusive movie stars to magicians to terrorist organizations.

A study outlining terrorist groups throughout the world, designed to strip away much of the mystique about many terrorist organizations, has been released by the Department of Defense. This 131-page guide profiles 52 of what DOD considered the world's most dangerous terrorist groups.

The study is divided into geographic sections that begin with an overview, followed by coverage of the key regional terrorist groups. Information includes an estimate of each group's membership strength, identities of key leaders, ideological orientation, target audiences, a narrative description of the groups' background and a selected incident chronology.

Officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which compiled the guide, identify the Libyan-based Abu Nidal Organization as the most dangerous terrorist organization in existence. Libyan military dictator Colonel Muammar Al-Quadhafi is named the Middle Eastern region's most notorious practitioner of terrorism.

Following the 1986 U.S. air strike against Libya, detectable Libyan involvement in terrorist activity decreased significantly. However, the study points out that there are signs that Libyan involvement in terrorism may again be on the rise.

Terrorism is essentially a tactic—a form of political warfare designed to achieve political ends. As the study states, "Whether the terrorists style themselves as separatists, anarchists, dissidents, nationalists, Marxist revolutionaries, or religious true belivers, what marks them as terrorists is that they direct their violence against noncombatants with the goal of terrorizing a wider audience than the immediate victims, thereby attempting to gain political influence over the larger audience."

The study also presents a description of what it labels the "variants" of terrorism among its participants.

The biggest challenge to the United States is state-sponsored terrorism. This is direct sponsorship or abetment of terrorist groups and their actions by sovereign states. Iran, Afghanistan, Libya and North Korea are termed the most notorious state sponsors of terrorism.

One DOD official said there has been an ongoing debate about whether terrorism is a national security problem or a nuisance. When one looks at the study, one can see that terrorism is definitely a national security problem.

The study will be distributed to embassies, law enforcement organizations and public libraries. It is for sale from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

# Training the New Military Police Soldier

*Captain Thomas H. Tatum*

Training new military police soldiers does not end after one station unit training (OSUT). Upon graduation from military police OSUT at Fort McClellan, Alabama new military police soldiers depart as highly-trained, confident and motivated soldiers ready to serve their country. They have just completed seventeen weeks of challenging and demanding training and are ready to go to work.

The new soldiers know the fundamentals of being MPs, but they lack experience and proficiency. They may have difficulty initially in meeting the requirements and standards of their first unit.

Gaining unit commanders should consider establishing orientation or training programs to successfully integrate new soldiers into their units. The program should not be to retrain new military police soldiers but instead should reinforce and sustain previously learned skills.

Prior to developing a unit training program for new military police soldiers, leaders must understand and recognize a few facts regarding recent military police OSUT graduates.

While attending training at Fort McClellan, soldiers receive instruction and testing on most of the common tasks and basic military police subjects required for skill level one military police soldiers. One station unit training does not teach soldiers every common task or military police skill level one subject.

Soldiers must attend all training and pass all written and performance tests. However, the training brigade may waive some training and tests if the soldier demonstrates motivation and potential to be a quality soldier. Weapons qualification cannot be waived. Every soldier must qualify with the M-16 rifle and 9mm pistol to graduate from OSUT. Also, male soldiers must qualify with the .45-caliber pistol and female soldiers must qualify with the .38-caliber revolver prior to graduation.

Another consideration for a unit training program is that soldiers simply forget many subjects and skills learned during OSUT, especially complex tasks that require continued practice and repetition. To reduce learning decay, soldiers must pass a comprehensive end-of-course test prior to graduation. While the test significantly reduces learning decay, the fact remains that soldiers cannot retain everything they learn at OSUT.

## Physical Fitness

Perhaps the most important subject that concerns unit commanders regarding new soldiers is physical fitness and weight control. Many trainees arrive at Fort McClellan physically unfit and overweight. To increase overall physical fitness soldiers must participate in a rigorous developmental physical training program during the entire seventeen-week training cycle. Each soldier must pass the Army physical fitness test (APFT) to graduate from OSUT. Some soldiers do not pass the final APFT.

If a soldier fails the final APFT but has shown progressive improvements in physical fitness and demonstrates potential to be a quality soldier, the training brigade commander can grant a waiver and allow the soldier to graduate. A few soldiers who successfully complete OSUT leave overweight.

## Weight Control

Soldiers attending OSUT are not subject to the requirements of AR 600-9, *The Army Weight Control Program.* They are required to meet only the weight requirements of AR 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness.* Soldiers who depart Fort McClellan overweight will recive a letter addressed to the gaining unit commander explaining the soldier's overweight status. Once overweight soldiers complete OSUT, they are subject to AR 600-9, and gaining unit commanders may put them on the overweight program.

New soldiers will report to their new units with records of all completed training and qualifications, to include all applicable forms, scorecards and waivers.

## Useful Publications

Several training publications are available to assist commanders and leaders in developing unit training programs for new military police soldiers. Perhaps the most useful publications are STP 19-95B23-SM-TG, *Military Police Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide* and FC 19-127, *Unit Law Enforcement Training After OSUT.* These publications list all training soldiers receive during OSUT and outline training requirements for gaining units. FC 19-127 also offers suggestions and examples for developing after-OSUT unit training programs.

Other useful publications are as follows: STP 19-95B1-SM, *Military Police Soldier's Manual;* STP 21-1-SMCT, *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks;* FM 25-2, *Unit Training Management;* and FM 25-3, *Training in Units.*

New military police soldiers will arrive at their first units as apprentices with a basic knowledge of their duties. It is the responsibility of unit commanders and leaders to enhance learned skills through training and develop soldiers into fully qualified and capable military police.

The health and success of the Military Police Corps and the Army depend on this. Without highly trained, technically and tactically proficient soldiers, failure on the battlefield is certain.

**Captain Thomas H. Tatum was a student in the Military Police Officer Advanced Course, Fort McClellan, AL, at the time this article was written.**

# Warrant Officer Training

Warrant officers in MOS 311A should be aware DA Pamphlet 600-11, *Warrant Officer Professional Development,* has been updated. The current version is dated August 21, 1989. This pamphlet describes the revised Warrant Officers Training System and professional development programs and policies for warrant officers.

USAMPS has developed a Reserve Component version of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course (WOTTCC). Personnel throughout the CID reserve system should be aware that it is now available. The course consists of twenty-three subcourses followed by two weeks of resident training at USAMPS, Fort McClellan, Alabama.

If you have any questions regarding the course, contact the USAMPS Warrant Officer Training Branch at AV 865-3155. Reserve warrant officer candidates must enroll in the WOTTCC-Reserve Component (RC) through the Army Reserve Personnel Center; telephone 1-800-233-5242 for more information.

The CID Senior Warrant Officer Training Course does not have a Reserve Component version. Eligible reservists who require the senior level training may complete the four week Active Component Senior Warrant Officer Training Course—attending two phases at USAMPS. Eligibility requirements and RC application procedures for the course are outlined in DA Pamphlet 600-11.

# The NCO's March in Army History

While serving as Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr. once said, "Often it serves to reflect on history to find direction for the future."

For the military officer such a statement probably comes as no surprise. The tactics and maneuvers of past battles are often studied as a matter of course. The biographies of past military leaders are read for insights into the secrets of leadership.

In officer education, history is no stranger because knowledge of the past often becomes a lesson for the future.

As the NCO is spotlighted this year, NCO history can have a useful role. It can offer a source of information for officers and a source of pride for NCOs. That, in turn, can lead to a stronger NCO corps in the future—a result of some importance to the Army.

### Narrowing the Focus

This article will narrow the focus of Army history to just the NCO. It will not attempt to be comprehensive since the length would be prohibitive. Rather, the scope will be highlights and important developments in NCO history.

First of all the original idea of the NCO in military forces is definitely not an American idea. The concept started well before this nation was ever formed. In fact a rough equivalent of NCOs can even be traced all the way back to the Roman armies and their system of "clerks."

The team sergeant as applied to one who had the duties of a noncommissioned officer can be tracked to the French armies of the mid-1400s. At that time, the equivalent of the senior NCO of each "company" unit was titled the "serjeant." Assisting was a "caporal," a term derived from an Italian phrase that meant head of a squad. The term eventually evolved into our rank of corporal.

### Essential Link

By the early 1700s the various ranks of noncommissioned officer were firmly established. They were recognized as important positions which helped control an army and helped assure that the orders of officers were executed.

The NCO was evolving into an indispensable link between the officers and soldiers. As the leader closest to the enlisted men, the NCO was respected and trusted by the soldiers.

For the officers, the NCO was the reliable source that steadied an army and communicated directly with the troops.

It's no wonder that Rudyard Kipling eventually wrote in his poem "The Heathen" that "the backbone of the Army is the noncommissioned man."

### The American Scene

Thus, when the American Army came into existence in 1775 (as the Continental Army), there was already a defined role for the NCO. The militias of the thirteen colonies were organized along the lines of the British Army. Naturally, that influenced the use and responsibility of the NCOs.

However, that didn't mean the American NCO became a carbon copy of the British NCO during the Revolutionary War.

In fact, the American NCO, like the American Army itself, became a unique blend of traditions from several different European Armies and our own colonial traditions and heritage.

One reason for the blend, and perhaps the greatest initial influence on the forming of a truly American NCO corps, was a gentleman from Prussia. The man was Major General Friedrich W.A. von Steuben.

### The Blue Book

The "Blue Book"—officially called the *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*—was the first printed Army regulation. The Continental Congress approved it in 1779.

Containing instructions to all ranks, it explicitly defined the duties and responsbilities of NCOs. One instruction made the point that it is "on the noncommissioned officers that the discipline and order of a company in a great measure depend."

As old as this original regulation is, it established principles of the NCO-soldier relationship that exist even today. For instance, the NCO duties of training troops and caring for them have roots in the Blue Book.

### Developing the Corps

With the base of the NCO corps firmly established during the American Revolution, the years which followed were a time of development. Change was more gradual than sudden.

Rank structure, for instance, remained relatively simple up to 1900. The NCO hierarchy in rank was basically regimental sergeant major, company sergeants and corporals.

Among the company sergeants was the first sergeant. The first sergeant could be distinguished by the uniform—epaulets and a crimson waist sash.

It was also during the 1800s that a number of specific administrative tasks led to specialized NCO positions. Thus the creation of such ranks as the ordnance sergeant, commissary sergeant, hospital steward and even an electrical sergeant toward the end of the century of course).

### Regimental Promotions

What about promotions for NCOs in the nineteenth century? How were they handled?

Well, from the American Revolution to just before World War II NCO promotions were handled quite differently than today. There was not Armywide promotion, but rather a regimental system. The regimental commander promoted NCOs—and the stripes stayed with the unit, not the individual.

This meant that when NCOs transferred from one regiment to another, the rank didn't go with them. In order to have the NCO grade transfer with the individual, the approval of the Army's top general was required. That didn't happen too often.

It's no wonder then that NCOs often spent their entire careers with just one regiment.

### Combat Role

Regardless of the rank or regiment of an NCO, when it came to the battlefield the noncommissioned officer had a definite leadership and discipline role. That was true in all the wars and skirmishes leading up to the Civil War.

The Civil War itself only further enhanced the combat leadership responsibilities of the NCO. On battlefields from Shiloh to Gettysburg it was the NCO who led the lines of skirmishers into the fire of the enemy.

It was also the NCO who carried the national flag as well as the regimental colors. This was a necessary job so units could be aligned properly in the field and commanders could easily identify units and direct their movement.

The Indian Wars in the latter part of the century also added to the NCO's role as combat leader. Because most of the fighting was in the form of small unit skirmishes and the soldiers were often raw recruits, the NCO expertise proved invaluable. Valuable, too was the battlefield courage frequently displayed by the NCOs, as attested to by numerous Medals of Honor during this time.

### Turning the Century

As the United States entered the twentieth century, technological changes were underway that would have a great effect on military forces. That led to substantial change in the Army.

Weaponry became more sophisticated. The organization of forces became more complex. Military tasks became more varied and numerous. The noncommissioned officer felt the effects.

Although the enlisted structure didn't change that much, it did have to expand to meet new requirements. The NCO jobs grew significantly in number beyond the regimental level. The result was staff NCO positions in battalions and specialized NCOs (e.g., supply, mess and so forth) down to the company, battery or troop level.

When the United Stated entered the World War I, the NCO corps faced more change. A relatively small Army (about 410,000 soldiers in June, 1917) expanded into a massive force. Army manpower eventually numbered 3.5 million at the height of our involvement.

That increase in soldiers caused a great dilution of experienced NCOs across the Army. NCOs were stripped from many of the regular units to staff and train the hundreds of newly created units. Eventually, four million soldiers were trained by NCOs during World War I.

The constant turnover resulted in confusion in the ranks and a loss of prestige for the NCO corps. The whole enlisted structure came under fire as a system that had outgrown its time. Congress and the War Department came up with a solution in 1920.

The National Defense Act of 1920 standardized the rank system for enlisted soldiers. It created five noncommissioned officer ranks—master sergeant, technical sergeant, staff sergeant, sergeant and corporal. A first sergeant was comparable in rank to the technical sergeant.

The Act also established the position of warrant officer, a rank outside of the enlisted structure but one which NCOs could aim for if they chose to.

### A Time of Demotions

Though the National Defense Act brought the rank system up to date, NCOs remaining in the Army after World War I faced a period of demotions rather than promotions. In 1922 alone, 1,600 NCOs were scheduled for reduction in rank.

This occurred because of the huge reductions in the Army once the war ended and because as units were disbanded an NCO's stripes were lost. Transferring to the next unit meant going there as a private.

As an example, one soldier who had enlisted in 1908 rose in rank until he was first lieutenant in World War I. After the war he was demoted to first sergeant, then to sergeant, to corporal, and finally to private. When he eventually retired, after 32 years of service, he was back up to a corporal. And his ratings had always been "excellent" along the way.

### At War Again

America's mobilization for World War II was another big jump for the NCO corps. NCOs not only greatly increased in number, but also as a percentage of the total force.

Thus, as the war began NCOs accounted for twenty percent of all enlisted soldiers. By 1945 that figure rose to nearly fifty percent.

The NCO's role as a trainer was especially emphasized during the war. All basic training was conducted by NCOs. When soldiers were then sent to units, the NCOs there continued to train them.

Of course, as in all past wars, the NCO performed admirable and bravely on the battlefield. Whether in Europe or in the Pacific, tales of NCO courage were numerous. Testimony to that fact can be found in any listing of medals, awards or other combat recognitions of that combat period.



### New Emphasis

The years after World War II saw new areas of emphasis for NCOs. With regimental promotions now a thing of the past, Armywide standards for NCO selection became important. Also receiving attention was the idea of NCO education.

Army professional schools for NCOs were one result of the educational emphasis.

An NCO school opened up in Germany in 1949, and two years later became the Army's first true noncommissioned officers academy. That idea snowballed and within eight years more than 180,000 soldiers would attend NCO academies in the United States.

Within the expertise requirements and educational needs of NCOs growing fast as the Army entered a hightech age, NCO ranks expanded. In 1958 two NCO grades were added—the grades of E-8 and E-9. They were an added career incentive for retention of the best NCOs.

### Key Leaders

Meanwhile, the battlefields of the fifties and sixties were found in Korea and Vietnam. Once more the NCO played a key role. Small unit combat more than ever, down even to the squad level, placed great challenges on the junior leader.

The NCO responded to the challenges.

From Yongsan and Kujangdong in Korea, to Song Be and La Chu in Vietnam, the stories of NCO combat exploits are plentiful. The stories tell of leadership and heroism under the most difficult combat situations.

The creation of the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course during the Vetnam War was an effort to provide potential NCOs with needed combat leadership skills. Ten weeks of schooling followed by ten additional weeks of training gave the new sergeant a chance to prepare for the rigors of battlefield leadership.

### New Positions

NCO leadership within the ranks was enhanced in 1966 when the position of Sergeant Major of the Army was created. The following year the command sergeant major position was established and the NCO ranks took the basic shape we know today.

Also taking shape, a few years later, was the mold for future NCO education—the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

The trend toward greater NCO education was formalized even more with the advent of NCOES. Education was linked directly to NCO promotions and the several levels of training of NCOES helped one advance in the enlisted ranks.

A culmination of sorts was achieved in 1987 with the completion of the new Sergeants Major Academy building at Fort Bliss, Texas. The new and better facilities allow for greater expansion of the flagship NCO courses taught there.

### Past and Future

The Army NCO has come a long way since the days of Valley Forge and the teachings of Steuben. This article has touched but a few highlights of that journey.

The Army's plan for the future is to futher develop and strengthen the corps.

But whatever conclusions are drawn or whatever recommendations are made for the future path for NCOs, you can bet that the lessons of history will be some part of the equation. (*Officer's Call,* March-April 1989.)

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# Promotion and the Primary Leadership Development Course

Military police promotable specialists and corporals who have not graduated from the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) will not lose their status when PLDC became a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant on October 1, 1989, according to a recent Armywide rule change made to protect soldiers' eligibility for promotion while they wait for PLDC training seats.

Under modified rules, soldiers may continue to be recommended for promotion to sergeant even though they have not completed PLDC. Previously announced rules scheduled to take effect on October 1, 1989 would have required soldiers to complete PLDC before being recommended for promotion; it also would have removed non-PLDC graduate promotable specialists and corporals from recommended lists.

The change will allow commanders to recommend specialists and corporals for promotion to sergeant without regard to PLDC graduation.

However, they will not be promoted until they graduate from the course, even if they exceed the announced monthly military occupational specialty cutoff scores. In that case their promotion would be delayed until the first day of the month after they graduate from PLDC.

These interim rules will be lifted when enough PLDC seats are available to require soldiers to graduate before they may be recommended for promotion to sergeant.

The Army remains firmly committed to linking training to promotion but wants to ensure that deserving soldiers are not denied promotion-list standing because of matters beyond their control. (*Army Personnel Bulletin,* No. 1-89, January-March 1989)

# YEAR OF THE NCO

Throughout the history of our Army the NCO has played an indispensable role in the warfighting readiness of our force. Baron Von Steuben, in writing our first Army manual, known as the "Blue Book," acknowledged the importance of selecting the right soldiers as NCOs: "The order and discipline of a regiment depends so much upon their behavior, that too much care cannot be taken in preferring none to that trust but those who by their merit and good conduct are entitled to it."

Today, we continue to expect of our NCOs the highest professional standards and a diversity of knowledge in order to lead their soldiers in ensuring our Army is trained and ready. Tomorrow we shall expect no less.

NCOs provide the day-to-day leadership to our soldiers. They ensure individual soldiers attain and maintain the required standards of proficiency and link soldier performance to unit missions.

It is the NCO who must be certain of the soldier's ability to succeed in combat. With their officers, NCOs are responsible for the planning, execution, and assessment of training.

The NCO is both a leader and a role model. (Joint Proclamation, December 1988, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono, and Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates.)

# The Officer and the NCO: Who Does What?

*Major General Donald R. Infante*

*Master Sergeant Norman J. Oliver*

A key element to warfighting ability is creating effective relations between the officers and sergeants in your unit.

But the Army hasn't yet written the book that tells an officer how to use a sergeant or tells a sergeant how to support an officer. You can find a lot of platitudes, but you'll search the leadership manuals in vain for specific guidance or doctrine.

The Army's mission—to preserve the peace and freedom—gives direction to that relationship. And what does it take to get the mission done? Quality soldiers, modern weapons of war, organization and leadership.

Leadership turns the soldiers, equipment and organization of a unit into an outfit that can deploy, fight, win and return. Good leadership in the unit means its officers and NCOs must respond to their soldiers' expectations.

## Great Expectations

Just what do those soldiers expect?

First, they expect their officer and their sergeant to be good at their jobs.

Second, they expect both of you to have a high sense of duty. They expect more of their officers and their sergeants than themselves. They expect the officer and the sergeant to be selfless. They expect them to challenge the system. They expect you both to become a little bit more than what you really are.

Third, they expect you to be courageous. We're not just talking about physical courage in combat because that is a given. We're talking about moral courage: the ability to take on the system and the ability every so often to let things go

ng and not get overly excited about it. Many call this ing your soldiers the freedom to fail.

eeting those three expectations requires that the officer the sergeant back each other up, cover each other and ke sure the right things get done.

### Looking at Responsibility

he division of responsibilty for certain tasks falls about ty percent on the officer and forty percent on the sergeant. her responsibilities fall more heavily on the sergeant. A rd set falls about fifty-one percent on the officer and forty-ne percent on the sergeant.

actical proficiency falls most heavily on the officer. The ficer, especially the commander, has to be the unit's tacti-n. For lack of a better term, the sergeant has to be the it's technician of violence.

he officer must understand how to deploy the unit, how make sure it is in the right place at the right time to generate ximum violence on the battlefield. The officer has to make re all the right things are taking place and that the war-ghting focus is being maintained.

he sergeant has to be an expert on all the individual stems that are in the unit. The sergeant has to understand e weapons systems inside and out. The sergeant needs to ow what makes them go and how to fix them quickly when ey're broken.

### Training Roles

As with technical and tactical profiency, there is a tradi-nal division of labor when it comes to training. The of-cer's focus should be on collective training; the sergeant's cus should be on individual training.

he officer has to come up with the priorities about where e unit needs to go. But the sergeant has to share the of-cer's vision. He or she should be able to take that vision nd spread it out in detail among the soldiers and become e executor of that vision.

he officer has to be the resource obtainer, and that rimarily means soldiers and dollars. The officer has to ar-culate to the chain of command what it takes to train and aintain the unit.

he sergeant must be a good executor. He or she has to e in the unit making sure that people are not wasting or quandering resources. The sergeant has to see to it that oldiers are going about business efficiently.

### Professional Development

The division of responsibilities in professional develop-ment falls most heavily on the officer, especially the commander.

What you are expecting us to say is that the commander s responsible for officer professional development and the command sergeant major or first sergeant is responsible for NCO professional development.

Wrong.

The commander is responsible for both.

Noncommissioned officer professional development (NCOPD) is, and has to be, officer business. Your commander must be involved in NCOPD. If you don't get the commissioned officer chain involved in taking care of the noncommissioned officer corps, you're going to get short-changed in war-fighting ability.

Finally, certain responsibilities are shared almost equally. About fifty-one percent of the burden for these falls on the officer and about forty-nine percent on the sergeant. These responsibilities include

*Soldier and family care.* You can do a lot of things that aren't quite right and stumble now and then. Your soldiers will take care of you if they are sincerely convinced that you are taking care of them and you care about their families.

*Discipline and standards.* If either the officer or the sergeant sees a wrong and walks by, they have a set a new standard. You will never have a higher level of standards or a higher level of attainment than the officer and the sergeant jointly set. If the officer and the sergeant have different sets of standards, the unit as a whole will only rise to the lower level of the two.

*Command climate.* In some units the only freedom is the freedom to succeed. There must be the freedom to fail. Sometimes soldiers, particularly leaders, try to find a better way of doing things and make mistakes. Provided they don't make the same mistakes over and over, there's nothing wrong with that.

*Balance.* It isn't enough for the officer to be a great tactician and the sergeant to be a great technician. It's just as important to have a good reenlistment program, to do well on the Combined Federal Campaign, to be sure that services are pulled on time for your tanks and trucks, to have a good physical training program, and to have training holidays.

Balance and excellence are called for in all things a unit does. The officer and the sergeant have to make sure that their unit preserves that sense of balance. The officer will be good at some things, and the sergeant better at other things. We're made that way.

The officer and NCO relationship is like a marriage. When you're married you take care of your partner. And together you make sure all things come out right. *(Officer's Call,* March-April 1989).

**Major General Donald R. Infante was the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center, Fort Bliss, Texas, and Commandant of the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School at the time this article was written.**

**Master Sergeant Norman J. Oliver was the Project NCO for the Year of the NCO at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and its public affairs supervisor at the time this article was written.**

## Officer Management Planning

The Army Chief of Staff recently reviewed Active Army officer management programs in a series of lengthy and detailed briefings to determine how best to execute the remaining cuts (one thousand officers) the officer corps must take for fiscal years (FY) 1989 and 1990.

First, the Army will exercise the selective early retirement (SER) provisions of law in FY89 and perhaps in FY90 as well. This tough decision is necessary to reduce a significant overage in senior end strength.

Second, steady accession flow must continue in order to maintain company-grade readiness and to ensure sufficient, qualified future leaders.

Next, career progression must also flow steadily to retain quality officers and build a healthy leadership structure in the senior grades.

To enhance career progression the Army has implemented policies to stabilize promotion timing, increase below-the-zone promotions to 7.5- to 10- percent selection rate, and eliminate caps on centralized command selections of officers from the first-time-considered category.

Selection boards will continue to be charged with picking the best.

However, over the next several years the Army will experience a lower promotion opportunity than originally envisioned under the Defense Office Personnel Management Act.

Application of this practice will not be aimed at any specific branch or group of branches; however, it may affect some more than others. This is necessary to stabilize the promotion pin-on point and provide equitable promotion opportunity to officers in each year group

In recent years the Military Police Corps has faired better than most branches, with selection rates higher than the Armywide average in twelve of the last eighteen promotion boards at the captain-to-colonel levels.

Finally, documented authorizations must mirror the aggregate officer inventory and congressionally mandated grade ceilings.

The Army Staff and major commands are working in concert to eliminate the field-grade overstructure and improve company-grade readiness.

In summary, these congressionally mandated officer cuts have required an intensive review of the Active Army officer management system.

These decisions represent the best ways to implement the directed cuts and ensure the long-term health of the Army officer corps. *(Army Personel Bulletin,* No. 1-89, January-March 1989)

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## Captain Promotion and CVI Selection Board

The Army has recently returned to an annual captain promotion and CVI (conditional voluntary indefinite) selection board. In light of this change, the next captain's board is scheduled to convene in March, 1990.

Because there was no September captain's board, a number of OTRA (other than Regular Army) officers will require extension for the purpose of being considered for promotion to captain and CVI selection. The above-mentioned population is composed of year group 1987 officers whose active duty obligation expires between October 1, 1989 and July 30, 1990.

Officers will not automatically be extended for promotion and CVI consideration as this population was in the past. Instead selection of officers to be extended is delegated to the first colonel in the officer's supervisory chain of command.

The colonel (delegated approval authority) will place the officers requiring extension into one of three categories: (1) extend, (2) do not extend, or (3) officer does not desire to extend. Only those officers wishing to remain on active duty past their initial obligation whose performance merits retention will be extended in order to compete for promotion to captain.

The recommendation for extension process should have occurred during the month of July. If you are a lieutenant within this population who has been erroneously omitted from extension consideration, alert your Personnel Service Company of MILPO immediately.

## United States Military Academy

Soldiers interested in becoming commissioned officers and graduates of the United States Military Academy (USMA), West Point, New York should review Army Regulation 351-12, *Nomination to the United States Military Academy: Enlisted Categories.*

Commanders should ensure the following items are included with the application form:

- Personal handwritten essay, subject: "Why I Want to Attend the Prep School and My Goals in Life;"
- Medical forms SF 88 (Report of Medical Examination) and SF 93 (Report of Medical History) not more than one year old;
- College and high school transcripts or GED certificate;
- GT score;
- Results of SAT (Scholastic Attitude Test) and ACT (American College Test) scores;
- ETS (expiration term of service) date;
- MOS;
- Current photograph;
- Most recent APRT result (baseline PT score cannot be accepted); and
- Commanders evaluation.

Soldiers who apply must be under twenty-one years of age prior to the course start date.

There are at present several USMA cadets who were military police before gaining acceptance.

Further information may be obtained by telephoning the USMAPS Admissions Officer at AUTOVON 992-1807, or by writing to the Commandant, US Military Academy Preparatory School, ATTN: MAPS-AD-A, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703. (Captain Ronald D. Reagan, Instructor and MP Branch Representative, USMA, West Point, NY.)

## Relocation Programs

At the last meeting of the Army Family Action Plan conference relocation assistance and sponsorship were selected as the top priorities for the coming year.

Additionally, greater publicity is in progress to create an understanding and awareness of program enhancements. Even in a climate of tight resourses there is much a commander can do to get maximum effectiveness from these programs.

The Army Community Service (ACS) Relocation Assistance Program helps soldiers and families plan and prepare before their move takes place.

Relocation assistance to departing soldiers is critical in facilitating wise moving decisions and reducing problems upon arrival at the gaining unit.

The program is designed to provide the essential professional expertise necessary to guide and educate soldiers on how to move and manage the complex process of relocation.

Predeparture planning and preparation are the keys to preventing the problems that gaining commanders contend with after the soldier arrives. ACS doesn't presume to be the expert in all areas of relocation.

Their job is to help soldiers and family members anticipate problems and moving requirements, then try to help find solutions.

The Army Sponsorship Program is unit-based and can work even if soldiers arrive without notice. It simply takes the element of caring and being there for the arriving soldier and family to help someone get settled. It is essential that each unit have a pool of trained sponsors who are given the time to actually sponsor.

In addition, the ACS Outreach Program is aimed at enhancing unit sponsorship efforts by targeting family members immediately after arrival and helping them integrate into the community as quickly as possible, This program should be viewed as an extension of the sponsorship process that takes place in the unit when soldiers and families arrive at their new duty station.

Relocation, Sponsorship, and Outreach are low-cost, high-return programs which work best when soldier sponsors, families and commanders take an active interest. These programs are strongly linked and must be fully implemented if they are to be effective.

The ACS Relocation Assistance Program provides the professional expertise soldiers need for their move, Sponsorship provides the essential "human touch," and Outreach provides the link to community caring. *(Army Personnel Bulletin,* No. 1-89, January-March 1989)

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## AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1989

| COMMANDER | CSM/SGM | UNIT | LOCATION |
|---|---|---|---|
| Larry Berrong | Don Hood | US DB | Ft Leavenworth, KS |
| James T. Rackstraw | Marion Clifton | Trng Bde | Ft McClellan, AL |
| Arnold Daxe, Jr. | Vincent A. Schenosky | USACB | Ft Riley, KS |
| Thomas Feuerborn | Thomas Davis | 8th MP Bde | Seoul, ROK |
| Lawrence Brede, Jr. | Devone Kinston | 16th MP Bde(Abn) | Ft Bragg, NC |
| Peter Hoffman | Thomas Harris, Jr. | 89th MP Bde | Ft Hood, TX |
| Paul Mouris | Jerry Lemke | 18th MP Bde | Frankfurt, FRG |
| Richard Pomager | Curtis Thomas | 14th MP Bde | Stuttgart FRG |
| George Powers | Terrance M. Seely, Sr. | 42d MP Group | Mannheim, FRG |
| Walter N. Ferguson III | Horst G. Lindenberg | 1st CID Rgn | Ft Meade, MD |
| Joel Leson | Thomas Smith | 2d CID Rgn | Heidelberg, FRG |
| Mark Mueller | John W. Brown | 3d CID Rgn | Ft Gillem, GA |
| Carl L. Lockett | Billy Vaughn | 6th CID Rgn | Presidio of SF, CA |
| Wilmer D. Snell | Herman L. Deavers | 7th CID Rgn | Yongsan, ROK |

## MP LIEUTENANT COLONEL COMMAND
## BATTALION LEVEL COMMAND DESIGNATED UNITS
## AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1989

| COMMANDER | CSM/SGM | UNIT | LOCATION |
|---|---|---|---|
| Donald J. Ryder | Roselle Robinson | 93d MP Bn | Frankfurt, FRG |
| Robert L. Baldwin | Joseph Cruz | 95th MP Bn | Mannheim, FRG |
| Herbert H. Tillery | Morgan Merrill | 385th MP Bn | Stuttgart, FRG |
| Michael L. Sullivan | James Killingsworth | 503d MP Bn (Abn) | Ft Bragg, NC |
| Richard R. Majauskas | Ronald Waitman | 504th MP Bn | Ft Lewis, WA |
| Michael K. Shanahan | James Slusser | 519th MP Bn | Ft Meade, MD |
| N. Wayne Ruthven | Karl L. Kreiger | 709th MP Bn | Frankfurt, FRG |
| George Jones, Jr. | James Armour | 716th MP Bn | Ft Riley, KS |
| Kenneth R. Wood | Gary N. Travis | 720th MP Bn | Ft Hood, TX |
| Jon F. Bilbo | Chester Warlick | 728th MP Bn | Taegu, ROK |
| Mary A. Maier | Forest Guess | 759th MP Bn | Ft Carson, CO |
| George Abraham | Richard M. Thrasher | 772d MP Bn | Seoul, ROK |
| David W. Foley | Bobby Henry | 793d MP Bn | Fuerth, FRG |
| Wayne C. Harris | Michael Davis | 795th MP Bn | Ft McClellan, AL |
| Robert V. Baker | Quillion Douthit | 40th MP Bn | Ft McClellan, AL |
| Michael P. Sudnik | Larry Gulick | 787th MP Bn | Ft McClellan, AL |
| James H. Reisenweber | Ellis C. Monk | 701st MP Bn | Ft McClellan, AL |
| Vickie S. Longnecker | Bert Arthur | 2d Bn, USACA | Ft Riley, KS |
| Ronald M. Zychowski | David Stalter | 3d Bn, USACA | Ft Riley, KS |
| Gregory A. Lowe | Steve Plimmer | MP Bn, USDB | Ft Leavenworth, KS |
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| Daniel A. Doherty | William Hileman | CID District | Frankfurt, FRG |
| Donald W. Tarter | Herman J. Gilader | CID District | Kaiserslautern, FRG |
| Richard F. Wistner | Owen T. Sheppard | CID District | Ft Bragg, NC |
| Charles H. Cogswell | Gary D. Stroud | CID District | Ft Hood, TX |
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